Turkey's foreign policy dilemma

Turkish-Israeli relations have deteriorated markedly in recent months. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticised Israel in an unprecedented way during the war on Gaza. He accused it of committing war crimes during a session on Gaza in Davos and left in protest against Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. Many in the Muslim world hailed Erdogan's "firm stand" against Israel; whereas others went as far as to anticipate a shift in Turkish foreign policy concerning both the US and Israel.

This shift, one must say, is unlikely to happen. Turkey's Islamist government will not challenge the long-established pro-Western stand adopted by the country's secular elite since the end of the Second World War. This is not to suggest, however, that Turkish Islamists have not tried to act according to their own beliefs, though change and restructuring of foreign policy in Turkey has always been a painful task.

Since their landslide parliamentary victory in November 2002, Turkey's Islamists have attempted to bring their country closer to the Arab and Islamic world after decades of almost total indifference. Yet, they favoured a normal foreign policy adjustment, which is usually slow and incremental, rather than a complete foreign policy restructuring, which involves a major shift in policy orientations at a relatively short period of time.

Turkey's Islamists came to realise soon, however, that foreign policy adjustment, not to mention restructuring, is an extremely difficult process wherein forces of continuity provide little room for any change.

Foreign policy is generally described as the external manifestation of domestic institutions, ideologies and other attributes of the polity. Hence, a state foreign policy is usually influenced by its bureaucracy, public opinion, ideology and the perceived national interests. In many states, government and state officials, lacking foreign policy expertise, rely on the permanent civil servants for information and advice.

Bureaucrats have, therefore, considerable influence on the making of foreign policy and their role in its implementation is also crucial. Bureaucrats may facilitate or block the implementation of a policy by slowing it or even refusing to act on it. In most cases they resist change and the stronger the bureaucracy the slower the process of change. In the case of Turkey the state bureaucracy is strongly centralised and is composed of both civilians and the military.

The foreign ministry is the key institution in foreign policy making where bureaucrats have significant influence. Turkey has also a National Security Council and through it the military exercises tremendous influence on foreign policy making. To make things worse for the Islamists, Turkey's bureaucrats, both civilian and military, are ardently secular and western-orientated. They loathed the coming of Islamists to power and have been doing their best to prevent change and keep the elected government at bay.

This leads us to the question of ideology which is considered a key factor in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. Decision-makers see international events through the lens of their ideological dispositions, according to which international events are interpreted. Ideology is also used to rationalise foreign policy decisions, which are often made on the basis of interpretations of national security interests, but are presented to the public as a reflection of certain values.

But ideology is not always the driving force in foreign policy making. In fact, states act according to national interests, rather than values based on an ideology. But as most cases show, the influence of ideology is pronounced more emphatically in states with strong bureaucracy.

If a state has an official ideology and a strong bureaucracy to implement it, it will be difficult to make changes in foreign policy. In Turkey, the ideology of the government is Islamist but the ideology of the state is secular. The attempt of the Islamists to challenge the ideology of the state is fiercely resisted by the bureaucracy, the military and the highly centralised political institutions. All have been trying to prevent the Islamists from defying the official agenda and change foreign policy in accordance with their ideological views.

The significance of public opinion is also relevant for any discussion on the internal sources of foreign policy making. But the impact of public opinion on this particular aspect of state activities is generally limited given the fact that the general public is less interested in foreign policy issues compared to domestic and economic matters. Public opinion is also easily manipulated by the political elite.

In addition, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making differs according to whether the state is authoritarian or democratic. In a domestically strong state, like Turkey, where centralised political institutions play a dominant role in the decision-making process, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making is minimal.

This did not allow the Islamists to make full use of the public support they received during the latest elections to adjust Turkey's foreign policy.

The last factor, which hinders the efforts of Turkish Islamists to change their country's foreign policy, is the instinct of survival. The memory of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey's first Islamist Prime Minister and his swift removal from power is still very much alive in the minds of Turkish Islamists.

Erbakan tried to challenge the logic of the secular state and adopt a more Islamic foreign policy. He was quickly brought down by the military junta.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in Media and International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science and Media in Damascus University in Syria.