Gaza wants back in from the darkness as Hamas feels the isolation

London; In his haberdashery, Saleem Salouha tracks the ups and downs of his business against events beyond his control.

The good times for his shop in Gaza City were when Mohammad Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood were in power in Egypt. The bolts of cloth stacked behind Salouha came via the network of smuggling tunnels under the border at Rafah. Gazans had money too to buy his goods in the middle of a mini-economic boom.

All that, however, ended last July when Mursi was deposed in a military coup and the new regime deemed the Brotherhood as “terrorist” organisation.

Egypt accused Hamas, the Brotherhood’s sister group that rules Gaza, of contributing to the security crisis in northern Sinai and closed down the smuggling tunnels.

Now Salouha orders the same goods, but they are brought through an Israeli border post, pushing up prices by 30 per cent, even as half his customers have withered away.

“It is a double blockade,” Salouha says, referring to the long-term Israeli policy of limiting goods to Gaza since Hamas assumed control in 2007. He adds bitterly: “Israel and the Egyptians are competing with each other.”

The story of the Salouha shop, in business since 1962, offers a microcosm of what has happened to Gaza and Hamas since Mursi was ousted.

It explains too why, after seven years governing Gaza at odds with its rival Fatah on the West Bank, Hamas might just be serious this time about moves to reconcile the often toxic Palestinian divisions. And if it is not serious, why Hamas views the agreement, signed last week, as an expedient move.

That deal vague on detail will see five weeks of talks for a national unity government, apparently largely technocratic. It would see moves to bring Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the prospect of elections by the year’s end.

Despite the very many uncertainties contained within it, not least the fact that the factions have travelled this road before without success.

The reality is that unfolding regional events since the Arab spring have left Hamas isolated as its former backers have become embroiled in war, like Syria, in Iran’s case more distant, or slammed the door on the Islamist movement as Egypt.

The consequences have been both economic and political.

The taxes the Hamas government once levied from the tunnel trade paid the salaries of the 47,000 people who worked directly for the movement. In recent months they have been occasionally received only half pay.

And if the economic crisis in Gaza is different to previous ones, it is because while in the past goods were expensive and hard to come by, at the start of the blockade in 2007 people had money. This time people don’t.

Omar Shaban, an economist at the Palthink think tank, says of the tunnel closures: “It was a huge source of income for them [Hamas] and they thought it would go on forever. The shock has been very deep because they didn’t anticipate that it could happen.

“What is devastating is that they can’t pay the salaries of those who work directly for the movement — and that includes a significant part of their security establishment including the Qassam brigades [Hamas’s military wing] and internal security.”

In political terms too, Hamas’s influence has been hugely diminished. Members of the movement are aware its popularity has halved in Gaza since it won the 2006 Palestinian elections, although it probably still enjoys the support from a third of the population despite polls suggesting a much lower proportion.

Behind the scenes Hamas has sustained another worrying blow to its prestige and influence. Despite Egypt’s tough new approach towards it, and the closure of the tunnels, it had still maintained a hotline to Cairo’s military intelligence, which historically had relied on Hamas to mediate with other factions like Islamic Jihad in times of crisis.

But when Islamic Jihad fired 70 missiles into Israel last month, both Gaza officials and Gaza analysts admit, Hamas was cut out of the loop with Egypt contacting Islamic Jihad directly to ask for a cessation.

Officially, Egypt says its policies, including destruction of the border tunnels, are to safeguard national security and stop the flow of weapons and supplies to Sinai’s militants responsible for more than 300 reported attacks since July and not a tactic designed to heap pressure on Hamas inside Gaza.

In showcase trials of Brotherhood figures, including Mursi, Hamas has been accused of helping spring him from jail during the 2011 uprising against the Hosni Mubarak regime.

“We will close the tunnels because they are illegal and because they constitute a security threat to Egypt,” the Egyptian foreign minister, Nabeel Fahmi, told the Guardian last week. “It’s not being used as a pressure point against Hamas in favour of the PNA [Palestinian National Authority].”

Privately, senior Egyptian military officials tell a different story. “Our main goal,” said one, “is to secure our borders and our national security interests, and to eliminate any kind of smuggling. But also as a side effect, we need to see the Palestinian Authority in charge of the Gaza Strip. It’s our business to see the Palestinian Authority run the Gaza Strip, to have somebody to deal with We don’t have a relationship with Hamas. We see them as a terrorist organisation that is allied to the Muslim Brotherhood.”

According to another military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, it was not Egypt’s problem if the tunnel closures affected Hamas. “Hamas will not be happy because they get a lot of money from the tunnels $2bn [Dh7.35 billion] a year. But it’s not our problem should we let them do it? No. It’s illegal.”

He added: “We would prefer any other government. [That’s] one of the targets. If I have an unfavourable government in a neighbouring country, of course we want regime change [there].”

Some products are still reaching Gaza from Egypt. Cement from a company in which the Egyptian military has a financial interest is one. Other foreign projects in which Egypt has a contractor interest are also still going ahead.

Politically too, while the present regime in Egypt may want to shut down Hamas for largely domestic considerations, it is also aware that collectively punishing Gaza may be unpopular.

“Hamas is a problem for Egypt. Because the Muslim Brotherhood is a banned organisation now in Egypt, Hamas is also banned. The Sissi regime cannot be seen to be dealing with Hamas. But that does not mean that there are no contacts at all, although for now they are at a minimal level,” said Mkhaimar Abu Sada, a political scientist at Al Azhar University in Gaza, referring to Abdul Fatah Al Sissi, the retired army chief expected to win the presidential elections next month. Abu Sada added that Hamas felt rejection last month when Cairo spoke directly to Islamic Jihad about ending rocket fire into Israel.

Since then, however, Egypt has allowed Hamas deputy leader, Mousa Abu Marzouk who had been in Egypt and banned from travelling to enter Gaza, as a prelude to the Palestinian unity talks.

One thing that many observers, both in Gaza and outside, agree on is that Hamas will be hoping the reconciliation process with Fatah leads to Egypt easing restriction at the Rafah crossing, which is currently only open for a handful of days a month.

There is another, perhaps more self-interested reason, driving Hamas back to talks with their West Bank rivals, as described by the Haaretz journalist Amira Hass in a recent comment article.

“Many Palestinian observers predict that the collapse of the Palestinian Authority assuming Israel sticks to its policy of weakening it would help strengthen the position of Hamas and its government.

“If Hamas joins the PLO, it will become a major force within it, and if it doesn’t join, it will be perceived as a true and legitimate representative of the Palestinians. These mutual suspicions about the motives of the other party could end up scuttling reconciliation once again.”