Musharraf must move to deliver his dream

If recent reports in the Western media are any guide, General Pervez Musharraf's honeymoon as a Western ally is gradually coming to an end. Soon after last September's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Pakistan's military ruler was hailed as one of the most significant members of the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.

President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union address, praised General Musharraf, along with interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai as the man who made the war against the Taliban possible. Praise also came from the international media where General Musharraf was described as a visionary who wanted to save Pakistan from the influence of militant Islamists.

But now the Western media has started criticizing the general. He is being accused of wavering in his commitment to build Pakistan as a moderate, Muslim state. Given that Western democracies are driven by public opinion, it is a matter of time before media criticism influences policies in the world's major capitals.

General Musharraf's apolitical approach to governance led him to think that the crisis created by the September 11 attacks was his opportunity. He thought that complete support to American military operations, a few strong statements against terrorism and some restrictions against Pakistani militants was all that he needed to secure massive doses of U.S. economic assistance.

Once foreign assistance started flowing, the general expected that he would be able to transform the life of ordinary Pakistanis thereby ensuring their support for his vision of 'democracy' guided by the military.

But the political world – and all governance and international relations are political – operates on slightly more complicated terms. The U.S., and other Western nations, expected a faster and broader change in Pakistan's policy direction than General Musharraf seems to have bargained for. The feeling that the shift in policy is somewhat limited in scope is causing concern that is increasingly being reflected in international media comments about General Musharraf and his regime.

The Pakistani President could have protected himself against such criticism by broadening the base of his government. The inclusion of civilians with political support would have enabled him to implement his new policies without frequent adjustments aimed at placating various pressure groups, especially militant Islamists.

He would also have been able to nuance his position on issues such as Kashmiri militancy and relations with India if his power base was not limited to his military constituency. But seeing the world in black and white, like a military man rather than as a politician or statesman, General Musharraf failed to appreciate the need for changing his domestic direction along with the shift in his foreign policy.

Confused

He saw himself as changing course, "in the national interest", and thought everyone else should see things the way he does. The result is increased questioning of General Musharraf's contradictory stance, coupled with the general's own confusion over why people find it contradictory.

The Western media's recent onslaught against General Musharraf is based on the allegation that his government is less effective than it claims to be. The general's own, rather unique, definition of democracy ("The people can vote as long as I remain in charge") is also coming in for criticism.

But the general's greatest problem seems to be that he cannot see his inconsistencies nor is he prepared to accept that his actions, rather than his (and Pakistan's) adversaries, are responsible for the end of his honeymoon with the international community.

Some critics are blaming the U.S. government for allowing General Musharraf to get away with a lot less than he should be doing to justify American support for Pakistan and his regime.

Writing in the Washington Post recently, Jim Hoagland asserted, "President Pervez Musharraf's failure to match promises with sustained action undermines Bush's campaign to make his war on terrorists a clear struggle of good vs. evil. Other nations will quickly notice the Pakistani shortfall and follow suit, mouthing deceptive words and taking evasive action".

According to Hoagland, "Washington now allows Musharraf to make expediency the guiding principle of the relationship" and ridicules the argument that Musharraf's survival, and Pakistan's interests, must take precedence for the time being.

Hoagland accused General Musharraf of steadily backing away "from his January boldness even as Pakistan rakes in hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in aid. Powell has said nothing as the backsliding has become more flagrant and more harmful to Bush's global cause." He then warns the U.S. administration that "False allies are often more troublesome for America than declared enemies.

The moral and diplomatic drift on Pakistan now strongly resembles the failure of the first Bush administration on Iraq in the late 1980s. Saddam Hussain's threats to incinerate Israel and invade Kuwait were explained away by State Department experts as rhetoric.

Iraq was seen as too important to confront – or even to describe its actions truthfully. The second Bush administration is on the road to making exactly the same mistake with Pakistan."

Observations

Such harsh language is not limited to foreign policy hawks in the United States. The arbiter of liberal opinion in Britain, The Guardian, warned in an editorial, "Pakistan is entering perhaps its most fractious period of instability since September 11 that forced General Pervez Musharraf to sign up for the 'war against terrorism'.

Far from being fortified by U.S. military aid and backslapping, Gen Musharraf is struggling to hold the line against resurgent extremist violence." According to the British newspaper, " The self-styled Pakistani president's banning of hard-line parties, his vow to wrest madrassas (religious schools) from the hands of politicized mullahs, his hasty trial this week of Pearl's alleged killers, and his round-up of 2,000 militants amounts to a high-stakes gamble.

Students of double-dealing should note that in recent days, over half those arrested have been quietly freed. Gen Musharraf vowed in January to 'rid society of sectarian hatred and terrorism', 'the Kalashnikov culture' and build 'a progressive Islamic state'. But his is a dangerous game that, like Hamid Karzai in Kabul, he may yet lose."

An editorial in the New York Times and articles in newspapers as diverse as the Baltimore Sun and the London Observer have made similar points. The New York Times editorial was captioned "Musharraf's Travails", while an article in the Observer bore the self-explanatory title "The myth of the good General Musharraf".

The Baltimore Sun article by Former U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay, Timothy Towell, ran under the heading "Hollow alliance with Musharraf yields only empty promises".

Having ruled out compromise with domestic political forces, General Musharraf had started counting on international support as his source of strength. But the world's major powers do not give their support in return for high-sounding statements that do not translate into sufficient action.