Zuma set to lead ANC to poll victory

EVENT: The National Prosecuting Authority last week formally dropped all charges against ANC leader Jacob Zuma.

SIGNIFICANCE: Zuma is now set to assume office as state president unencumbered by any pending legal proceedings, following the ANC's anticipated victory in the April 22 general election.

Zuma's partial vindication may bring short term gains for South Africa's political stability but long term concerns about the credibility and integrity of South Africa's institutions will remain.

The withdrawal of charges against Zuma comes conveniently close to the April 22 general election.

Depending on how well or badly it polls, COPE could be vulnerable to implosion, fragmentation into other parties and re-absorption in to the ANC.

ANALYSIS:

During the past eight years, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has investigated and at various times charged Jacob Zuma for alleged corruption. The charges have arisen from his relationship to Schabir Shaik, Zuma's financial adviser, who was convicted of fraud in 2005.

The foundation of the NPA's case was 1,000 payments totalling 4 million rand (Dh1.5 million) made by Shaik to Zuma, allegedly to get him to use his political appointments to further Shaik's business ventures. In the latest case against Zuma, the charges amounted to 16 counts of fraud, corruption and racketeering.

The underlying basis for Zuma's defence was that the investigation was manipulated by former President Thabo Mbeki, who was determined to discredit Zuma so that he could not succeed to the ANC presidency and hence the state presidency.

The NPA made its decision to drop the case on the grounds that new evidence presented by Zuma's legal team vindicates his claim of political interference.

The key evidence is taped telephone conversations between former Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) head Leonard McCarthy (now head of a World Bank anti-corruption unit in Washington) and individuals outside the NPA, principally the former director of public prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka.

The tapes clearly indicate that McCarthy conspired with Ngcuka to time the latest version of charges against Zuma to the advantage of former president Mbeki before the ANC conference at Polokwane in December 2007. There is no conclusive evidence that Mbeki was party to the manipulation, but a number of people believe that the inference is very strong.

Zuma's partial vindication may bring short term gains for South Africa's political stability but long term concerns about the credibility and integrity of South Africa's institutions will remain.

The country remains divided between those who believe his innocence has been established (including the leadership of the ruling ANC alliance) and those (including acting NPA head Mokotedi Mpshe) who believe that Zuma is a wronged but not innocent man who has escaped on a technicality.

This largely follows the divide between those who believe that the rule of law has been vindicated and those who feel that it has been compromised and succumbed to political pressure.

Zuma and his advisers have two choices. They can:

Draw a line under the past by claiming that his (partial) vindication demonstrates the essential robustness of South Africa's institutions and that any irregularities were committed by a discredited old regime that is no longer in office; or

Appoint an independent enquiry into the manipulation of the prosecution against him, and into the arms deal, which is at the root of the allegations of corruption against him and Shaik in order to expose how political partiality infected the organs of state.

If Zuma opts for the former, he is open to the criticism that he merely wants to inherit the same tools that were used against him. If he chooses the latter, much could be exposed that is embarrassing to the ANC and himself. Given the ANC's conviction that all important state organs should be staffed with party appointees, it is likely to be the former and scepticism will continue about the integrity of South Africa's institutions.

The withdrawal of charges against Zuma comes conveniently close to the April 22 general election. Poll results from late last year indicated that less than half of ANC supporters believed in Zuma's innocence but a more recent ANC internal poll registered 66% support for the ruling party with only 6% being "soft" supporters (people who are worried about the implications of Zuma's leadership while still at this stage loyal to the ANC).

Only one independent poll has been quoted widely in the run up to the election. The pollster, Markinor, underestimated the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) votes in 2004 (the DA by more than 3 percentage points and the IFP by 2.5) but predicted the ANC's total to within 1 percentage point.

Markinor's March polling figures suggest that the ANC was already heading for another substantial victory before Zuma's charges were lifted. This could give a boost to the ANC but also motivate opposition supporters to turn out.

The breakaway Congress of the People (COPE) has not conclusively broken the mould of South Africa's electoral politics. COPE has been hampered by a slow start to its campaign, and is likely to be adversely affected by revelations of Mbeki's intrigues, since the party is composed principally of Mbeki-ite defectors from the ANC. Depending on how well or badly it polls, COPE could be vulnerable to implosion, fragmentation into other parties and re-absorption in to the ANC.

One possible exception to predictions of another big ANC victory is the Western Cape Province, where the DA scored strongly in recent municipal by-elections.

The DA's leadership of a ruling coalition in the Cape Town metropolitan authority has made a good base and showcase for its administrative capabilities. To hold both the city and the province would provide a strong base to increase the DA's standing nationally leading up to the 2014 general election.

From 1994 to 2004: the ANC won increasing percentages of votes cast (63.1 per cent in 1994 to 69.7 per cent in 2004), masking a declining percentage of support from the voting age population for the ruling party (53.8 per cent in 1994 to 39 per cent in 2004);

The percentage of the voting age population voting for opposition parties also declined sharply (from 32.1 per cent in 1994 to 16.9 per cent in 2004); and

The percentage of the eligible population abstaining rose from 14 per cent in 1994 to 43.9 per cent in 2004.

However, it is possible that this trend of dropping participation may have slowed or even have gone into reverse:

The percentage of eligible voters registering has gone up from 75 per cent to 77 per cent, possibly as a result of heightened political interest caused by the fierce struggle for ANC leadership succession and the COPE breakaway.

Data show that 18-29 year olds account for a higher proportion of registered voters (27 per cent) than their share of the population as a whole (23 per cent).

The ANC may lose a few per cent of the votes cast, but improve on its broad claim to represent the electorate by comparison with 2004, if:

The turnout of registered voters this month stabilises at around the 2004 turnout figure of 76.7 per cent or climbs back towards the 1999 figure (89.3 per cent); and

Markinor's poll predictions are as accurate as they were in 1999 and 2004. Such an outcome would be interpreted as a strong endorsement for the new, post-Mbeki ANC and could be used as an argument for policy change in the competition for influence in the ruling party after the election.

CONCLUSION:

The lifting of charges against Zuma will boost chances of a strong ANC showing in the April 22 election. Nevertheless, long-term doubts about the integrity of South Africa's institutions remain.