It's not winning that matters in Pakistan

President Pervez Musharraf has promised to strengthen Constitutionalism, the prime ministership and the parliamentary form of government through a strengthened presidency. And developments during the past few weeks point towards a strong possibility of Musharraf's "calculated risk" paying off as far as people coming out to vote for him are concerned.

Despite criticism by major political parties, lawyers and analysts of Musharraf's decision to hold a referendum seeking public support for himself as president, there is likely to be a decent voter turn-out for the referendum.

Criticism of the referendum on grounds of constitutionality, democracy, power politics and fairness will linger. That these criticisms are unlikely to translate into any threat to Musharraf's presidency or to the holding of the referendum itself is also evident.

Bomb blasts and armed attacks, not political agitation, could threaten the referendum exercise. Beyond the referendum, how far can differences among the political players over the referendum become a peg for a broader anti-Musharraf movement is also clear.

Not far at all, at least not with the government's policy of clamping down on agitational politics, with the principal political actors abroad, with a public uninterested in agitational politics and the government's proactive alliance-making with all and sundry to strengthen the president's position.

The lack of visible excitement for the referendum notwithstanding, there are personality-related, political and administrative factors that will ensure a big voter turn-out. On the personality front Musharraf generally enjoys public goodwill, despite his coup leader status, hobnobbing with controversial politicians and the referendum. People consider him to be better than the rest, financially honest and a man who has the interest of Pakistan at heart.

In relative terms, many see him as better than the two former prime ministers. Some believe he is the man who has the will and the determination to re-establish the writ of the state and the rule of law. There are, however, also small and scattered groups who remain critical of his policy to support the U.S. military operation Afghanistan.

In showing flexibility and adjusting his position on Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's return, Musharraf has managed to regain some of the stature he lost after his speech at the Lahore rally. In his subsequent rallies and interviews, Musharraf has said that the law will take its course if the two former prime ministers decide to return to Pakistan.

He has repeated his commitment to upholding the Constitution of 1973, including retaining the supremacy of the parliament, the chief executive status of the prime minister and interpreting the referendum as an endorsement act and not an election.

In pure power terms the referendum is a big step towards Musharraf's election as president. Nevertheless, his recent statements demonstrate flexibility and adjustment. Even on the issue of the National Security Council he appears to be opening it up for public debate.

On the political front, unlike General Zia ul Haq's 1984 referendum, Musharraf's 2002 referendum has managed an impressive line-up. He has the assured or tacit support of a range of elements capable of mobilising voters.

From among the political parties, the pro-Musharraf Muslim League and the two major provincial ones have popular backing and a functioning organizational structure. The MQM and the ANP are also directly or indirectly supporting the referendum.

Other parties with hitherto low electoral support but high-profile leadership, like Pakistan Tehreek-I-Insaaf and Pakistan Awami Tehreek, are fully supporting the referendum. The cumulative impact of all this political support will be visible voter turn-out on the referendum day giving credibility of numbers to this exercise.

The multiple-tiered elected local government structures down to the village level are Musharraf's principle constituency.

The opposition of a few nazims and many more naib nazims to the referendum notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of nazims especially in the major cities are supporting the referendum.

These are elected men and women who have won the polls through public support and now enjoy the support of the governor and the Corps commanders.

Barring Sindh, where the PPP nazims are unlikely to support the referendum, the elected local government set-up will mobilise its own supporters to cast a 'yes' vote for Musharraf.

The state institutions will facilitate the transportation of these voters to the nearest election booths. This local body structure may in some cases undermine the electoral power that traditional politicians may have held previously. Given the state structures' support to these groups they would become the power on the ground, undermining the power of national assembly or provincial assembly candidates.

Because of the state institutions supporting the referendum, the dice is heavily loaded against those opposing the referendum. However, there will be no stuffing of ballot boxes. Willing voters plus the servants of the state, including the armed forces, will all vote for the incumbent president and chief of army staff.

Against this backdrop, the political opponents of the referendum have the difficult task of ensuring a low voter turn-out for the referendum. This is a tall order. Ensuring a very low voter turn-out will be impossible. It will be difficult for opposing parties to fire up people against Musharraf or the referendum.

Despite varying degrees of access to mass communication tools, free press and state-controlled and private television channels, the opponents of the referendum have not successfully created a negative public mood against the referendum.

In Sindh, however, majority public opinion, is likely to remain against the referendum. Their opposition underscores the need to opt for consenus building among all political forces as part of launching genuine democracy in Pakistan. And for achieving what General Musharraf tirelessly repeats "inter-provincial harmony".

Opposition to the referendum has come from other groups too. In the forefront of the anti-referendum ranks have been the Bar Councils and Associations. They have categorically rejected the referendum because they believe it further increases the participation in politics of a serving military man, it undermines parliamentary democracy, politicises the armed forces and wastes state resources on an individual-promoting exercise.

Another contributing factor to a relatively high voter turn-out will be the administrative arrangements being made to make voting easy. On the administrative front the entire state apparatus will be deployed to facilitate the casting of votes.

The voting procedure has been simplified, the voter's list has been done away with, voting age has been reduced to 18 years and polling booths have been set up in massive numbers across the country.

All this will contribute to making the referendum a "success". Television screens within and outside Pakistan will show huge crowds coming out across the country, except in Sindh, to vote in the referendum.

Winning is not a real test for Musharraf. A "suc