Kandahar is the key to Osama's capture

When diplomatic and economic initiatives fail, military means - war - is the only option to secure political objectives.

With a vast majority of the American population still demanding vengeance in the wake of the September 11 bombing, failure to retaliate would have been tantamount to an open invitation to terrorists of all kinds to target U.S. citizens and interests world-wide. The U.S. had a Hobson's choice 'damned if you will, damned if you won 't.'

With the expected Taliban refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, the U.S. declared war on him and his protectors, as the very first objective of the "war on terrorism". A civilised society cannot associate itself with terrorists. Enough circumstantial evidence was available for Mulla Omar to have distanced himself from his tainted guest.

The U.S. war aims are to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and overthrow the Taliban regime protecting him. The immediate U.S. military objectives in pursuit of these aims are in four phases: destroy all air force and anti aircraft potential so as to control Afghan skies; destroy such Taliban personnel and defence material interfering with the primary aims; kill or capture Osama bin Laden and overthrow the Taliban regime.

The political phase should follow the conclusion of war, putting in place a broad-based alternative government acceptable to the Afghan people.

A conventional war would seek to eliminate economic targets, very unnecessary for this impoverished country. You seldom win hearts and minds of people by sending them to graveyards or hospitals.

The rest of the world is now getting restive over the mounting civilian casualties. Total air superiority (Phase 1) was achieved in less than 24 hours, thereafter, only fuel and ammunition dumps, far from civilian population centres, should have been targeted in Phase 2. When engaging an enemy, steeped in over a decade of urban and rural guerrilla warfare, capable of living off the land, there is a fail-safe line in target acquisition.

Focus on the war aims, why spread your effort and get hate in return particularly when you are straitjacketed in the pursuit of war by a severe limiting of acceptable casualties that you can absorb.

Bin Laden draws his staying power from proximity to Mulla Omar, who rules by sole edict.
Dovetail Phase 3 and 4 to focus only on them, only on one city, a small area of operations allowing concentration of effort, the creation of inter-connecting fields of fire, force-multiplied by air support.

The blockade of Kandahar should be the focus of battle, no men or material allowed to flow in or out, the objective being to isolate Mulla Omar (and Osama bin Laden) from the rest of Afghanistan, forcing the Taliban into the open for them to cross the killing zone to have a go at you or try to get past you.

Without putting ground troops in harm's way astride choke points into Kandahar, there is no blockade. One must understand the terrain and make-up of the population around Kandahar.

Afghanistan's second largest city is situated in a flat area about 60 kilometres west of the Pakistan border town Chaman. The river Arghandab runs on a north east-south west axis and passes a few kilometres west of Kandahar. Parallel on the same axis, but equidistant from Kandahar on the east, flows the river Tarnak. Further east is the river Argasthan.

The main Arghandab runs on an east-west axis about 15-18 kilometres south of Kandahar. None of the rivers are perennial and all have tracks running alongside or in the river bed itself. North of Kandahar are high mountain ranges. About 45 kilometres south of Kandahar is a desert where tracks run east to west. There are three major roads, the first one going to Kabul is in very bad condition. The road to Chaman runs south-east through Spin Boldak. Lastly, the road to Herat, runs east south-east to Gereshk and then on a north-westerly direction to Herat. The Kandahar airbase, a few kilometres south of Kandahar, has Zakir-i-Sharif mountain range parallel to the runway.

Astride the road between Kandahar and Chaman (on the Pakistan border) are mainly the Achakzai tribe, alongwith Nurzais and Alikozais.

The Ghilzais dominate the road from Kandahar to Kabul while on the road to Herat around Gereshk we have Popalzai, and also Barakzai, Achakzai, Alizai and Saddozai.

The Registan desert is mostly occupied by the Barachi, a tribe mainly into transportation and narcotics, having extensive lands in Sindh.

Barakzai and Achakzai are mostly anti-Taliban, some of the finest Soviet-era Afghan army generals including the hero of Jalalabad, General Asif Dilawar, was an Achakzai.

Defending Kandahar successfully during the Afghan war was General Nurul Haq Alooni, a Barakzai, an artilleryman trained in the US. Another famous general was Achakzai tribal Juma Chak. Good fighters, the tribesmen could be persuaded to see where their interests are best served.

An Afghan is an ally if his ego and friendship is stroked, a stubborn enemy if he is attacked. Because of the bombing, the Barakzai have pledged their loyalty to Mulla Omar even ahead of the Nurzai, and the Nurzais are closer to the Taliban.

Afghan loyalties

Afghan loyalties can be won over but the widespread bombing and the "Haq episode" has put a dampener on such efforts.

The Soviet used Spetsnaz special forces troops on high mountain peaks and choke points with latest weapons and hi-tech gadgets to interdict any mujhahideen movement by using combat aircraft and Hind helicopter gunships.

The Soviets suffered heavily when the induction of the Stinger missiles took out their aircraft, particularly the Hind gunships and M- 8/M -17 troop carrying helicopters, quite consistently.

Small-unit operations are good enough for "hit and snatch" but not for blockading a large city like Kandahar. Put battalion-sized task forces not only astride the choke points in the south like Takhtapol -Torkotal, 20 kilometres on the road to Chaman but also Maiwand 25-30 kilometres on the road to Herat, establish blocking positions in the north leading to the mountains and on the choke points along the three rivers.

Take over Bund-e-Daillah also, the dam feeding water to Kandahar. The route to Chaman must be kept open for refugees from Kandahar. A brigade plus task force (four battalions) can be deployed astride the Hada Hills range to create a funnel to the Pakistan border and into properly supervised holding camps for the screening of refugees. This should be carried out by a Pakistani Brigade plus deployed within Pakistan borders on Khwaja Amran Rang mountain range where the defences were made by the British against a "Czarist invasion" during the days of the empire.

The area, 10 kilometres on all sides around the choke points and the funnel should be a free-fire zone.

Fighter aircraft, AC-130 gunships and Apache helicopters could provide air cover and frustrate any attempt to relieve the blockade from both outside and inside Kandahar.

The Taliban risk losing other cities to the opposition if they thin out anywhere. Attacking the blockade will mean walking into the killing fields, movement of troops from any direction can be intercepted and pulverised from the air. The