This time Schwarzkopf isn't convinced

Norman Schwarzkopf wants to give peace a chance.

The general who commanded U.S. forces in the 1991 Gulf War says he hasn't seen enough evidence to convince him that his old comrades Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Paul Wolfowitz are correct in moving toward a new war. He thinks UN inspections are still the proper course to follow. He's worried about the cockiness of the U.S. war plan, and even more by the potential human and financial costs of occupying Iraq.

And don't get him started on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

In fact, the hero of the last Gulf War sounds surprisingly like the man on the street when he discusses his ambivalence about the Bush administration's hawkish stance on ousting Saddam Hussain. He worries about the Iraqi leader, but would like to see some persuasive evidence of Iraq's alleged weapons programmes.

"The thought of Saddam Hussain with a sophisticated nuclear capability is a frightening thought, okay?'' he says. "Now, having said that, I don't know what intelligence the U.S. government has. And before I can just stand up and say, 'Beyond a shadow of a doubt, we need to invade Iraq,' I guess I would like to have better information.''

He hasn't seen that yet, and so - in sharp contrast to the Bush administration - he supports letting the UN weapons inspectors drive the timetable: "I think it is very important for us to wait and see what the inspectors come up with, and hopefully they come up with something conclusive.''

Schwarzkopf is one of the nation's best-known military officers. What's more, he's closely allied with the Bush family. He hunts with the first President Bush. He campaigned for the second, speaking on military issues at the 2000 GOP convention in Philadelphia and later stumping in Florida with Cheney, who was secretary of defence during the 1991 war.

But he sees the world differently from those Gulf War colleagues. "It's obviously not a black-and-white situation over there'' in the Mideast, he says. "I would just think that whatever path we take, we have to take it with a bit of prudence.''

So has he seen sufficient prudence in the actions of his old friends in the Bush administration? Again, he carefully withholds his endorsement. "I don't think I can give you an honest answer on that.''

Now 68, he's had time to think. He likes the performance of Powell - chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, now secretary of state. "He's doing a wonderful job, I think,'' he says. But he's less impressed by Rumsfeld. "Candidly, I have gotten somewhat nervous at some of the pronouncements Rumsfeld has made.''

He contrasts Cheney's low profile as defence secretary during the Gulf War with Rumsfeld's frequent television appearances since September 11, 2001. "He almost sometimes seems to be enjoying it.'' That, Schwarzkopf admonishes, is a sensation to be avoided in wartime.

Some at the top of the Army see Rumsfeld and those around him as overly enamoured of air power and high technology and insufficiently attentive to the brutal difficulties of ground combat. Schwarzkopf's comments reflect Pentagon scuttlebutt that Rumsfeld and his aides have brushed aside some of the Army's concerns.

The Rumsfeld thing

"The Rumsfeld thing ... that's what comes up,'' when he calls old Army friends in the Pentagon, he says.

"When he makes his comments, it appears that he disregards the Army,'' Schwarzkopf says.

"He gives the perception when he's on TV that he is the guy driving the train and everybody else better fall in line behind him - or else.''

That dismissive posture bothers Schwarzkopf because he thinks Rumsfeld and the people around him lack the background to make sound military judgments. He prefers the way Cheney operated during the Gulf War.

"He didn't put himself in the position of being the decision-maker as far as tactics were concerned, as far as troop deployments, as far as missions were concerned.''

He notes that there are "guys at the Pentagon who have been involved in operational planning for their entire lives. ... And for this wisdom, acquired during many operations, wars, schools, for that just to be ignored, and in its place have somebody who doesn't have any of that training, is of concern.''

Schwarzkopf is sceptical that an invasion of Iraq would be fast and simple. "I have picked up vibes that ... you're going to have this massive strike with massed weaponry, and basically that's going to be it, and we just clean up the battlefield after that,'' he says.

He expresses even more concern about the task the U.S. military might face after a victory.

Huge question

"What is postwar Iraq going to look like, with the Kurds and the Sunnis and the Shiites? That's a huge question, to my mind. It really should be part of the overall campaign plan.''

(Rumsfeld said last week that post-Saddam planning "is a tough question and we're spending a lot of time on it, let me assure you.'') Schwarzkopf draws fire for approving a cease-fire in the Gulf War that permitted the Iraqi military to continue flying helicopters. Soon afterward, Iraqi helicopter gunships were used to put down revolts in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north of Iraq. Only later were "no-fly zones'' established to protect those minority populations.

When Army colonels study the Gulf War at the Army War College nowadays, notes one professor there, "a big part of the class is discussing war termination.''

Schwarzkopf was never as lionised in military circles as he was by the general public. His reputation inside the Army has "always been a bit different from the outside view,'' notes retired Army Col. Richard Sinnreich, who frequently participates in war games and other military training.

Sinnreich doesn't think many in the armed forces blame Schwarzkopf for the inconclusive ending of the Gulf War. "I know of no Army officer, active or retired, who holds such a view,'' he says. "The decision to suspend offensive operations clearly was a political decision that I suspect the relevant principals now profoundly regret, even if they're loath to admit it.''

But what did sour some in the Army on Schwarzkopf, says Sinnreich, was his "rather ungracious treatment of his Gulf War subordinates.''

Schwarzkopf raised eyebrows across the Army when, in his Gulf War memoir, he denounced one of his generals, Frederick Franks, for allegedly moving his 7th Corps in a "plodding and overly cautious'' manner during the attack on the Iraqi military. He elaborated on that criticism in subsequent rounds of interviews. The Army, even more than the other services, likes to keep its internal disputes private.

The other behaviour that bothered some was Schwarzkopf's virtual absence from the Army after the Gulf War. Many retired generals make almost a full-time job of working with the Army - giving speeches at West Point and at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. visiting bases to mentor up-and-coming officers, sitting on Pentagon advisory boards, writing commentaries in military journals.

Tight agenda

"The fact that Schwarzkopf ... did not make himself available to speak to the many, many Army audiences anxious to listen to him won him