Turkey's Islamists and the logic of the secular State

Turkey's decision to send troops to Iraq to help the US military occupation in strengthening its grip on the war-stricken country has been denounced throughout the Islamic world. Many had hoped the Islamist government of Recep Erdogan would stand firm and resist American pressure to lend support for an operation that lacks international legitimacy and the backing of the Iraqi people. To the dismay of many this did not happen. Turkey's Islamist government could not challenge the long-established pro-Western stand adopted by the country's secular élite since the end of World War II.

This is not to say, however, that Turkish Islamists have not tried to act according to their own beliefs, though change and restructuring of foreign policy in Turkey has always been painful. Hence, since their landslide parliamentary victory in November 2002, Turkey's Islamists have attempted to bring the country closer to the Arab and Islamic world.

Normal foreign policy

Yet they favoured a normal foreign policy adjustment, which is usually slow and incremental, against a complete foreign policy restructuring which involves a major shift in policy orientation. Turkey's Islamists soon came to realise that foreign policy adjustment, not to mention restructuring, is an extremely difficult process whereby forces of continuity provide little room for change. Foreign policy is generally described as the external manifestation of domestic institutions, ideologies and other attributes of the polity. Hence, a state foreign policy is usually influenced by its bureaucracy, public opinion, ideology and the perceived national interests.

In many states, government and state officials, lacking foreign policy expertise, rely on the permanent civil servants for information and advice. Bureaucrats have, therefore, considerable influence on the making of foreign policy, and their role in its implementation is also crucial.

Bureaucrats may facilitate or block the implementation of policy by slowing it or even refusing to act on it. In most cases they resist change and the stronger the bureaucracy the slower the process of change.

In Turkey the state bureaucracy is strongly centralised and composed of civilians and military. The foreign ministry is the key institution in the civilian branch of the state while the National Security Council is the military arm and through it the junta exercises tremendous influence on foreign policy-making. To make things worse for the Islamists, Turkey's bureaucrats, both civilian and military, are ardently secular and western-orientated. They loathed the coming of Islamists to power and have been doing their best to prevent change and keep the elected government at bay.

This leads to the question of ideology which is considered a key factor in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. Decision-makers see international events through the lens of their ideological dispositions, according to which international events are interpreted.

Reflection of certain values

Ideology is also used to rationalise foreign policy decisions, which are often made on the basis of national security interests, but are presented to the public as a reflection of certain values. But ideology is not always the driving force in foreign policy making. States act according to national interests rather than values based on an ideology.

The influence of ideology is pronounced more emphatically in states with strong bureaucracy. If a state has an official ideology and a strong bureaucracy to implement it, it is difficult to make changes in foreign policy. In Turkey the ideology of the government is Islamist but the ideology of the state is secular. The attempt of the Islamists to challenge the ideology of the state is fiercely resisted by the bureaucracy, the military and the highly centralised political institutions. All have been trying to prevent the Islamists from defying the official agenda and change foreign policy in accordance with their ideological views.

The significance of public opinion is also relevant for any discussion on the internal sources of foreign policy-making. But the impact of public opinion on this particular aspect of state activities is generally limited, as the public is less interested in foreign policy than domestic and economic matters.

Public opinion is also easily manipulated by the political élite who may use it in their foreign relations to improve their bargaining position but without allowing it to disturb the official agenda.

In addition, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy-making differs according to whether the state is authoritarian or democratic. In a domestically strong state, like Turkey, where centralised political institutions play a dominant role in the decision making process, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making is minimal. This did not allow the Islamists to make full use of the public support they received during the general elections to adjust Turkey's foreign policy. The last factor which hindered the efforts of Turkish Islamists to change their country's foreign policy was their perception of Turkey's national interests and the instinct of survival.

Turkey has been for long obsessed with the possibility of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and its impact on its considerable Kurdish minority.

Marginalise ideological stands

Turkey's Islamists have, thus, decided to marginalise their ideological stands, alienate the public, which was against involvement in Iraq, and act according to their own national interests. The instinct of survival has also played a significant part in the Islamists decision to bow to the pressure of the military and continue to follow a pro-Western foreign policy.

The memory of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey's first Islamist prime minister, and his swift removal from power is still very much alive in the minds of Turkish Islamists. Erbakan tried to challenge the logic of the secular state and adopt a more Islamic foreign policy.

He not only failed to proceed with this agenda but was quickly brought down by the military. Bearing this in mind, Turkish Islamists decided to accept the $8.5 billion the US offered Turkey in exchange for sending its troops to Iraq, subject to approval by the Iraqi people.

Dr. Marwan Al Kabalan is a scholar in International Relations, UK