Could the Iran conflict become Trump’s forever war?

Dubai: Donald Trump returned to the White House promising to end America’s “forever wars,” not start new ones.

But a New York Times analysis raises a question that is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: Could the renewed conflict with Iran become the very kind of prolonged military engagement he vowed to avoid?

The concern is not that the United States is preparing for another Iraq or Afghanistan, with thousands of troops on the ground. Instead, analysts say the greatest risk lies in an open-ended struggle over the Strait of Hormuz, where Washington is determined to keep one of the world’s most important shipping lanes open while Tehran insists it remains an “unbreakable red line.”

With diplomacy stalled, military strikes resuming and tensions once again centred on Hormuz, the conflict is beginning to resemble a long strategic contest rather than a short campaign.

Unlike previous confrontations between the US and Iran, the latest crisis has moved beyond the nuclear programme alone.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil passes, has become the conflict’s strategic centre of gravity.

The United States has repeatedly pledged to ensure freedom of navigation through the waterway. Iran, however, views control over Hormuz as one of its strongest strategic assets and has shown little willingness to surrender that leverage.

The Iranian military this week described the strait as an “unbreakable red line”, warning it would destroy “all infrastructure throughout the region” if President Trump followed through on threats to attack Iranian infrastructure.

Those opposing objectives create the risk of repeated military confrontations even if neither side seeks a full-scale regional war.

According to The New York Times, military historians describe this as the “short-war fallacy” — the belief that overwhelming military strength can quickly achieve political objectives.

Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London, argues that powerful nations often underestimate how difficult it is to convert battlefield success into lasting political outcomes.

History offers several examples.

The United States quickly achieved its initial military objectives in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan but became drawn into years of conflict after political solutions proved elusive.

Iran presents a different challenge. Washington has shown little appetite for deploying ground troops, relying instead on air strikes, naval power and economic pressure. But analysts say those tools alone may not be enough to compel Tehran to change course.

Unlike insurgent groups in Iraq or Afghanistan, Iran is a sovereign state with the ability to impose economic costs far beyond the battlefield.

By threatening commercial shipping or disrupting traffic through Hormuz, Tehran can affect global energy markets without confronting the United States conventionally.

That gives Iran a form of leverage that military superiority alone cannot easily neutralise.

According to The New York Times, this asymmetry could force Washington to maintain an elevated naval and military presence in the Gulf simply to reassure allies and protect international shipping.

The memorandum of understanding that briefly paused hostilities has effectively collapsed, leaving both sides accusing each other of violating its terms.

Without a broader agreement covering Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions and maritime security, analysts say there is little to prevent the conflict from settling into a cycle of periodic military action followed by failed diplomatic efforts.

Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group, quoted by The New York Times, warned that without a sustainable political settlement, the current confrontation risks creating “the circumstances for a forever war.”

Not there yet — but the risk is growing

It would be premature to conclude that the United States is already locked into another forever war.

Diplomatic channels remain open through regional mediators, and neither Washington nor Tehran appears eager for a direct, prolonged conflict.

Yet the strategic reality has shifted.

As long as the United States views keeping the Strait of Hormuz open as a vital national interest, and Iran sees control over the waterway as its strongest bargaining chip, every military exchange risks reinforcing a cycle that becomes harder to break.

For Trump, the challenge may no longer be simply ending the current fighting.

It may be avoiding a conflict that evolves into a years-long contest over one of the world’s most strategically important waterways — precisely the kind of open-ended engagement he once promised Americans he would never begin.