Kissinger's analysisis a recipe for disaster

In an interview published on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a key supporter of the war on Iraq, lashed out at the Bush administration's "efforts" to establish democracy in Iraq.

He mocked at the idea that the United States can democratise the Arab country or deal with it in the same way post-war Germany or Japan were dealt with.

For Kissinger the analogy which was made in the run up to the war between Iraq and the two non-Arab countries was overly mistaken. Germany and Japan were countries which have a coherent national structure and history.

They were countries that felt they had been defeated and therefore needed a new approach.

Iraq, by contrast, was nothing like that. And for this reason, Kissinger argued, "I preferred an approach, which is now being decried, of trying to get somebody to surrender and establish a government, and then creating some sort of UN structure, in which UN forces could protect the borders and help this government in a crisis, rather than assuming full responsibility for rebuilding the country as a democracy".

Anyone who reads Kissinger's analysis would instantly think that the former US secretary of state is trying to project his celebrated pragmatism about how to go about things in politics.

Yet, if we follow his words to the end we discover soon that this is never the reason that makes Kissinger pessimistic about establishing democracy in Iraq.

Rather, he fears the emergence of a radical, theocratic government in Baghdad as a result of the democratic process.

If that happens, Kissinger argues, the consequence will be earth-shaking. "The radical side of Islam will get tremendous impetus in every Islamic country. And I don't know any leader of any country that has a large Islamic minority, or is Islamic like Indonesia or Malaysia, that would not be grievously affected by an American defeat as I have defined it in Iraq".

Kissinger pretends he is not against democracy per se. But believes, just like Judith Miller and Daniel Pipes, that democracy is not for everyone.

"I support the concept, I support the attitude, but we should keep in mind that we also support stability. It's difficult to apply this in every country."

To support this argument, Kissinger cites Iran as an example, where he believes democracy and stability are incompatible.

Historically, he argued, attempts to forcefeed democracy in the Carter administration produced Ayatollah Khomeini, or contributed to producing Khomeini. So the line one has to walk here needs to be very sensitively drawn.

Kissinger tends to forget, however, that the very logic he advocates today on Iraq has cost America Iran and earned it animosity that is still amazingly alive.

Indeed, Kissinger was outside the power circles at the time of the Iranian revolution. But his sympathisers presented Carter with exactly the same argument.

Two factions

At the time, two factions were competing for formulating US policy on Iran: the National Security Council (NSC) headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and advocated supporting the Shah to the last drop of Iranian blood.

The other faction was represented by the State Department and advised Carter to ignore cultural and religious issues and focus instead on economic, political and strategic interests in dealing with the Iranian revolution.

Some officials in the State Department went as far as to recommend that the United States facilitate the removal of the Shah and establish a dialogue with Khomeini prior to his imminent victory.

This policy, State Department officials argued, would serve US interests and bolster its position and credibility vis-à-vis the Iranian clergy should they come to rule the country.

Hardliners in the NSC rejected this policy and tried to undermine it. Gary Sick, chief assistant to Brzezinski and NSC staff member in charge of Iranian affairs, held the argument that at the heart of US-Iranian relations lay deep cultural antagonism.

The relation symbolised a confrontation between two world models and two different cultures: Khomeini's theocratic Islam and America's secular-democratic concepts.

For Sick, America had no choice but to win this civilisational conflict by preventing Iran from going Islamic. This policy ended up in losing both the Shah and Iran.

Kissinger's statements carry the risk of repeating the same mistake in Iraq.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations, faculty of political science and media, Damascus University, Damascus, Syria.