Musharraf continues with his manoeuvres

General Pervez Musharraf has finally settled on 29 arbitrary amendments to Pakistan's constitution that give him sweeping powers. Almost everyone outside his close circle sees the amendments as an attempt to perpetuate his rule, without any check or balance.

Musharraf, however, insists that his package of constitutional amendments will lead to restoration of democracy. As George Perkovich pointed out in a recent article on Pakistan's military leader, Musharraf sees his intentions as the criterion for judging his actions. And since, in his view, his intentions are good he cannot understand why anyone should question his actions.

But constitutional arrangements cannot be based on the whims or beliefs on an individual. They must have the sanction of a broad national consensus behind them. Similarly, the concept of checks and balances practiced the world over assumes that one institution of state will act as a check on the arbitrary power of the other.

Musharraf is reviving the notion of divine right of rulers in suggesting that he (and his good intentions) is the only check needed in Pakistan's constitution. And there is no need for a check or balance against his powers. While re-distributing powers between president and prime minister, the Musharraf constitution does not address the consistent failing of Pakistan's political life: the preponderance of power of the executive branch of government.

Pakistan's constitutional experiments have failed in the past because they were designed to suit the writers of the constitution. The latest attempt at constitutional engineering is no different. It would have been much better if, instead of re-writing the constitution to suit his perceived needs, Musharraf had opted to become the first Pakistani leader who submitted his whims to the constitution.

The virtually new constitution confers dictatorial powers on a military ruler-turned-president. But Musharraf does not seem satisfied with "securing" his future by decree. His governmental team is working overtime to influence the outcome of the October 10 parliamentary election. The manner in which the European Union's attempt to objectively assess the electoral process has been questioned indicates that the government's plans for the polls are not completely above board.

Usually one does not mind observers when one has nothing to hide. India's refusal to accept international monitoring of the forthcoming election in Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir has been justifiably criticised for that very reason. If Pakistan tries to handicap election monitoring, the credibility of the electoral exercise will certainly come into question here as well.

The failure to register the names of several hundred thousand eligible voters in the electoral register, and the inability to issue 10 million eligible voters with national identity cards are enough to make the election process doubtful. Such massive disenfranchisement is possibly the result of bureaucratic incompetence. It could also be part of a deliberate policy to contain the influence of the two major political parties led by former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

The government is going to considerable lengths to ensure that the two former leaders do not return to office. Several decrees have been issued to exclude Bhutto and Sharif from the election. Disenfranchising voters in districts considered their traditional strongholds could be an added precaution against their parties emerging victorious at the polls. If the people are not to be given a free choice in electing their leaders, and an election is only meant to go through the motions of democracy without really conceding any ground, then what does it matter if a large number of voters cannot vote?

Rules of the game

The rules of the game for the election are different from those that were introduced for last April's referendum. Then, 18-year-olds were allowed to vote and the need for identity cards was waived. Laws relating to the composition of the future parliament, as well as about the conduct of elections have been changed several times. While there is consistency in Musharraf's desire to exclude some politicians from future politics, confusion and eclecticism have characterised his plans for fulfilling that objective.

In many ways, Pakistan is witnessing a re-run of the days when the abbreviation of General Zia-ul-Haq's title, CMLA for Chief Martial Law Administrator, was humourously used by journalists to mean "Cancel My Last Announcement".

A farcical election may take away the remaining veneer of respectability from the Musharraf regime, which started with considerable goodwill in 1999 and got a second lease of life after September 11 last year, only to squander both its opportunities. For now, Musharraf appears firmly in control and wields effective power. But the only reason he is holding elections is to acquire legitimacy that he does not enjoy as a military ruler.

Musharraf's patron since September 2001, the United States, looked the other way over the massive fraud in the referendum. It may not be able to do the same if the October election fails to meet the standards of a free and fair poll.

Musharraf hopes to change the label on his military regime, redefining it as a democracy without altering its substance. That would leave the U.S. dealing with him and the complexities of military-dominated politics in Pakistan - something Washington is not too keen to do despite its need of Pakistan in the war against terrorism. Having a military dictator in charge may be good for the current phase of the Afghan war though even that is debatable. But even American analysts recognise that it does not transform Pakistan into the stable ally sought by the U.S. in the region and the Islamic world.

To influence a correction of course by the general, the U.S. should publicly declare that it does not approve of his attempts to re-write Pakistan's constitution by decree. Such public criticism would bolster the morale of Pakistan's judiciary and political parties. It might even force Musharraf to reconsider his arbitrary constitutional plans.

The Bush administration feels that it owes Musharraf a debt of gratitude for his support in the war effort since September 11. One way to repay this debt would be to advise him against self-destructive actions. A fixed or flawed election will only destabilise Pakistan and undermine its capability in confronting terrorists. Although more than half of Pakistan's life as an independent nation has been spent under military rule, military governments have never been able to achieve moral authority. A regime that draws power from the military, and not from a popular mandate, could be rendered ineffective at any stage.

Pakistani democracy has a mixed track record. No elected leader in the country has been able to complete their term of office. Recent civilian prime ministers were removed through palace coups amid accusations of widespread corruption and incompetence.

The problem is partly linked with the pervasive role of the military in decision-making. Pakistan's security services play a behind-the-scenes role even when civilians are visibly in charge. Even now, covert efforts are afoot to support an alliance of