Comment: The 'predicament of GCC states'

Created in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, that same year's Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the GCC purported to be a defence alliance without emphasising security.

Since 1981, a number of reports, published by the GCC as well as respected Arab and Western research institutions, have recommended additional cooperation. What is the "state" of GCC states' security cooperation?

Although GCC states could not prevent previous regional wars, their versatile diplomatic positions, rather than any intrinsic military capabilities, protected them rather well. In fact, the logic of "Gulf security" revolves around permutations that regional hegemons pose that, it must be clear by now, cannot be tolerated by any of the six.

To be sure, all GCC states now possess modern military equipment, from front-line aircraft to efficient land forces, but the numbers are modest compared with Iranian and Yemeni capabilities.

Of course, GCC capitals are pursuing engagement policies with both Iran and Yemen, even if concerns remain. Likewise, while Iraqi forces were critical under the last Baathist regime, these have been reduced to rubble and it will be a while before Baghdad poses any military threat to a GCC member-state.

Arsenals

According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, which publishes an annual Military Balance listing most available data on each country around the world, GCC states field about 300,000 men under arms.

The number of battle tanks stand at over 2,000 and there are approximately 600 combat fighters/bombers. While these figures for the year 2003 are impressive - especially when one realises that most of this arsenal was put together since the late 1970s - there are several perennial difficulties.

First, all GCC states lack indigenous and proficiently trained manpower that, not surprisingly, necessitates a heavy reliance on expatriate labour. Soldiers, pilots, technicians, and many critical positions that cannot be entrusted to "outsiders" are routinely assigned to foreign mercenaries, for lack of alternatives.

Second, while bilateral and even some multilateral GCC training exercises have been held in the past, the process of competent force integration is still ephemeral.

Naturally, some integration has been achieved, but what has been done so far is not sufficient to field proficient forces that could act within a regional framework. How well troops do on the battlefield is directly commensurate with their equipment and training.

The better equipped and trained units that can actually talk to each other and coordinate whatever tasks they may be engaged in determines their relative successes. At a regional level, this cross-fertilisation is a very difficult task (the reason for fratricide), and GCC states are at their initial training stages.

Current state of affairs

Third, there is also a fundamental disagreement among GCC leaders regarding the further development of regional capacities. In the aftermath of the 1991 War for Kuwait, His Majesty Sultan Qaboos of Oman suggested that a 100,000-men GCC military force be organised.

Disagreements over who should lead such a force have prevented any concrete advances on this score. GCC leaders have opposed Qaboos' recommendations in the past although he was entrusted with the task of devising a workable solution. He did but there were few takers.

Under the circumstances, GCC states have extended military cooperation with the United States, Britain and France - less with several other states, including Pakistan, which provides internal security assistance - in the hope of deterring putative foes.

Towards that end, all GCC states accepted bilateral security agreements - but short of formal defence treaties - with Washington, London and Paris. These are non-negligible accords, even if it is difficult to determine the depths of commitment, especially on the part of Western powers.

In other words, will the latter assist GCC states once they are under direct attack from a foreign foe, or will rush in to buttress local governments? Hard to tell.

Still, ties with every GCC state have been strengthened with pre-positioned materials, joint exercises, and significant long-term commitments. This is important because the tens of billions of dollars allocated to sprawling facilities, state-of the-art equipment, and blue-ribbon training, have not prevented several wars.

GCC states cannot afford to spend without limit and probably need to concentrate much more on readiness as well as training.

Joseph Kéchichian, author of several books, is an analyst on Gulf and Middle East affairs.