Druze leader comes in from the cold

In November 2000, Walid Jumblatt broke a 25-year alliance with Syria by joining the anti-Syrian movement in Lebanon. Today, having spent two years with the opposition, Jumblatt returns to the Syrian fold. His historic April meeting at his castle in the Mukhtara village with Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam, raises many questions on Jumblatt's aims. Why now? And, what does he want?

When Hafez Al Assad died in June 2000, Jumblatt shifted to the opposition and spoke out in parliament asking for Syrian troop redeployment from Lebanon. He also established himself as an opposition leader to President Emille Lahoud, who had been handpicked by Syria, claiming that Lahoud had imposed a dictatorship over Lebanon. Jumblatt allied with Prime Minister Rafiq Al Hariri, who was also at odds with Lahoud, and the two men began working for his downfall.

Jumblatt also allied himself with Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, who was spearheading the anti-Syrian movement, and increased his powerbase in Lebanon from a mere Druze leader to a national leader for Christian, Muslim and Druze, who all shared a common desire to curb Syrian influence in Lebanon.

Syria, eager to strike back, declared Jumblatt's VIP status in Damascus void. Undaunted, Jumblatt further allied himself with the Qurnet Shahwan.

Policy shift

Gathering, an alliance of Christian opposition leaders who wanted Syria out of Lebanon and, in August 2001, received the Patriarch at his stronghold in the mixed Druze-Maronite Shouf.

The mountain district, the battleground for bloody clashes between both communities during the Civil War, became a spot for national reconciliation between Jumblatt and his past. During the war, from his headquarters in the Shouf, the Druze leader had called for the annihilation of the Maronites. On September 11, 1983, while his troops were engaged in bloody combat with the Maronites, Jumblatt announced his future policy from Damascus saying: "With the help of our Syrian allies we have removed the Christians and only the Druze villages will remain from now on. Such is our objective."

In 2001, he also made his peace with declared Syrian opponents like ex-President Amin Gemayel and other one-time enemies whom he had repeatedly clashed with during and after the civil war. Also in August 2001, Jumblatt clashed with Lahoud over the crackdown on anti-Syrian activists in Beirut, claiming that their arrest was un-constitutional. Lahoud, in a bid at pleasing the Syrians and alienating both Hariri and Jumblatt, ordered the arrest of hundreds of Christian student activists. Hariri complained, claiming that the orders had been given without his permission, and Jumblatt accused Lahoud of infringing civil liberties and called on him to step down.

New incarnation

The new Jumblatt that emerged in May 2002 is completely different from the former. First, after a long honeymoon with the prime minister, Jumblatt has began to openly criticise the Hariri cabinet, claiming the presence of ministers from his coalition in its ranks has become "a pain and source of embarrassment." Jumblatt decided to disengage himself from Hariri when it was rumoured that a cabinet change was in the air and Hariri would not survive as prime minister.

Hariri's relations with Damascus has also deteriorated due to his clash with Lahoud and Syria expressing its unequivocal support for the Lebanese President against his prime minister. The Druze leader was then faced with choosing between Hariri, his traditional ally, and Lahoud-Syria.

Seeing that the latter option was more promising and secure, he chose Lahoud.

Jumblatt added fuel to the mounting criticism against Hariri by claiming that his cabinet must be replaced by one based on "national unity." He then spoke the magic words and said: "I am not in an alliance with Hariri against Lahoud." This was all that was needed for the masters of Damascus to take note of him and re-open channels with the Druze warlord.

Unlike the norm, where. following a Lebanese politician's support for Syria, he is invited to Syria for talks, Jumblatt did not go to Syria, but rather had Syria come to him. Khaddam showed up at the Mukhtara along with a convoy of pro-Syrian statesmen in Lebanon, for a working lunch with Jumblatt. Present in the crowd was Assem Quanso, leader of the Lebanese Ba'ath Party, who had threatened to kill Jumblatt when the latter asked for redeployment in Parliament in November 2000.

Now, Quanso was an honoured guest and warmly received by Walid Bey at the stairs of his mansion. In his meeting with Khaddam, who has been re-appointed in-charge of the Lebanese portfolio, Jumblatt said that his village, which had hosted Sfeir in August 2001, had now become an "indivisible part of Damascus." In response, Khaddam said that despite "different interpretations on several issues of secondary importance," Syria and Jumblatt shared the same position in regard to the "main issues."

Khaddam was speaking of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syrian troop presence in Lebanon, the Qurnet Shahwan Gathering. Other gestures of goodwill ensued, with Khaddam signing a photo of Jumblatt with his son Taymor, who is being groomed to replace him as leader of the Druze community. The signature, observers claimed, was all that was needed for Taymor to make it to the top.

Survival instinct

The Druze leader is simply showing that he wants to do what it takes to survive in the complex world of Beirut politics. He is also acknowledging that unlike what was believed in Beirut, nothing has changed in Syrian-Lebanese relations since the death of Al Assad two years ago. Syria is here to stay, and Jumblatt has realised this earlier than other statesmen in Lebanon.

Jumblatt now claims that Beirut needed Damascus, if not for military then at least for political support. Meanwhile, Jumblatt has kept an eye on domestic Syrian affairs and realises that the young Assad, whose regime seemed shaky one year ago, was there to stay. Jumblatt began to send off signals to Damascus and speeded up his pro-Palestine activity, believing that it would earn him points with Syria. He called on Druze serving in the Israeli army to deviate, met with Druze leaders from within Israel, and supported the dispatch of more Syrian troops to Lebanon in August 2001, claiming that in the wake of the Sharon threat, they were a must for Lebanon.

The assassination of Elie Hobeika, another warlord who had signed the Tripartite Agreement with Jumblatt in 1986, no doubt had a profound influence on Jumblatt. Hobeika was paying the price for his alliance with Syria. He was killed for siding with the enemy and Jumblatt feared that he too, after so many years of an alliance with Syria against the Christians, would be accused of siding with the enemy by Arab nationalists.

The killing of Jihad Jibril and Ramzi Irani in Beirut, this month, gave Jumblatt all the more reason for caution. He must have done some serious thinking before re-opening channels with Syria. Picking the right connection in Syria is very important, especially if one is a practicing politician in Lebanon.

In the past, Jumblatt had bet on General Hikmat Al Shihabi, a losing horse who had been sacked in 1998, and suffered for his alliance with the ex-Chief of