From Hormuz to renewables: Inside China’s race for energy security

What happens when the country that imports the most energy thinks that future energy crises are inevitable rather than exceptional?

China’s answer has been clear: prepare for every possible scenario.

From record investments in solar and wind energy to expanding nuclear power, importing massive volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG), building strategic petroleum reserves, and signing long-term oil agreements with Gulf producers, Beijing is constructing one of the most comprehensive energy security strategies in modern history. China is not relying on a single solution. Instead, it is building a layered system designed to protect the country from geopolitical shocks, supply disruptions, and long-term strategic competition.

The urgency behind this strategy has become even clearer during the Iran war. Instability in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, has reinforced Chinese fears about fragile global energy flows. For Beijing, the lesson is simple: energy security can no longer depend on stability or optimism. This does not mean China is immune to oil shocks or Hormuz disruption, but it is better positioned than many major economies to absorb prolonged instability.

Today, China is the world’s largest energy consumer and crude oil importer. A significant share of its oil and LNG imports still passes through vulnerable maritime routes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Chinese policymakers have long viewed this dependence as a strategic weakness, often referred to as the “Malacca dilemma” — the fear that conflict, sanctions, or foreign naval power could disrupt China’s energy lifelines.

The Iran war has intensified those concerns. Maritime disruptions, tanker threats, and rising insurance costs have exposed how quickly global energy markets can become unstable. In response, Beijing has accelerated efforts to diversify imports, increase domestic production, and strengthen emergency reserves. China’s National Development and Reform Commission recently emphasised the need to enhance “strategic resource security” and expand energy stockpiles in response to global instability.

What makes China’s energy strategy particularly significant is that Beijing is not simply transitioning away from fossil fuels; it is developing resilience across every possible energy source simultaneously. China has three times the renewable capacity of the US and India combined in solar and wind power. It’s the world’s biggest coal consumer, the leading builder of new nuclear reactors, and expanding strategic petroleum reserves while importing record LNG and signing long-term oil agreements with Gulf producers.

As the South China Morning Post recently noted, China’s energy structure is increasingly designed to “cushion the blows” of global oil crises rather than rely on stable international markets. Beijing increasingly views the future global energy environment as unstable, fragmented, and politically contested. Rather than choosing between traditional and renewable energy, China is building redundancy across every major energy channel. Renewables reduce dependency on imported fuel. Nuclear power strengthens long-term domestic supply. Coal provides industrial backup during crises. Strategic reserves create emergency buffers. Overseas energy partnerships ensure supply diversification.

The result is a system designed not for maximum efficiency, but for maximum resilience.

This gives China a major strategic advantage during periods of energy instability. In the event of oil shortages, maritime disruptions, or geopolitical crises such as the Iran war, Beijing is better positioned than many other major economies to absorb shocks through strategic reserves, diversified suppliers, renewable capacity, domestic production, and state-directed energy management. While many economies remain highly dependent on uninterrupted global oil flows, China has spent years preparing for a world in which disruption becomes normal rather than exceptional.

Beijing now leads in the production of solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles, and many critical green technologies. China produces more than 80 per cent of the world’s solar modules and dominates large parts of the global battery supply chain. This gives Beijing influence not only over energy markets but also over the future industrial foundations of the global economy.

Through pipelines, ports, and energy infrastructure across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the Belt and Road Initiative extends this logic beyond China’s borders, deepening supply diversification while giving Beijing influence over the energy infrastructure of developing economies that increasingly depend on Chinese technology, financing, and expertise. As Western states debate decoupling from Chinese supply chains, that dependence only deepens elsewhere, turning energy into a tool of international influence as much as domestic security.

Nevertheless, contradictions remain. Despite its green leadership, China still depends heavily on coal to maintain industrial stability and energy reliability. This has generated criticism over emissions and environmental sustainability. In addition, China’s dominance in renewable technologies has triggered growing backlash from the United States and Europe, which increasingly view Chinese control over green supply chains as a strategic vulnerability.

Most importantly, China’s maritime exposure has not disappeared. A large share of its imported energy still moves through contested sea lanes vulnerable to conflict or blockade. Ultimately, China’s energy strategy reveals how Beijing sees the future world order: more competitive and more vulnerable to disruption. The country is preparing accordingly. China is no longer treating energy simply as fuel for economic growth. It is treating energy as national security, industrial policy, geopolitical leverage, and crisis insurance all at once. And in a world increasingly shaped by conflict and supply chain insecurity, that resilience may become one of Beijing’s greatest long-term advantages.

Najla Al Midfa is a Researcher at TRENDS Research & Advisory.