How Mojtaba Khamenei reshuffled his hardline team for long war, unrest at home

Dubai: After spending nearly six months largely out of sight, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei is beginning to show what his Iran will look like.

And it looks increasingly like a country preparing for a long fight.

Khamenei has installed a string of veteran military and security hardliners in some of Iran’s most powerful positions, reshaping the leadership at a moment when diplomacy with Washington has stalled and another round of fighting could erupt with little warning.

But the appointments point to threats on two fronts.

Externally, Tehran needs commanders capable of confronting the United States, defending its grip over the Strait of Hormuz and strengthening its deterrence.

At home, the leadership faces a battered economy and the possibility of renewed protests among Iranians already struggling with the consequences of war and inflation.

In effect, Khamenei is building a security establishment equipped to handle both.

Among the most significant appointments is Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, who has been named head of the Supreme National Security Council.

Hossein Taeb, a cleric and former intelligence chief, has been put in charge of the Basij, the powerful paramilitary organisation frequently deployed to suppress protests.

Khamenei has also installed a new armed forces general staff, a new IRGC chief and a new commander of the Guards’ naval forces — a particularly sensitive position now that control of Hormuz has become Tehran’s most potent bargaining chip against Washington.

“I would characterise this first and foremost as Mojtaba Khamenei putting his stamp on the national security structure of Iran,” Sina Toossi of the Center for International Policy told The New York Times.

But the faces Khamenei has chosen are hardly new.

Many belong to the generation shaped by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the brutal Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

“The appointments suggest that, after the enormous vulnerabilities exposed by the war, Mojtaba still trusts the old guard most,” Iran analyst Omid Memarian told the Times.

The appointments do not necessarily mean Iran has abandoned diplomacy.

Instead, they point towards a harder version of it: negotiate while keeping the country ready to fight.

Several of the new security figures have supported returning to the June memorandum of understanding with Washington — but only under Tehran’s interpretation of its terms.

Crucially, Iran wants to retain control over Hormuz until a final agreement is reached rather than surrendering its strongest leverage beforehand.

That reflects a debate now playing out inside Tehran.

Moderates, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, favour using Iran’s control of Hormuz to secure a deal.

Hardliners argue that history has shown Washington cannot be trusted.

They point to US President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement and argue that recent conflicts began even as Iran was negotiating with Washington.

The lesson hardliners have drawn is stark: Diplomacy without military leverage leaves Iran vulnerable.

Khamenei himself signalled the tougher posture when announcing Rezaei’s appointment, calling for readiness for “powerful offensive operations against the enemy”.

But perhaps the most revealing appointment concerns not America, but Iran’s own population.

Taeb’s return to power at the head of the Basij comes as the economic consequences of the war deepen.

Khamenei instructed him to strengthen the organisation’s “public intelligence network”, language analysts interpret as signalling an expanded role in domestic surveillance and repression.

That could become increasingly important for the regime.

Iran’s roughly 90 million people face an economy battered by war, sanctions and inflation. Nationwide protests before the war were crushed by security forces, and analysts warn that worsening living conditions could ignite unrest again.

“Iranian society increasingly resembles a boiling pot that could erupt with little warning,” Memarian said.

That creates an uncomfortable logic for Tehran: Maintaining confrontation abroad may require greater control at home.

The emerging strategy ultimately rests on a huge bet.

Iran believes it can withstand economic punishment longer than Trump can tolerate the consequences of disrupted energy supplies, military expenditure and political pressure at home.

Washington is making precisely the opposite calculation.

The expiry on Monday of the 60-day deadline for a nuclear agreement has left neither side willing to make the concessions needed for a settlement.

Khamenei therefore appears to be preparing Iran for both possibilities: Negotiations if Washington offers acceptable terms, and prolonged confrontation if it does not.

It is a more aggressive posture than that associated with his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the opening US-Israeli strikes on February 28.

“Mojtaba may be willing to take risks in confronting the United States that even his father avoided in his final years,” Memarian said.

That may be the clearest message from Khamenei’s reshuffle.

Iran is not merely waiting to see whether diplomacy succeeds.

It is organising itself for what happens if it fails.