Sri Lanka tries to tame Tamil Tigers

The proposed talks between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government, to be held in Thailand next month, could help end the bloody civil war that has been going on for a long time in the teardrop Indian Ocean island of Sri Lanka.

Ever since the minority ethnic Tamils took to arms 19 years ago to carve out an independent state of Tamil Eelam in the north-east of the country, successive Sri Lankan governments have used all options to solve the ethnic struggle but in vain.

The bitter conflict so far has claimed 64,000 lives, including those of leading Sri Lankan politicians and the high profile assassinations of Sri Lanka's president Ranasinghe Premadasa and India's former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.

As such the mere announcement that the two parties are ready to sit down and discuss the modalities of a negotiated settlement holds significant importance.

Sceptics have enough reasons to be pessimistic, for they know well that past efforts to bring the Tamil secessionist groups, especially the dominant LTTE, to the negotiating table have faltered at the final stages. But that was then. Now, there is a glimmer of hope and the expectations have risen due to changed circumstances in the aftermath of September 11 and the U.S.-led international war on terrorism.

Under prevailing world conditions, the LTTE is one rebel group that has been affected by the anti-terrorism campaign. Already, six countries, including Britain, Canada and India, have classified the LTTE as a foreign terrorist group and banned it from using their soils to mobilise support and raise funds for the cause of Tamil Eelam.

The U.S. too has tightened the screws on the LTTE. In the list of terrorist organisations released by the U.S. on October 8, 1997, the name of the Tigers has figured prominently and under a provision of the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996, members of these groups cannot operate from or enter the U.S.

The rebels are savvy enough to realise that the tide is turning against them and hence will not be able to hold their base Jaffna and its surrounding areas where they have established a de facto state. These are all the more reasons for the LTTE to negotiate for a solution as they can do so now from a position of strength.

Moreover, optimism sprouts from the fact that reclusive LTTE leader Veluppillai Prabhakaran himself has expressed hope for an end to the separatist war. In his first public appearance after a 12-year hiatus, Prabhakaran at a tightly guarded press conference on April 10 in Kilinochchi about 430 kms north of the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo, insisted that his LTTE was "committed to peace and a negotiated settlement".

He even had a word of praise for the Norwegian intermediaries, for doing the spade work and said with elated confidence that "with the mediation help by the Norwegian government, I believe this process will succeed this time."

The recent LTTE 's efforts to patch up their differences with the Muslims of the north-east also adds credence to Prabhakaran's resolve to end the conflict. It may be noted here that the Norwegians have been working behind the scene for the past two years and their efforts have borne fruits with the ceasefire agreement on February 22.

On the other hand Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickre-mensinghe, a pacifist, has walked an extra mile and is ready to accommodate most of the LTTE demands within the frameworks of the country's Constitution. However, he has a difficult task in hand as he has to trod on a fine line, so as not to upset the radicals in both camps.

The premier knows that by acquiescing to the Tigers' demand, he will antagonise Sinhalese hawks, especially the nationalist JVP party, who advocate a military solution to the conflict and are against giving greater autonomy to the Tamils.

The JVP argue that it is pointless to reach an agreement with Prabhakaran as he has used such ploys before and point at pre-conditions, especially the de-proscription of the LTTE, to justify their opposition.

But Wickremensinghe is undeterred by the opposition harangue and is considering lifting the ban on the Tigers. As a first step in this direction, he has tried to seek the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist clergy for his peace plan.

Moreover, as he has won the presidential election on a peace platform, Wickremen-singhe feels he has the backing of the majority to strike a deal with Prabhakaran and thereby bridge the widening chasm between the nearly 74 per cent Sinhalese, who are mainly Buddhists, and the 18 per cent Tamils, mostly Hindus.

The two communities started to drift apart soon after independence from Britain on February 4, 1948. The rift started initially due to economic and social disparities - the Tamils due to their advanced education had better jobs and more income than the majority community.

It was precipitated further with the rise of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, wherein Sinhalese intellectuals opined that the unity of the island was intertwined with the Buddhist faith and Sinhala language and the Tamils were invaders from South India.

Successive governments, starting from the late prime minister, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, gave in to the sentiments of the nationalists and approved legislations which the Tamils considered discriminatory and unjust. Acts to disenfranchise the Tamils of Indian origin and the official language act, granting the sole official language status to Sinhala further alienated the minority community.

By the mid-70s, the Tamils started to talk in terms of a separate state in the north and east of the country, areas in which they are in a majority. And their resolve was reinforced after the government of Srimavo Bandaranaike, widow of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, introduced the standardisation of education in the early 1970s, making Sinhala compulsory in all schools.

The radicals felt that the only way to achieve their goal was through an armed struggle. Hostility began to grow and the emotional division between the Sinhalese and the Tamils became more acute.

Against this background, a group of highly organised young Tamil militants, first calling themselves the New Tamil Tigers and later The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 1976, under the leadership of Prabhakaran emerged to confront the government by bearing arms.

The school-drop out from Velvettihurai, a port town in Jaffna peninsula, moulded the LTTE into a highly disciplined and dedicated force, a manifestation of which is inherent in what is called the 'cyanide cult'. Each regular member of the LTTE carries a cyanide capsule around his/her neck and is pledged to committing suicide rather than being captured by the enemy.

Prabhakaran exerts total influence over his cadres due to his ruthless and authoritarian control. He has developed a cult of hero worship, and eliminates anyone who opposes him. Many moderate Tamil leaders lost their lives by differing with him on ideology. By instilling terror and fear, Prabhakaran has became a fearsome enigma.

Under his command, the LTTE have not only grown to great heights with regard to manpower, but they have also expanded themselves in every aspect of warfare and governing. The discipline and respect that its members have both within their