Can diplomacy survive a war that keeps getting bigger?

Iran spent Tuesday pursuing two seemingly contradictory objectives.

On one hand, it intensified attacks across the Middle East. Missiles and drones targeted countries hosting US forces, fresh strikes disrupted shipping around the Strait of Hormuz and Yemen’s Houthi rebels declared a blockade of Saudi ports, threatening to widen the conflict beyond the Gulf.

On the other, Tehran kept diplomatic channels open.

Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni travelled to Pakistan for talks with political and military leaders, while Tehran confirmed that indirect exchanges with Washington through mediators were continuing. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also insisted the door to diplomacy remained open, saying negotiations were still possible — but “it has to be real.”

Far from undermining one another, those military and diplomatic tracks may now be moving together.

As the conflict enters its third week since fighting resumed, both Iran and the United States appear to be trying to improve their positions before any serious negotiations resume. The battlefield is no longer separate from diplomacy. Increasingly, it may be shaping it.

While mediators worked to keep communication alive, Iran broadened its military campaign. Bahrain activated warning sirens after intercepting incoming projectiles, Jordan said it shot down two waves of Iranian missiles and drones, and Kuwait reported further attacks on power and desalination facilities.

At sea, the Revolutionary Guards said they had stopped two oil tankers attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, while maritime authorities reported another tanker had been struck by a projectile off the coast of Oman.

The message from Tehran was equally uncompromising.

Following the latest attacks, the Revolutionary Guards warned that “the enemy should prepare for even more decisive and powerful waves of drone and missile attacks.”

Washington’s response was no less firm.

US Central Command said American forces had targeted Iranian command centres, missile and drone launch sites, maritime capabilities and air defence systems, adding that US forces “remain postured and prepared to hold Iran accountable for unwarranted aggression toward civilian mariners seeking to freely and openly transit the strait.”

Neither statement sounded like a government preparing to compromise.

Yet both Washington and Tehran continue to participate in indirect diplomatic exchanges.

That raises an important question.

Are negotiations continuing despite the fighting, or is the fighting increasingly becoming part of the negotiation?

The Strait of Hormuz remains at the centre of the conflict.

The United States says its military campaign is intended to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping through one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Iran, meanwhile, continues to use the blockade as its principal source of strategic leverage.

But Tuesday’s developments suggest the conflict is becoming broader than a battle over a single waterway.

The most significant new development came from Yemen.

The Houthis’ declaration that they would blockade Saudi ports potentially extends the confrontation beyond Hormuz to the Red Sea, another vital artery for global trade. Whether the group has the capability to enforce such a blockade remains uncertain, but the announcement alone broadens the economic dimension of the conflict.

Saudi Arabia has continued exporting oil through its Red Sea port of Yanbu despite the disruption in Hormuz. Any threat to that route would increase uncertainty in global energy markets at a time when oil prices have already climbed sharply.

The attacks on Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait reinforce the same pattern.

Rather than concentrating pressure in one location, Iran is now forcing Washington and its regional partners to respond across multiple fronts simultaneously.

That does not necessarily mean Tehran has abandoned its focus on Hormuz.

Instead, it suggests that the conflict is expanding geographically while remaining centred on the same strategic objective: increasing the pressure on the United States and its allies.

Despite ten consecutive nights of US air strikes, Iran has not loosened its grip on the Strait of Hormuz.

Likewise, Iran’s disruption of shipping and attacks on regional targets have not persuaded Washington to reduce its military campaign.

President Donald Trump underlined that position after the deaths of American troops, warning on social media that “Every time Iran kills an American Soldier they will pay for that killing many times over!”

That statement reflects a growing reality for both governments.

Neither appears willing to enter negotiations from what it sees as a position of weakness.

That calculation helps explain why diplomacy has not disappeared despite the increasingly intense military campaign.

Pakistan, which helped broker last month’s interim agreement, is once again trying to bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. During his visit to Islamabad, Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, while Pakistani leaders urged restraint and warned against further destabilising the region.

Rubio, meanwhile, reiterated that Washington remained open to diplomacy, provided “it has to be real.”

Neither side is rejecting negotiations outright.

Instead, both appear determined to improve their leverage before any serious talks begin.

For Tehran, easing pressure on shipping or scaling back regional attacks without securing concessions would risk surrendering one of its strongest bargaining tools.

For Washington, reducing military pressure while US troops and commercial vessels remain under attack could be portrayed as rewarding Iranian escalation.

The result is a dangerous paradox. The longer the war continues, the greater the need for diplomacy. Yet every new strike makes diplomacy politically more difficult because neither government wants to appear to be negotiating under pressure.

The conflict is also creating costs that extend well beyond the battlefield.

Brent crude has climbed towards $90 a barrel, while higher fuel prices are becoming increasingly visible to consumers. Energy markets have reacted not only to the disruption in Hormuz but also to the possibility that instability could spread to other shipping routes if the Houthis act on their threat against Saudi ports.

For the United States, military casualties are adding another layer of pressure.

The Pentagon says nearly 100 US service members have been wounded since fighting resumed on July 7, while recent Iranian attacks killed three American soldiers. Those losses inevitably sharpen questions in Washington about strategy, objectives and how long the campaign can continue without a clearer path to success.

Trump’s warning that Iran would pay “many times over” for every American soldier killed reflects those pressures as much as it signals resolve abroad.

For Iran, the costs are also rising.

Successive rounds of US air strikes have targeted command centres, missile and drone launch sites, air defence systems and maritime capabilities across multiple provinces. Although Tehran continues to demonstrate that it can strike regional targets, it is also absorbing sustained military pressure at home.

Neither side, therefore, can claim a decisive strategic advantage.

That may be one reason both continue to leave diplomatic channels open, even as military operations intensify.

What distinguishes this phase of the war is not simply the scale of the attacks but the growing number of fronts involved.

The conflict is no longer confined to the Strait of Hormuz.

It now encompasses attacks on shipping off Oman, missile and drone strikes against countries hosting US forces, threats against Saudi ports and continuing efforts by both Washington and Tehran to degrade each other’s military capabilities.

Every additional front increases the possibility of miscalculation.

An attack causing large-scale civilian casualties, a prolonged disruption to Saudi exports or significant damage to critical infrastructure could rapidly alter the political calculations in both capitals.

The attacks on Kuwaiti desalination plants illustrate how quickly military operations can affect essential civilian services. With around 90 per cent of Kuwait’s drinking water produced through desalination, strikes on such facilities carry implications well beyond immediate military objectives.

Likewise, any sustained disruption to Red Sea shipping would broaden the economic consequences of a conflict that has already shaken global energy markets.

The more geographically dispersed the conflict becomes, the harder it will be for mediators to prevent local incidents from triggering a wider regional crisis.

There is no evidence from Tuesday’s developments that either Washington or Tehran has abandoned diplomacy.

Nor is there evidence that either believes negotiations alone will produce a favourable outcome.

Instead, the latest developments suggest both sides continue to see military pressure and diplomacy as complementary rather than competing tracks.

The United States is maintaining sustained strikes while insisting negotiations remain possible.

Iran is expanding military pressure across the region while continuing indirect contacts through mediators.

Neither approach guarantees success.

For now, diplomacy has survived because both governments still see value in keeping channels open.

With inputs from AFP and AP