Iran seeks recognition of Hormuz ‘sovereignty’ in high‑stakes end‑of‑war talks

Many Iranian officials have publicly stated: their strategic goal is to ensure "sovereignty" over the strait.
This demand has featured prominently in negotiations with the US so far, a global conflict monitor notes.
Amid the on-going talks, US negotiators have pushed for stricter limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, while Tehran has demanded guarantees on sanctions and recognition of its strategic interests in the Gulf.
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At the heart of Iran’s negotiating strategy: its push for “sovereignty” over the Strait of Hormuz, a slender but vital waterway through which a significant share of the world’s oil flows — making its future a matter that could directly affect energy bills and inflation worldwide.
"One of Iran’s primary objectives in the current negotiations is to secure its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz," Brian Carter of the Institute of the Study of War (ISW), a Washington think-tank, wrote on May 23, 2026.
"This objective is more important for Tehran than securing fees from merchant vessels as they transit the Strait," he added.
"Tehran may be willing to trade this objective for major gains on the nuclear program, sanctions relief, the release of frozen funds, or a large-scale US withdrawal from the region," ISW writes.
However, all of these “trades” are still bad from the perspective of the US and its Gulf allies, and pretty much of the rest of world.
Tehran has framed management of Hormuz as a "sovereignty issue" and has resisted US efforts to classify the passage as fully international waters outside Iranian authority.
The dispute has become increasingly intertwined with negotiations over Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, sanctions relief, frozen Iranian assets and broader regional security arrangements.
On Monday, a senior Tehran official said Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz remains a "central" condition for any peace agreement with the US.
The Strait of Hormuz is not up for negotiations the way we did with the nuclear issueEbrahim Azizi, who heads the Iranian parliament’s National Security Committee
Ebrahim Azizi, who heads the Iranian parliament’s National Security Committee, said Tehran would not negotiate away its authority over the strait, describing the issue as "fundamentally different" from discussions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme.
“The Strait of Hormuz is not up for negotiations the way we did with the nuclear issue,” Azizi said.
His remarks came as Washington and Tehran continued indirect talks on a possible framework that could extend a ceasefire, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and create a pathway for broader negotiations over Iran’s nuclear activities and sanctions relief.
It also underscores one of the key sticking points in ongoing negotiations aimed at ending months of conflict and reopening of Hormuz.
Reports from Reuters and other international media outlets said the US and Iran have discussed a phased plan under which the strait could reopen around 30 days after a formal agreement is reached.
The proposal reportedly includes demining operations and guarantees for the safe passage of commercial vessels.
Iranian officials, however, have repeatedly stressed that reopening the strait does not mean surrendering control over it.
Despite reports of "progress", both sides have cautioned that no final agreement has been reached.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei Hamaneh said discussions had produced understandings on many issues but warned that an imminent deal should not be assumed.
The uncertainty has kept oil markets on edge, with traders closely monitoring developments around Hormuz because any prolonged disruption could affect global energy supplies and fuel prices worldwide.
US and world vital interests require denying Iran control of the strait – by negotiations or by force.
Iran likely sees two paths to controlling the strait.
First, Iranian control could be officially recognised by the United States through an agreement.
Other countries would probably oppose such recognition, but changing the new status quo would be extremely challenging.
Second, Iran could maintain the current situation by firing missiles or drones (or credibly threatening to do so) at ships that fail to heed Iranian demands related to transiting the strait.
Very few countries — and perhaps none — will approve of Iranian threats, but stopping Iranian coercion will require the use of force or an agreement that formally ends Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.Institute of the Study of War
"Very few countries — and perhaps none — will approve of Iranian threats, but stopping Iranian coercion will require the use of force or an agreement that formally ends Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz,” ISW states.
Iran’s scheme to extract large fees for safe transit through the strait will likely “fail”, the think-tank predicts, absent a major change in the appetite among shipping companies for risking sanctions.
“But the failure of the fee scheme does not ipso facto result in a failure of Iran’s scheme to control the strait,” Carter added.
Many shipping companies are extremely hesitant to pay Iran for transit due to sanctions compliance issues, but even if these ships do not pay Iran, they still cannot pass the strait without serious risk-taking.
To illustrate the point, if a ship wants to pass the strait, it has four basic options.
First, it can pay the Iranians.
Second, it can refuse to pay the Iranians and not transit the strait.
Third, it could seek out a government that would work out a bilateral agreement with Iran to enable the vessel’s transit without a fee.
Fourth, it could “run the guns” and attempt to transit the strait (an incredibly small number of ships have done this so far).
The first violates sanctions, the third is not viable for many vessels, and the fourth carries extreme risk.
Iran may not be able to collect fees, but it will retain its leverage.
The US Navy blockade
Some industry analysts have suggested that Iran does not actually control the Strait of Hormuz at all because any “Iranian vessel” exiting the strait is subject to the US Navy blockade.
The US Navy blockade does not negate Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz because the blockade is against Iranian ports — not against ships that have accepted Iran’s terms for passing the strait as long as they do not travel to or from Iranian ports.
The current US blockade thus does not impede de facto Iranian control over the passage of the strait for other countries.
Any vessel that uses Iran’s transit scheme but does not leave or enter Iranian ports can still exit, and any vessel that does not use the transit scheme will still get shot at by the Iranians.
For example, Iraq reportedly negotiated a tanker’s transit through the Strait of Hormuz with Iran.
The tanker did not pay a fee, and though the US Navy stopped it briefly, it was subsequently released because it did not violate the blockade by traveling from an Iranian port.
The Iranians may suffer grievous economic damage from the blockade, but the blockade itself is not undermining Iran’s assertion of control over the passage of third-country ships through the strait.
A deal to reopen Hormuz is now a key sticking point between the Americans and Iranians involved in negotiations.
What it would take for Hormuz to “return to normal”
Analysts say that without either a deal that ends Iranian control or a US-led military operation that forces the strait open to prevent Iranian control, the strait will not “return to normal”.
The third option is recognition of Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait, which is both unacceptable and fails to accomplish a “return to normal” in the strait.
For as long as they are willing to attack, harass, and threaten shipping in Hormuz, the Iranians could maintain their stranglehold over the strait.
The international community cannot “wait out” Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
The protraction of the current situation, on the contrary, serves Iran’s interests by letting Tehran “normalise” its de facto control of transit through the strait.
The Iranians are likely aware of that fact: this is seen as one of the reasons they are stalling and delaying the negotiations process.
The US and the world should not allow Iran to impose a new reality on this critical international waterway.
“If negotiations do not lead rapidly to an agreement to reopen the strait under the previous, internationally-recognised transit scheme, then it will unfortunately be necessary to resort to force,” ISW stated.