Iran is running out of money. Can Trump’s ‘economic D-Day’ force a deal?

Dubai: Six months into the Iran war, Donald Trump may finally have something that has repeatedly eluded him: Real leverage over Tehran.

Iran’s oil revenues are being squeezed, its currency has plunged beyond two million rials to the dollar and senior officials are publicly warning that the economy cannot withstand indefinite pressure.

Now Washington is trying to tighten the noose further.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s newly announced “economic D-Day” is designed to attack virtually every remaining route through which money reaches Tehran — from oil sales and ship-to-ship transfers to disguised financial transactions and movements of gold.

But unlike earlier sanctions campaigns, the financial offensive is being reinforced by American warships.

The US Navy is simultaneously trying to prevent Iran from exporting oil while escorting tankers from other countries through the Strait of Hormuz along the southern route near Oman, according to The Telegraph.

That combination could fundamentally alter the balance of the war.

Earlier in the conflict, Iran had achieved an extraordinary advantage: It continued exporting its own crude while severely restricting other countries’ tankers through Hormuz.

Between February 28 and the first ceasefire on April 8, Iran exported about 1.8 million barrels per day, according to The Telegraph — actually above its 2025 daily average of around 1.7 million barrels.

Now that advantage is disappearing.

The clearest evidence of Tehran’s predicament has come from Iran’s own leadership.

Abdolnaser Hemmati, governor of Iran’s central bank, acknowledged last week: “It is a reality that we are not exporting oil.”

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker and one of its most powerful political figures, issued an even starker warning.

“No matter how much military power we have, if people are hungry, and we do not have financial circulation and economic growth, we will not endure,” he said.

Then President Masoud Pezeshkian appeared to signal that Tehran should consider ending the conflict, saying it would be better to bring the war to an end while Iran remained in a position of “power and dignity”.

The comments suggest economic pressure is reaching a level where Tehran’s leaders are being forced to confront the cost of continuing the war.

But that does not mean Iran is about to capitulate.

Maintaining the pressure carries a substantial cost for Washington too.

The US Navy must enforce the blockade while simultaneously protecting commercial shipping through one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

The strain is illustrated by the USS Abraham Lincoln, which is finally being relieved after an extraordinarily long deployment that included more than 270 days at sea without touching land, The Telegraph reported.

Its replacement by the USS George Washington also leaves the US without a carrier deployed in the Pacific.

That raises a crucial question for Trump: Can America maintain the pressure for longer than Iran can withstand it?

Tehran may calculate that Washington’s global military commitments eventually make the blockade harder to sustain.

And Iran retains another option — escalation.

Its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones gives it the ability to threaten shipping or regional energy infrastructure, potentially driving oil prices higher and increasing pressure on Washington and its Gulf partners to seek an agreement.

Iran’s threats this week to fine or confiscate ships travelling through Hormuz underline that danger.

There is another potential escape route for Tehran: Beijing.

China bought more than 80 per cent of Iran’s exported oil in 2025, according to The New York Times, making Chinese cooperation crucial to Washington’s attempt to sever Tehran’s remaining economic lifelines.

Yet Bessent conspicuously avoided naming China when he threatened secondary sanctions against countries continuing to do business with Iran.

That is no small omission.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to visit Washington next month, and Trump must decide how aggressively he is willing to confront Beijing over Iranian oil while simultaneously managing disputes over trade, Taiwan and technology.

China’s purchases of Iranian crude have already fallen substantially — from about 1.4 million barrels per day before the war to roughly 700,000 barrels per day in recent months, according to Vortexa figures cited by CNN.

But if Washington wants to reduce those flows further, it may have to threaten Chinese entities directly.

Trump therefore has more leverage over Iran than he has enjoyed at several earlier points in the conflict.

But leverage is not the same as victory.

Iran must decide how much economic pain it can absorb before making concessions. Washington must decide how long it can sustain an extraordinarily demanding naval operation. China must decide whether it will bow to American pressure or continue providing Tehran with an economic outlet.

And Trump still faces perhaps the most basic question of all: What exactly does he want Iran to concede?

Tehran is unlikely to agree to dismantle its own government, while its nuclear programme is already constrained by the earlier memorandum of understanding and damage to its facilities.

That leaves Washington facing an endgame in which both sides may ultimately return to negotiations — but from very different positions.

Trump may finally have Iran where he wants it. The question now is whether he can keep it there long enough to turn financial strangulation into a political deal.