Musharraf yet to fulfil promise of reforms

Two seemingly unrelated developments over the last few days bring into question the intentions of Pakistan's present military oligarchy, which continues to present itself as a reforming regime working towards a transition to democracy.

The first was the release of Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar, ostensibly under the orders of a court. General Pervez Musharraf banned Jaish earlier in the year for being a terrorist organisation.

Maulana Azhar was reluctantly put under house arrest after much pressure from the United States, on account of his public advocacy of suicide bombings and his statement accepting responsibility for last year's October 1 attack on the legislative assembly building in Srinagar.

The court ordering his release said the government had failed to make the case for his continued detention under the Public Safety law, raising the question whether the government really wanted to keep him detained.

After all, once it decides to keep someone in prison, the Pakistani government can find a hundred ways to attain its objective. Asif Ali Zardari, husband of exiled opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, has obtained bail from various courts several times only to face continued imprisonment on a new charge.

General Musharraf purged the superior courts soon after his 1999 military coup under his Provisional Constitution Order and the courts have been virtually subservient to the executive ever since.

Pakistan's prosecuting authorities have never been independent of political decisions, making Maulana Masood Azhar's case all the more troubling. If General Musharraf and his government did not have evidence to consider Jaish-e-Muhammad a terrorist organisation, why did they ban it? And if such evidence does exist, why was it not used to extend Maulana Azhar's detention.?

The second recent manifestation of the disturbing trend of General Musharraf's policies was the 'election' of the new Sindh Chief Minister. The Sindh assembly was convened 62 days after its election, the longest delay in the convening of any provincial assembly in the country.

The provincial government was cobbled together by the Intelligence services, which brought disparate elements and individuals together to deny the single largest party in the province, the PPP, the right of trying to form a coalition.

To accommodate the demands of the largest coalition partner, the Mutahhida Qaumi Movement (MQM), terror was unleashed against its local rival and breakaway group, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (commonly known as MQM-Haqiqi). Both groups of the MQM have, at different times, been considered as proteges of the establishment in its effort to limit the PPP's influence in Sindh.

Police besieged the assembly building soon after the assembly was convened to arrest a Haqiqi legislator. By all accounts, the new Sindh government is likely to follow in the footsteps of a similar anyone-but-PPP regime unleashed on the province between 1990-1993. The then Chief Minister, Jam Sadiq Ali, was handpicked by the Intelligence services in the same manner as Ali Mohammed Maher has been chosen.

Lacking any substantive political following, Jam Sadiq Ali presided over a reign of terror bereft of any semblance of adherence to the law or constitution. Then as now, the majority within the coalition belonged to the urban-based Urdu-speaking MQM, which was accused of controlling Sindh's cities with the help of its private militia.

It is obvious that notwithstanding his promises to his U.S. allies, General Musharraf's overall game plan for Pakistan is not different from that of his predecessors. He considers civilian politicians like Bhutto a greater threat than leaders of groups that he has himself named as militants.

He has no interest in allowing politics as usual, enabling politicians to negotiate with each other and making decisions for which they can subsequently be held responsible by the electorate.

The military establishment's invisible fixers, who were not that invisible during the horse-trading in Sindh, continue to muddy Pakistan's political water. But the military and its apologists routinely deny they have anything to do with whatever is going on. They want the world to believe that the court released Masood Azhar and that the political wheeling and dealing is the handiwork of the politicians.

Even though General Musharraf and his team are calling all shots, any and all blame for the resultant chaos will invariably be laid at the doorstep of politicians as has been the case for the last several decades.

Behind-the-scenes manipulation of the political system does not make it easy to hold accountable those truly responsible for bad decisions.

Soon after he assumed power, General Musharraf managed to convince many Pakistanis of his good intentions. Over the last three years, he has not been an easy man to define. He rules by decree while professing to build a democracy. He supported the Taliban only to become famous for his role in their destruction. He seeks dialogue with India without hiding his belief that India is Pakistan's eternal enemy. He enjoys and clings to power while claiming he came to it by accident.

In a recent interview he revealed that Richard Nixon and Napoleon are his leadership models.
Perhaps that is the most telling revelation about him. Neither Nixon nor Napoleon was known particularly for following rules as for them ends justified their means. And the end for both of General Musharraf's leadership models was none other than wielding and accumulating power.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed General Musharraf Pakistan's army chief in 1998, choosing him over two senior generals because he did not see him as a potential coup-maker. Within a year of his appointment, General Musharraf had overthrown Sharif in a military coup.

According to General Musharraf, the military took over because Sharif tried to replace him as army chief while he was on his way back from a trip to Sri Lanka. Sharif was even tried for plotting to kill Musharraf by refusing to let his plane land in Pakistan.

Now, three years later, it seems that the 'reluctant coup maker' was part of the myth General Musharraf wanted to create about his personality. He promised reform and a swift return to democracy. He also cultivated the image of being a straightforward soldier who speaks his mind.

But that image has been shattered by the manner in which he held a fraudulent referendum in April, amended Pakistan's constitution by decree in August to consolidate his power, and the recent political machinations to create a pliant civilian façade for his regime.

General Musharraf has so far ruled with the help of a small group of close military friends. He has avoided a reputation for repression and has allowed a relatively free press. But he does not believe in legal niceties if and when he needs to get tough.

General Musharraf demonstrated his willingness to take risks by abandoning support for Afghanistan's Taliban and took on Pakistan's own Islamists. But his promises of reform remain unfulfilled and he seems to be going back on most of his promises.

Some attribute his failure to an instinct for surv