Diplomatic intervention

As alarm bells over the possibility of a Pakistan-India war ring in many western capitals Washington has again despatched an official to South Asia on a fire-fighting mission.

There is a regularity to such a response from Washington. It is the threat of possible war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan that ostensibly has Washington panicked. Believing Indian claims that cross-Line of Control infiltration will be on the rise Americans, other western diplomats and analysts have talked of a real possibility of the two countries drifting into a conflict. Hence this fire-fighting exercise. The American message, we are told, to both the South Asian neighbours is 'cool it.'

There has been a regularity to such diplomatic interventions. In the nineties alone numerous US delegations arrived in South Asia on a fire-fighting mission. Washington's messages were delivered to various Pakistan and Indian governments.

For example in Pakistan and in India, through the Gates Mission in 1990 and also in 1999 through the Zinni-Lampher Mission during the Kargil crisis, U.S. diplomatic interventions have sort to prevent limited or full scale war between the two nuclear armed states.

In the case of Kargil such a message combined with other pressure elements including the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's July 4 dash to Washington ensured a Pakistani withdrawal from the heights of Kargil.

The common threads in Washington's numerous fire-fighting through U.S. officials' South Asian visits are three. One, at the root of most Pakistan-India military tensions prompting US intervention has been Kashmir. Two, to de-escalate military tension, Washington has always expected Islamabad to 'deliver'. India has been urged to exercise restraint.

Now the U.S. Under Secretary of State Christina Rocca carries for the Musharraf government the Bush administration's message for Islamabad that cross-border terrorism must end and in the summer months Delhi's fear of increased infiltration should not become a reality.

Although U.S. Under Secretary of State's visit is focusing exclusively on Pakistan-India tensions related to the issue of cross-LoC infiltration , it raises for the Pakistanis the broader context of Pakistan-U.S. relations.

Then the visit did reinforce the post-September 11 Pakistan-U.S. phase of intense re-engagement.

There has been a multi-sectoral re-engagement signaling Washin-gton's interest in what the Bush team refers to as "the new Pakistan." In the American mind this is linked to the 'safe delivery' of the "new Pakistan."

Americans are seeking to engage with the Pakistan that Musharraf informed American intellectuals existed during his Washington trip. The Pakistan that is "a liberal, tolerant, progressive, dynamic and strong Pakistan" which is committed to "eradication of Islamic extremism and terrorism" in Pakistan and the neighbouring areas.

While internally all Pakistanis long for the return of rule of law in the country through the re-establishment of the writ of the state there is scepticism if not active resentment towards Washington's simplistic notion of extremism. Organisations like Hizbullah, Hamas and Hizbul Mujahideen involved in the freedom struggles of Palestine and Kashmir are dubbed by Washing-ton as terrorist organisations.

Most importantly Washington's inability to separate the issue of the Kashmiri freedom struggle waged by Kashmiris demanding their UN-sanctioned right to self-determination, draws criticism from the Pakistani public.

The U.S. demand that Pakistan adopt a virtual hands-off approach on the Kashmir question until there is willingness in Delhi to engage in a dialogue over Kashmir is seen here as unrealistic. Instead of pressurising Pakistan, Washington must play a more active role in encouraging intra-Kashmiri dialogue and Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir.

Washington must undertake concrete action in initiating dialogue. Washington's enjoys sufficient clout within the United Nations systems to encourage, directly or indirectly, an active UN role on the Kashmir question. Resolution 1172 passed in June 1998 after the two South Asian states conducted the nuclear tests specifically called for the solution of all outstanding issues including the Kashmir dispute which prevent normalisation of Pakistan-India relations.

The future of Pakistan-U.S. relations will be determined by multiple factors. Five are significant.

One, how far does 'common purpose', both domestically and externally, on anti-terrorism hold between the two. In the domestic arena, formerly state-supported and externally funded armed and hate-spewing men must be disarmed and dealt with legally.

And a Pakistani society divided by deliberate state policy and external factors now needs a bridge-builder; Pakistani society needs a healing touch not the U.S. sledge hammer approach to hunt down non-American "extremists."

Externally, Pakistan cannot afford partnership in Washing-ton's unilateralist, destabilizing and illogical military campaign against the axis of evil.

Two, how far can the U.S. make accommodations in its relations with Pakistan's India-specific security challenges without undermining U.S.-India growing strategic relations.

Three, how far will deepening military and economic ties with a unilateralist and militaristic Was-hington undermine Pakistan's own interests in the region and within the Muslim world; especially with Pakistan's long-term stable strategic partner China and important neighbour Iran.

Four, how far will US policies in the Middle East and Kashmir negatively impact or not impact on Pakistan's internal security and political environment vis a vis Pakistan-U.S. military engagement.

Five, how transparent and fair will the October elections be and what role, if any, the Pakistan army will retain post-October in the politics and in the management of the country.

Imbibing the lessons from the earlier phases of Pakistan-U.S. intense engagement – the fifties and the eighties-Pakistan has to develop a relationship seeking realistic advantages including support for the right of Kashmiri self-determination.

On the Pakistan-India relations from Washington, there has been a 'constant' , as far as expectations from Islamabad of 'decreasing' the tensions on the Kashmir issue are concerned. Islamabad is expected to ensure the end of all cross-border infiltration from across the LoC. Washington's diplomats often tell their Pakistani counterparts of the 'independent' evidence they have on the cross-border infiltration.

The pressure , although especially at this point against the backdrop of Pakistan -U.S. cooperation on anti-terrorism , cannot be more than diplomatic it does raise questions about how far Islamabad has used its leverage with the U.S. to make Washington see Pakistan's reasoning and the principle on Kashmir.

After all, Washington remains a party to the UN Security Council resolutions granting the right of self determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, it still considers Jammu and Kashmir disputed territory and it still does see India and Pakistan as parties to the Kashmir dispute along with people of Jammu and Kashmir.

There are indeed limits to what