An insider's view

Jack O'Connell, a trained attorney and former CIA agent stationed in Amman who became King Hussain's "lawyer" after he retired from the agency, does not mince words in this fascinating book that should be read by those who are interested in Arab leaders.

To say that the book is provocative is an understatement, especially as the key period when O'Connell worked in Jordan — 1963-1971 — witnessed key developments, including the catastrophic Six Day War.

The story of whether O'Connell "kept King Hussain in power" by alerting him to coup plots against the monarch will have to await the declassification of government documents in both Washington and Amman. Suffice it to say that the young ruler relied on the equally young and eager attorney to explain Byzantia-on-the-Potomac, which O'Connell managed rather well and which landed him a lucrative relationship after his formal retirement from the agency in 1971, which continued until after King Hussain's death in 1999.

The book contains myriad gems that will thrill the reader, even though most highlight Arab naivete. Apparently, president Lyndon Johnson "authorised" Israel to attack Egypt, Syria and Jordan "preventively" in 1967 (p50), which is widely known but always denied.

Tragically, when Israel launched a naval assault on the USS Liberty and killed 34 American sailors, Washington buried the story, as third-rate officials such as Dean Rusk and Eugene Rostow advanced "strategic" arguments. No Arab official ever refuted these blatant interferences.

In the event, after O'Connell, then the CIA station chief in Amman, alerted King Hussain of imminent conflict a day before operations were launched, the monarch sent word to Jamal Abdul Nasser. However, according to O'Connell, Nasser seldom trusted King Hussain (though the feeling was mutual) and did not believe the report (p59) — a perfect example as to why sometimes one does not need to have enemies.

Equally perplexing is O'Connell's assertion that "Henry Kissinger instigated the 1973 war against Israel by the Egyptians so that the United States could negotiate a ceasefire and begin a process which would remove Egypt as an enemy of Israel", though neither Anour Al Sadat, nor any other Arab leader, ever objected.

Still, because King Hussain wanted an end to all hostilities, he relentlessly pursued secret negotiations with the Israelis. However, he found only obstructionism, because neither Israel nor the US wanted genuine peace.

O'Connell considers Kissinger to be a hypocrite and not only charges him with fomenting the October 1973 war (pages 110-129), but also for setting the groundwork for neocons to do Israel's "dirty work".

This is what happened with Saddam Hussain in 1990, the author claims, when one of the available options was to negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Needless to say, the option was not applied, nor was King Hussain given a chance to resolve the conflict.

Although the author believes that Hussain Bin Talal was betrayed, as the likes of George Shultz and Richard W. Murphy expressed low opinions of the Jordanian (pages 151-153) — only Jimmy Carter trusted the king (p139) — O'Connell's most interesting revelations come towards the end of the book, when he discusses the monarch's relationship with Iraq's Saddam Hussain.

Despite the Baath regime's abhorrence of everything that touched upon the Hashemite monarchy, Saddam Hussain respected the Jordanian and displayed utmost courtesy by accompanying him to lay a wreath at King Faisal II's grave every time King Hussain visited Baghdad (p162).

This is one of the few Western sources that report a human story on the former Iraqi strongman, emphasising that King Hussain had a good deal of influence over him.

O'Connell is explicit in his many criticisms of Israel and asserts that "Jewish sources in the United States" drafted various media memos against Iraq throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Needless to say that the Consigliere identifies American neocons as those who poisoned George H.W. Bush's relationship with King Hussain to the point when the president would no longer value his "friendship" (p179). At one point, O'Connell reveals that the king eventually distanced himself from Baghdad, but he does not tell us if the monarch was threatened by the US and/or Israel (p199).

The author closes his memoir with a couple of frank assessments, including how Washington succeeded in making many enemies in the Arab world, especially as several administrations relied on men such as Dennis B. Ross, "a pro-Israeli" State Department official (p215), or Paul Wolfowitz, a well-connected neocon who enjoyed a near monopoly in Washington political circles. These men, he contends, "didn't know what they were talking about, [as] the only contact they had with the Middle East was with Israel" (p221).

There are many gems sprinkled throughout the book which ought to interest those who hold naïve views as to who actually influences the area.

Read and weep.

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian is the author of the forthcoming Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (2012).

King's Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East by Jack O'Connell, with Vernon Loeb, WW Norton & Company, 266 pages, $26.95.