The post election period in Pakistan has not produced a quick and clean arrangement. Bargaining through protracted negotiations continues creating a situation which is far removed from any political deadlock.
The post election period in Pakistan has not produced a quick and clean arrangement. Bargaining through protracted negotiations continues creating a situation which is far removed from any political deadlock. Instead the fast changing political scenario makes it difficult to predict with any certainty the exact composition of the ruling coalition.
Based on recent moves and reports the chances of a PML(Q) and MMA coalition forming the government at the Centre appears most likely. The establishment-supported Grand National Alliance would also be part of any future ruling coalition in which the PML(Q) would form the centrepiece.
Indeed Pakistanis have witnessed a constantly changing political scene as negotiations between the major political groupings and between them and the government continues. Used to either a one party government at the centre or partyless or caretaker governments with the blessings of the establishment, Pakistanis are also showing impatience with the prolonged process of coalition building.
Caught between their desire to see a rapidly functioning 'neat and clean' political set up and the simplistic yet widely publicised observations that delay government formation, their reservations reflects the weakness of the political class who tend to lose patience with politicians.
There are three key factors upon which the formation and to some extent the stability of the future government will be based.
One the actual convening of the National Assembly session. The authority to convene the session currently lies with the President. The convening of the session has been delayed because the main establishment supported party PML(Q) was unable to collect the numbers required in the parliament to form government.
Negotiations with parties, involve agreeing on the crucial power sharing formula who gets what ministries and also to some extent on the position of the parties on the Legal Framework Order (LFO).
The delay in convening the session theoretically helps parties to cobble together greater numbers through additional negotiations. Additionally, the rumoured lifting of the floor-crossing amendment could help members of various parties to cross over to the PML(Q). Similarly another form of again rumoured horse trading would be the attempt to encourage formation of a forward PPP bloc.
While the responsibility for individual or groups of politicians to indulge in horse trading lies largely with the politicians themselves, it is indeed the President's failure to convene the Assembly session promptly which prolongs the time available to politicians to break away from their parties.
This failure is deliberate. The President himself is keen to see some coalition arrangement in place before the Assembly session is convened. Hence he himself has been actively involved in meeting leaders from key political parties. His recent meeting with Qazi Hussain Ahmad facilitated by the PML(Q) and the President's own advisors was very significant.
Signs of some breakthrough between the PML(Q) and the MMA have been evident since that meeting, even as that impression was completely reversed the next day. So indeed the establishment itself is involved in the formation of future ruling coalitions; not however taking away from the independent moves made by major political leaders.
The second element that has delayed the formation of a future government until today has been the actual intra-party negotiations to get the right numbers. All the three major parties the PML(Q), the PPPP and the MMA have been negotiating with each other.
The ARD alliance which consists of the PML(N) and PPPP have also been active. However despite tough rhetoric against the army's involvement in politics no major political groupings within or outside of the ARD have been able to evolve a consensus position on the LFO.
At least no common position on the 'irreducible minimum' has been coherently articulated. Also as part of its power politics the PPP has shifted gears mid-stream. First after entering into negotiations with the MMA, the PPP reportedly struck a discordant political note when its leadership maintained in the United States that it could not enter into an alliance with the MMA.
Essentially, the PPP has now blocked that possibility completely. It has opted to not focus on the virtually shared LFO-specific position. Instead it has maintained that there are wide differences between MMA and PPP in foreign and domestic policy issues. Unless some other dramatic development takes place either a break away PPP group or the MMA would join hands with PML(Q) to form the government. And fairly soon.
The third element that has influenced party positions and the timing for government formation is the position of various parties on the Legal Framework Order. Of the around 42 elements in the LFO, the three key clauses are the dual charge of the President and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) held by General Pervez Musharraf; the National Security Council headed by the President and the powers under article 58(2)b given to the President to dismiss the Assembly.
The MMA , the PPPP and the PML(N) have all opposed all these three clauses. Interestingly MMA in its negotiations with the PML(Q) has stuck to its position of no National Security Council, giving up of the COAS's position by General Pervez Musharraf on a specific date which he should announce before being sworn in as President and finally exercise of presidential powers under 58(2)b should be allowed only after the Senate has cleared such a move.
While General Musharraf may give up the NSC he is unlikely to dilute his powers to dismiss an elected government. He maintains he will move from the khaki to mufti soon but refuses to announce a date. Clearly there has been some softening of General Musharraf's position on constitutional amendments; however only as far as the power of the politicians has required him to be.
The power game of give and take on Pakistan's political scenario continues. And the players remain the civilian politicians and uniformed managers. Developments in the post election 2002 period have ensured continued civilian-military partnership in running the government. The responsibility for these developments lies with both the civilian politicians and uniformed men. Pakistan's democratic experimentation is still under way.
Nasim Zehra is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political affairs.