Trump weighs riskiest Iran mission yet: Race to seize nuclear fuel

Dubai: As the war with Iran intensifies, US President Donald Trump is increasingly focused on what may be the most dangerous decision of the conflict — whether to launch a ground operation to seize or destroy Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

Repeatedly over recent days, Trump has argued that Tehran was on the verge of building a nuclear weapon and could use it within “one hour or one day,” according to remarks reported by The New York Times. That claim is disputed by experts and even some US intelligence officials, who have long assessed that while Iran has the material, turning it into a weapon would take months, if not longer.

Still, the focus on the stockpile reflects a shifting reality. After nearly three weeks of US and Israeli strikes that have degraded much of Iran’s conventional military capability, its nuclear material has emerged as one of its last strategic assets — and a central concern for Washington.

According to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran is believed to possess about 440.9 kilogrammes of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, stored across multiple underground and clandestine facilities. Roughly half is thought to be buried deep near Isfahan, with the rest possibly hidden at sites such as Natanz, Fordow or a location known as “Pickaxe Mountain.”

This creates a dilemma. Leaving the material in place carries risks: Iran could attempt a rapid “dash” to build a crude nuclear device, reconstitute enrichment capabilities over time, or — in a worst-case scenario — lose control of the stockpile if the regime weakens, raising fears of proliferation to non-state actors.

But removing it is no simple task.

As The New York Times reports, any attempt to seize the material would rank among the boldest and most complex US military operations in modern history — far riskier than the 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The uranium is believed to be stored deep underground in sealed canisters. If breached, the gas inside could be both toxic and radioactive, posing immediate danger to troops.

There are also major intelligence gaps. Officials are not certain where all the material is located, and experts warn that Iran may have created decoys — potentially multiplying the number of containers that special forces would have to identify and secure.

“The Iranians understand the US and Israel want to destroy or seize this material,” nuclear analyst George Perkovich said, noting that Tehran is likely to have planned defensive measures in advance.

The operational challenges are immense. CSIS notes that such a mission would require precise intelligence, total air superiority, and a coordinated plan for handling the nuclear material once secured. Unlike past operations such as Project Sapphire — a 1994 US-led effort to remove uranium from Kazakhstan — this would take place in an active war zone without the host country’s consent.

Even transporting the material poses risks. The uranium is believed to be stored as uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a volatile compound that can react dangerously if exposed to air. Extracting it would likely require specialised protective gear, sealed transport systems and large cargo aircraft operating in contested airspace.

Despite these dangers, the pressure to act is growing. Experts warn that ending the war without addressing the stockpile could leave behind what one analyst described as a “weakened but embittered regime” — one potentially more determined to develop a nuclear weapon.

Yet there are alternatives. Before the conflict escalated, Iran had floated a proposal to dilute its enriched uranium under international supervision while keeping it inside the country — an idea rejected by US negotiators, who insisted the material must be removed entirely.

For now, there is little sign of a diplomatic off-ramp. Trump himself has sent mixed signals — at times suggesting ground operations are not a concern, while also refusing to say whether he is ready to authorise such a move.

What is clear is that the war has entered a new phase. No longer just about strikes and retaliation, it is now centred on a single, high-stakes question: what to do with the material that could determine whether Iran becomes a nuclear power — or is prevented from ever crossing that threshold.