Time running out for coalition forces in Iraq

A recent visit to Iraq convinced me of several thi-ngs. We were right to go to war to liberate Iraq. The Iraqi people welcome their liberation from tyranny. A free Iraq could transform the Middle East. And failure to make the necessary political and financial commitment to build the new Iraq could endanger American leadership in the world, empower our enemies and condemn Iraqis to renewed tyranny.

If we are to avoid a debate over who "lost" Iraq, we must act urgently to transform our military success into political victory.

We fought a just war in Iraq to end the threat po-sed by a dictator with a record of aggression aga-inst his people and his nei-ghbours and a proven willingness to use weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq's transformation into a progressive Arab state could set the region that produced Saddam Hussain, the Taliban, and Al Qaida on a new course in which democratic expression and economic prosperity, rat-her than a radicalising mix of humiliation, poverty and repression, define a modernity in the Muslim world that doesn't express itself in ways that threaten its people or other nations. Conversely, a forced US retreat from Iraq would be the most serious American defeat since Vietnam.

America's mission in Iraq is too important to fail. Given the stakes, we cannot launch this "generational commitment" to changing the Middle East on the cheap. The administration should level with the American people about the cost and commitment required to transform Iraq.

Americans must understand how important this mission is and be prepared to sacrifice to achieve it. Without an intensive campaign now to explain what is at stake and absent the necessary political and financial commitment, we raise the potential for a defeat that will deal a lasting blow to American interests and freedom's progress.

Having liberated Iraq, we must demonstrate the tangible benefits of occupation, which the Iraqi silent majority will tolerate if it successfully delivers services, law and order and a transition to Iraqi rule. The danger is that our failure to improve daily life, security, and Iraqis' participation in their own governance will erode their patience and fuel insurrection.

We don't have time to spare. If we don't improve services and security in Iraq over the next few months, it may be too late. We'll risk an irreversible loss of Iraqi confidence and reinforce the efforts of extremists who seek our defeat and threaten Iraq's democratic future.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, an able administrator, lacks resources and the political commitment to ach-ieve his goal of Iraq's transformation. His operation is nearly broke, and he admits Iraq will need "tens of billions" of dollars for reconstruction next year alone. Yet there's an insufficient sense of urgency in Washington, and needs on the ground in Iraq are going unmet.

Security remains a serious problem in Iraq partly because, contrary to administration assurances, our military force levels are obviously inadequate. A visitor quickly learns in conversations with US military personnel that we need to deploy at least another division. We need more foreign troops, particularly from Muslim allies such as Turkey and Pakistan, but security doesn't necessarily improve with each new country that deploys forces. It's the number and quality of military forces, not the number of countries that send them, that matters.

Iraq's reconstruction requires not simply more troops but a different mix of troops – linguists, civil affairs officers, military police, engineers – as well as a significant increase in civilian experts in development and democracy-bui-lding. The number of civilian advisers in Iraq is astonishingly low. I was struck by the near-unanimity of opinion among Ame-rican officers in Iraq that civilian expertise – on reconstruction, judicial reform and local governance – is as important as our military presence.

I was also struck by the distrust many Iraqis hold for the United Nations. It's questionable whether UN authority over Iraq's political transition would enhance its legitimacy. A UN peacekeeping force like the one that stood by as thousands of Bosnians were massacred at Srebrenica wouldn't inspire the Iraqi people's confidence. UN blessing of the occupation authority, recognition of the Governing Council and advising on Iraq's reconstruction could help in soliciting foreign troops and reconstruction aid, but UN primacy would endanger Iraq's transformation. Ira-qis must have a greater role in determining their future.