Obama draws lessons from Bush setbacks

EVENT: US officials are preparing for the possibility of sidebar talks with Iranian representatives at the international conference on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31.

SIGNIFICANCE: President Barack Obama has many pressing matters on his foreign policy agenda, but the Middle East remains a focus. While he lacks the sweeping transformational objectives that former president George W. Bush adopted after September 11, 2001, his comparatively modest near-term goals have been unhindered by internal dissent.

The administration of former president George W. Bush largely failed to accomplish its ambitious aim of improving regional security by promoting "democratisation".

According to US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, Obama is "more analytical" than Bush and values a diversity of factual input, actively soliciting viewpoints.

The administration appears to have learned useful lessons from Bush's regional policy setbacks, and is unlikely to make the same mistakes.

ANALYSIS:

Just two months into his term in office, Obama has undertaken a series of high-profile moves designed to signal that the region is a priority, including: granting his first interview in office to Al Arabiya television; appointing former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell as Middle East special envoy; announcing that most US combat forces would leave Iraq by mid-2010; attempting to effect a rapprochement with Syria; and moderating the tone of US rhetoric towards Iran.

This suggests that the president intends to reshape Washington's approach to the Middle East, without repeating his predecessor's tendency to exaggerate the likely scope and pace of change. Yet the region's problems remain deeply entrenched. While the change in style may help increase regional receptiveness to the White House's leadership, progressing Obama's agenda will require difficult choices and hazarding political capital.

Bush-era setbacks:

The administration of former president George W. Bush largely failed to accomplish its ambitious aim of improving regional security by promoting "democratisation". Three chronic administration problems helped undermine this approach:

1. Privileging ideology. The influence of "neo-conservative" ideas on key policymakers was well documented. Many tenets of this ideology, such as a belief in the universal appeal of liberal democratic values, may have predisposed the administration to downplay the socially and historically rooted complexities of Middle Eastern societies - and their possible impact on US policy options.

2. Bureaucratic infighting. Neo-conservatives (chiefly at the Defense Department and White House) and traditional foreign policy "realists" (largely within the State Department) clashed over ideology and policy. This led to both a diversion of attention and resources and a blocking of bureaucratic channels, to the point where some crucial information on the regional effects of, and reactions to, US policy did not filter through to top decisionmakers.

3. Inconsistent policy application. These two factors helped make US Middle East policy highly inconsistent, in a manner that was clearly visible to, and exploited by, regional players. For example, in 2005-06, even as the administration pursued democratisation in Iraq and Lebanon, it assiduously avoided criticising the Saudi government on this issue and backed away from the result of the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Assembly elections. The administration strongly encouraged Egypt to hold fairer elections, but then made little protest about serious flaws and abuses in the process. Such inconsistencies, along with the decision not to make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a priority until the last year of Bush's tenure, undermined US credibility and political capital.

These three elements contributed to a string of policy setbacks that have complicated the Obama administration's task.

Obama priorities:

Obama's early statements suggest that he has four key priorities in the region:

1. Preserving Iraq gains. After four years of increasing chaos, Bush succeeded in effecting major security gains in Iraq, which have given Obama the opportunity rapidly to reduce US troop numbers. Obama faces the challenge of withdrawing US forces without jeopardising stability.

2. Managing Iran. The administration generally recognises that a policy of "regime change" in Iran only encourages Tehran's nuclear ambitions - and that it may need to recognise the regime's regional influence (to a degree) and assuage its security concerns, in order to convince Iran to curtail its nuclear programme. However, such a rapprochement will be more difficult if President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is prone to inflammatory rhetoric, secures re-election in June.

3. Re-engaged "peace process". Obama faces major challenges following the Gaza war and the rise of the Israeli Right in February's elections. The conflict has not reached its current level of acrimony in decades, and the two sides appear still to believe that they have more to gain through force than negotiation. The key to unlocking the problem may be re-establishing a degree of Palestinian political cohesion, and engaging neighbouring states and other secondary participants, particularly Syria.

4. Restoring US credibility. A key reason for Bush's ineffectiveness was his unpopularity among most ordinary Arab citizens, which made it difficult for their governments overtly to embrace US policies. Despite the lack of democracy in the region, public opinion matters.

Reasons for optimism: Early indications suggest that Obama seems to have learned from the Bush administration's travails:

According to Defence Secretary Robert Gates, Obama is "more analytical" than Bush and values a diversity of factual input, actively soliciting the views of those who remain quiet in Cabinet meetings.

There is little sign of internal ideological conflict - for the most part, the president and his advisers seem to be on the same page.

His initial moves appear to show an understanding of the interconnected nature of many of the region's problems, especially the toxic influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

His change in tone has begun to make a difference in terms of public diplomacy and US "soft power".

This change in approach seems to have permeated private as well as public diplomacy, as the administration has sought engagement with Syria. He is also reaching out tentatively to Iran by suggesting that it could play a positive role in ensuring security in Iraq and Afghanistan - while simultaneously laying the groundwork to bring further pressure to bear over Tehran's nuclear programme through new overtures to Russia.

Potential challenges: However, the administration may have its own potential liabilities and blind spots, which could undermine its regional agenda:

Maintaining Arab support. Although domestic concerns demanded they keep it under wraps, many members of the conservative ruling elite in countries such as Saudi Arabia were quietly satisfied by Bush's decision to topple Saddam Hussain and take a hardline against Iran (although they also feared a potential US-Iranian confrontation). Some Arab leaders may be sceptical of an Obama agenda that seeks to engage Iran and its allies in the region, such as Syria and Hezbollah. Initially, many have lined up to support the White House's engagement agenda - Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud and Ahmadinejad held talks on March 4 - but this may not last.

Perceived "weakness". Obama may be perceived as less likely to use force, especially as his focus shifts to Afghanistan. This may prompt foreign policy boldness or "testing" behaviour from states such as Iran.

Policy coordination. Obama has outsourced many tasks to seasoned deputies such as Mitchell. Such a strategy presents certain management risks, as strong personalities clash over who controls particular policy areas.

Diplomatic disappointment. Iran (and possibly Syria) may choose to ignore the administration's diplomatic overtures. Although the administration has begun to make certain moves suggesting means of increasing international pressure, if this occurs, it may be insufficient to deter Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

Conclusion: The administration appears to have learned useful lessons from Bush's regional policy setbacks, and is unlikely to make the same mistakes. However, it may not have sufficiently probed its own assumptions and planned for contingencies in the event that its regional diplomatic push fails to advance its policies on Iran, Syria and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.