Afghanistan's moment

Hamid Karzai marked his three months in office last week by reopening a school in Afghanistan's bleak capital Kabul, signalling a symbolic end to the former Taliban regime's cardinal blunder - their antediluvian, even medieval attitude towards women's employment and girls' education.

By any definition, it's a unique moment in history for this country, emerging hesitantly from years of bloodshed and wanton destruction. But equally, there's no denying that it is poised on a knife edge, between disaster and hope.As the world waits to see whether Afghanistan will slide back into the abyss, its fledgling administration led by Chairman Karzai is dealing with a multitude of problems, all at once.

To no -one's surprise, it's running into predictable bottlenecks in setting up a government that is acceptable to the country's myriad factions. Karzai's own future, given he has no political base and is really the U.S.'s handpicked nominee, is hotly debated.

"The U.S.'s first choice was Ahmed Seerat. They then veered to Karzai, who was acceptable to Pakistan and to the Ahmed Shah Massood faction. The Panjsheeris had been approached by Karzai earlier, and believe they could work with him. Even though he is a Pashtun, his views are the closest to the Massood faction" said a top diplomat in Kabul.

Whether that comfortable arrangement will continue after June 21, and the convening of the Loya Jirga, which will have its own dynamics, remains to be seen. Karzai, although increasingly enjoying the media spotlight, said at a recent press conference that he would be happy to retire into obscurity once the Loya Jirga was convened. That scenario too, has few takers.

The head of the interim administration has called in tried and trusted lieutenants, whom he worked with when he was a deputy minister in the Sibghatullah Mojadeddi -led government to set up a power structure at Gulkhana Palace that generates its own synergy.

An endless stream of tribal leaders from Paktia, Paktika and Khost, apart from cabinet ministers and dignitaries from various countries pour into the palace that despite the pockmarked walls and bullet holes, speaks of past grandeur.

Much of it is pomp and circumstance, but the visits add nevertheless to his image as a leader with clean hands. Karzai's international celebrity status however cannot hide his lack of a political base. He has no fighters to call his own. His own security staff are a mix of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Pashtuns, trained by an Afghan who worked with the Soviets.

Karzai took over the mantle of leadership of the smaller Popalzai tribe,after the assassination of his father Ahad Karzai in Pakistan at the hands of the ISI. It is the more powerful Ghilzais, Ahmedzais and Durranis who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan.

Other leaders, of other ethnic persuasions could still pose a challenge. The return of Ahmed Wali Massood, the slain Tajik leader's brother to Kabul is being seen in some quarters as a bid by the Tajiks to build up their own leader so that he finds a place in the mini parliament, the 'Milli Jirga' which will be elected by the Loya Jirga.The late Massood has attained almost cult status, with his larger than life posters more evident than Karzai, in the city that he once defended against rival Gulbadin Hikmatyar.

There is some speculation Wali Massood could, on his own steam, be jockeying for a more powerful position within the Shoor -e -Nazar, the Panjsheeri political group once headed by Ahmed Shah Massood, and today headed by Defence Minister Gen. Mohammed Qassem Faheem.

Two other key ministers, seen as the political animals in the government, Foreign Minister Dr. Abdulla and Interior Minister Younis Qanooni are also Ahmed Shah Massood loyalists. The Shoor -e -Nazar is expected to help nominate all three ministers to the Jirga.

Other Pashtun leaders like Haji Qadeer, whose brother Commander Abdul Haq was executed by the Taliban, when he was captured under suspicious circumstances in the south, are also reported to harbour ambitions of leading the Pashtuns, while remaining inimical to the Panjsheeris grabbing the lion's share of the spoils.

In fact, despite the public displays of bonhomie, suspicions persist on both sides, leading analysts like former Kabul University Professor Arif to underline how fragile that unity really is. "We hope that all sides will bury their differences and work to rebuild our country.

The common people are against the mulla and the mujahid. They come from the same source and feed off conflict. We want them all out. I believe that message has gone home.But it takes only one incident for the whole situation to unravel. We are sitting on a powder keg," he said.

A senior Karzai aide was equally frank. Off the record. "The Northern Alliance did not want international forces to police Kabul. They wanted to do it themselves, because that would mean they retained control. We need international forces to stop that from happening, both in Kabul and in the provinces. Every meeting with people in the interior brings the same message, they want international soldiers to enforce security and de -weaponise."

Powerful Massood loyalist Commander Mirjan who heads the Defense directorate, attached to Faheem's defence ministry would have none of it. He said the Panjsheeris had every right to stake their claim.

"After all, we fought the jihad, first against the communists and then against the Taliban, who were slaves of foreign forces, and we won. We liberated Kabul. Should we give the slaves of foreign forces these positions in government. We do not want foreigners here. The Taliban were not Afghans, their masters were not Afghans," he said.

In fact, the Karzai administration's decision to send the national army, made up largely of Tajik fighters from the Northern Alliance to fight alongside U.S. forces in recent battles in Gardez and Shah -i -Kot in the southern provinces was the first real demonstration of the inherent contradictions in this uneasy power sharing formula.

Pashtun tribal chiefs in the south refused to work with the Tajiks, a diplomat said, underlining the U.S.'s difficulty in relying on Tajik fighters to do their fighting, while seeking the Pashtuns to further their own political aims.

A senior member of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (Unsma) attached to the Loya Jirga commission, who has travelled extensively in the interior, sounding out tribal elders and commanders, said that trying to lay the groundwork for a future democratic set up that will overlay these tribal and ethnic loyalties that have marked Afghanistan's divisive polity is the biggest challenge ahead.

The other task and necessary corolloray is de -weaponisation, as armed commanders could force village elders to appoint the commanders' choice as nominee. De -weaponisation has not even begun. A senior Karzai aide said the chairman, (read U.S. government), believed it would be prudent to wait until the Loya Jirga was over.

Which in turn, raises questions over the safe conduct of the Loya Jirga itself, and by association, the safety of the former King Zahir Shah, who announced new dates for his return home after cancelling two weeks ago over a security scare. "We are looking at taking over the old Polytec