An opportunity for peace in the Valley

Pakistan's announcement that it is going to exercise "maximum restraint" on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir marks the first major positive development on the volatile Kashmir issue since the Lahore summit between the leaders of Pakistan and India in February 1999. While optimism is a dangerous commodity when it comes to Pakistan-India relations as defined by Kashmir, this latest development does present  a new hope that renewed efforts will be made to stabilise the situation.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Inamul Haq made the announcement in a press conference in Islamabad on Saturday. The important parts of the offer are: first, Pakistani troops will exercise 'maximum restraint' (which amounts to a virtual ceasefire); second, there should be tripartite talks between Pakistan, India and Kashmiris after the month of Ramadan; and third, India should allow the leadership of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to visit Pakistan to prepare for negotiations. The foreign secretary urged India to respond positively to this offer.

Hizb stance

Earlier, India had offered a ceasefire to Kashmiri militants for the duration of the month of Ramadan. The reaction to this offer has been mixed, with hardline militant groups rejecting it outright while some others giving a lukewarm response. Hizbul Mujahideen, the biggest militant group, has not accepted the Indian ceasefire, but says it has not rejected it either.

Both countries have been here before. There have been ceasefires in the past and numerous rounds of talks at various levels. But no enduring understanding has ever developed which could serve as a platform for a meaningful and result-oriented dialogue. The divide is simply too large.

This ceasefire may be no different. There are no guarantees that violence will end, and no assurances that the two arch-rivals will manage to silence their guns. There are preconditions on both sides, buttressed by a healthy dose of suspicion and mistrust. But circumstances beyond their control may force them to the negotiating table. This, if nothing else, is a start.

In a way, this latest attempt at rapprochement has not come as a surprise. A string of events in recent months were pointing towards some sort of a movement on what had become a stalemated issue.

The first indicator was the surprise offer of a unilateral ceasefire by Hizbul Mujahideen in July this year. This was obviously a well-thought out move, but it failed to materialise into anything larger despite one round of face-to-face talks between Kashmiris and Indian officials.

India insisted on holding talks within the framework of the Indian Constitution, while Hizbul Mujahideen rejected this precondition. Hizb said Pakistan must be included in the talks, which India rejected. The initiative collapsed, and violence resumed.

But quiet diplomacy continued. According to credible Pakistani sources, back-channel communications remained active between Islamabad and New Delhi even as the war of words continued publicly.

Prodding, and sometimes gentle arm-twisting, by Washington also kept the two sides engaged. Broad terms of a ceasefire were also said to have been discussed, and some details, including which areas it would be applicable, were also talked about, and perhaps chalked out. Both countries obviously realised that the high level of tension could not continue indefinitely.

Indian initiatives

India's decision to allow a senior member of the APHC, Abdul Ghani Lone, to travel to Pakistan to attend his son's wedding to the daughter of another prominent Kashmiri Amanullah Khan, was an important development. Lone utilised the opportunity to hold consultations with a large number of people in Pakistan, including General Pervez Musharraf.

Soon after, an American of Pakistani origin by the name of Mansoor Ijaz arrived in New Delhi to indulge in unofficial diplomacy. Claiming to have the informal mandate of American officialdom, he is said to have met a senior Indian and Kashmiri leadership in a bid to revive the dialogue process between Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris.

While these developments were unfolding, it was announced that IMF had sanctioned a desperately-needed loan to Pakistan. Though seemingly unrelated to the Kashmir issue, it is widely accepted that IMF loans are directly connected to American foreign policy objectives. Was it a reward for Pakistan?

At about the same time, India unveiled its offer of a ceasefire during the month of Ramadan. The different pieces appeared to be falling into place. A week later Pakistan made its own announcement.

Kashmiri involvement

This is where the situation stands now. Is it a 'breakthrough'? Using this term would be slightly premature, because in conflicts as deep-rooted as Kashmir, breakthroughs come after a long protracted process. At best, this is a step forward, a hesitant and unsure one, but forward all the same. It reflects a willingness on part of all the three parties, Pakistan, India and Kashmiris, to make yet another effort at addressing this festering problem.

There is however one distinguishing feature of this latest round of diplomacy, which also marks a 'first' in the history of Pakistan-India relations in reference to Kashmir. This is the prominent involvement of Kashmiris themselves. In the past, Kashmiris have always been kept out of formal negotiations, relegated to the sidelines. This time, both Pakistan and India are talking to them, and through them. This is very significant.

The July offer of ceasefire was made by Hizbul Mujahideen, a purely Kashmiri outfit. It led the way in talking to India, and to other militant organisations. While that initiative fell through, India's November offer was again made to Kashmiris, with APHC keeping its lines of communications open with New Delhi. A delegation of APHC, led by its former chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, was also given permission by India to attend the OIC summit in Doha.

The visit to Pakistan of Abdul Ghani Lone also became a high-profile event, with Kashmiris from both sides of the Line of Control holding lengthy consultations. These meetings were splashed across the media, further raising the public profile of Kashmiri involvement in the ongoing diplomacy.

For its part, Pakistan has for the first time offered to hold tripartite negotiations on Kashmir, and asked APHC leaders to travel to Pakistan to prepare for these talks.

The inference is that the initiative remains with the Kashmiris, who now have to talk to both Pakistan and India to formulate a mutually acceptable agenda. If and when talks do place, they will be unprecedented in that Kashmiri leaders will share the table with Pakistani and Indian diplomats. This marks a qualitative change in nature of diplomacy on Kashmir.

And it opens up a new window of opportunity – in fact many windows. It is the fate of Kashmiris which is at stake, and no one can speak better for them than themselves. What is natural is that they will not be bogged down by the official positions of Pakistan and India, and may have ideas and proposals which may break fresh ground on the issue.

A bridge in place

Kashmiris understand the nuances of the issue much better than both Islamabad and New Delhi, and there are two reasons for this: first, they know what they