Entering new phase with old challenges

General Pervez Musharraf appears to have had his way. The main man from the establishment's party Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-QA) has been elected Pakistan's 19th prime minister.

Mir Zafrullah Jamali won the election of the Leader of the House by a wafer thin majority. Requiring a majority vote from a 342 member House, Jamali needed 171 votes to win. Only 172 were cast in his favour. Although Jamali made it to the prime ministership only by one vote his party claims that since the House has only 332 members he only required 166 votes for victory. That too gives Jamali a lead of only six votes.

This six vote victory too came through 'engineered' means. In reviving the Constitution, General Musharraf held the anti-defection clause under abeyance. This was done to provide an 'enabling environment' to the 10 PPP defectors to abandon their party and support the PML-QA's candidate.

Without the Pakistan People's Parliamentary Party (PPPP) defectors votes, the establishment's candidate could not have won. Also in changing its policy on the no-go areas and 'managing' the political destruction of the Moahjir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi), state power was used by the Musharraf government to win over support of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) for its candidate.

On the eve of the Speaker's election the MQM leadership announced its support for PML-QA as a quid pro quo for General Musharraf's decision to end the 'no-go' areas held by its opponent party the MQM (Haqiqi).

Risk-free route

While General Musharraf kept his promise of holding the elections to replace what he called Pakistan's 'sham democracy' with 'genuine democracy,' on two counts he opted for a 'risk-free' route towards 'genuine democracy'. One, he would not allow his own position of president to become dependent on the parliamentarians. Therefore, instead of going through the parliament he opted to be sworn in as a self-appointed president.

Also he has opted to retain the position of the Chief of the Armed Services (COAS) till he consolidates his own position vis a vis the parliament.

The second issue on which Musharraf has opted to take no risks is the issue of the 42 amendments. Through the LFO (legal framework order), those have been integrated into the 1973 Constitution.

Learning from the earlier military rulers General Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq whose amendments to the Constitutions were brought before the parliament for discussion Musharraf chose to not take them to the parliament. Instead he argued that in exercise of powers given to him by the Supreme Court he could amend the Constitution.

Interestingly General Zia brought his amendments before a non-party House which debated the amendments for 38 days and then finally threw out 80 per cent of the Eighth Amendment including the National Security Council.

Advised by the same man, Sharifuddin Peerzada, who had earlier advised Zia to take the amendments to the parliament Musharraf has decided to bypass the parliament. Banking upon the division within the opposition parties and the staying power of the PML-QA-centred ruling coalition, he must believe that the LFO cannot meaningfully be challenged in the House.

Essentially turning the past practice of military rulers to seek parliamentary support he has handed the amendments under the LFO down to them as a fait accompli. They are required now to devise their own strategy to challenge Musharraf's power and his moves. Once the reluctant coup-maker, now the all-powerful leader President Musharraf had promised only guided and controlled democracy to Pakistan.

True to his candid style in answer to a question in Washington, Musharraf had said: "I will put a label of democracy" on the existing system. He has done more than putting a label. Elections were held in which all the parties participated, they are all now sitting as powerful voting blocs and also as a very strong opposition in the parliament.

Many have played along with the establishment's game of forming a king's party; for which they themselves deserve 'credit.'

Musharraf had all along argued that ends justify the means. His means were never going to be entirely legal or even constitutional. Having formulated macro policies for Pakistan in the economic, development, internal security and foreign policy fields he remained determined to retain power so that he could ensure what he has repeatedly maintained the "continuity of his reform programme."

Hence all means available including horse-trading, outright political support, uniformed guidance to politicians were used to ensure the formation of a PML-QA government. Equally important objectives outlined by Musharraf in his plan for future Pakistani politics was keeping leaders of two political parties out of the political fray. In this round Musharraf has also achieved this objective.

Four key factors will influence the future of parliamentary democracy.

One, how does the opposition conduct itself? To what extent will it press ahead on the two central issues that will determine the supremacy of the parliament; the fate of the amended Constitution in which all the 42 amended articles, introduced through the LFO, have been included and the question of getting the president elected through the parliament.

Two, the performance of the government will come into sharp focus. Although the Jamali government will operate in the shadow of General Musharraf, its own performance too will be scrutinised, the incumbency factor will unleash its own dynamics. How the prime minister will handle the president and the opposition will also impact on the stature that the government will or will not acquire.

Controversial

Three, the conduct of the Speaker in handling the many debates that will be conducted on constitutional matters, on how he handles the business of the House generally and of the opposition, specifically will be important.

Already the Speaker, through his although expected comments on the LFO being part of the Constitution, has become highly controversial within the House. The manner in which he handled the parliamentarians has questioned his credibility as a neutral Speaker.

Four, the conduct of the president, specifically his relationship with the civilian government and with the parliamentarians. In the coming days a competitive dynamic will become operational in the president-prime minister relationship. The prime minister will be under pressure in the House to assert the parliament's power over the powers of an unelected president.

These four factors will also impact on what remains a fundamental question in Pakistan's power scenario - the division of power between the elected civilians and the army-backed president. The shrill voice of the parliamentarians on issues of the LFO and the president's election notwithstanding they all seem to not want to derail the system.

The divided opposition promises to be strong and assertive but not necessarily life-threatening for the government. As parliamentary democracy in Pakistan enters another phase, the parliamentarians are confronted with the old challenge; of proceeding responsibly and credibly as a group to regain for the elected parliament its