Panama lessons will be put to work in Iraq

As now planned, a U.S. attack on Iraq would look less like the Gulf War and more like a less-noted conflict, the 1989 Panama invasion, military officials say. It would be characterised by lightning-fast, simultaneous strikes on key targets designed to shock a dictatorial regime into collapse.

These officials and defence analysts noted that the United States' narrow goals in Iraq - disarming and removing President Saddam Hussain - are reminiscent of the attack on the Panamanian strongman, Gen. Manuel Noriega.

As with Noriega, U.S. forces would focus on isolating and decapitating Saddam's regime while not laying waste to his country.

That is a tougher task than the 1991 Gulf War, where the primary goal was simply to push Saddam's armies out of Kuwait. That war let U.S. forces conduct a highly sequential campaign - a five-month build-up of forces, a 40-day air bombardment and, ultimately, a ground campaign that lasted 100 hours.

This time, U.S. forces would seek to accomplish several things simultaneously in the invasion's first hours: Knock out Saddam's ability to command his army, prevent him from launching Scud missiles or chemical or biological weapons, stop him from torching Iraq's massive oil fields, prevent him from escaping and destroy or contain his forces.

For those reasons, defence officials and analysts predict a swift start to the war, combining air, ground and special operations forces. Special forces are expected to be dispatched to western Iraq to neutralise the Scud threat to Israel.

Conventional forces, possibly including the 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas, would hold down a front that the Pentagon would like to launch from Turkey, to protect ethnic Kurdish communities and the oil fields in northern Iraq.

Army and Marine forces, along with special forces, probably would focus on southern Iraq, protecting oil fields around Basra and possibly grabbing an airstrip to use as a staging area for more U.S. forces.

"Every arrow in the quiver is going to be used," one military officer said. "The more targets you can hit simultaneously, the harder it is for an enemy to counter your moves."

A second official predicted an effort to surround and isolate the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, in the hopes of waiting out Saddam and his top generals, instead of having to go in and get them in street-to-street combat.

But this official added: "If we have to divide the city into districts and take it down, we're prepared to do that."

These imperatives harken back to Panama, defence officials say, where U.S. forces hit 27 targets simultaneously in the invasion's first wave, a 1am thrust that combined special forces, conventional ground forces and paratroopers backed with attack helicopters, AC-130 gunships, tanks and a limited bombing campaign.

Differences between Panama and Iraq - mainly, their size - mean that assaults on them can be compared only in broad strokes. About 27,000 U.S. troops were used in the Panamanian invasion, compared with the 250,000 expected to take part in an Iraqi campaign.

An attack on Iraq is expected to open with a massive air campaign, not a major feature in Panama. But U.S. officials say technological advances such as smart bombs and airborne surveillance drones have greatly improved U.S. abilities to strike even faster than in Panama.

In Panama, the goal was to overwhelm Noriega's Panama-nian Defence Forces that it and the regime would crumble quickly. The December 1989 invasion was over in days and was considered a success, as it elevated an elected government to power and brought Noriega to justice in the United States.

But Panama also provides a cautionary tale on several fronts, from the dangers of post-war unrest that rocked the nation to the difficulty in tracking down a single person. Noriega was captured after only 14 days.