Did Iran overplay its Hormuz leverage? Why attacking commercial ships during 60-day ceasefire may have cost Tehran its greatest strategic miscalculation

By allegedly targeting three civilians tankers during what was supposed to be a 60-day ceasefire, Iran may have crossed a line that weakened — rather than strengthened — its negotiating position.

The attacks prompted renewed US military strikes against Iranian military targets and infrastructure, triggered fresh sanctions and an intensified international effort to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has been Iran's most powerful geopolitical bargaining chip.

Ship traffic has since fallen dramatically as insurers raised war-risk premiums and shipping companies delayed voyages or rerouted vessels.

Tehran has repeatedly signaled that if it cannot export its own oil, neither should anyone else.

That threat alone has often been enough to rattle global markets.

The irony is striking.

Turns out that Iran's greatest strategic asset has never been its missile arsenal or even its nuclear programme.

It has been uncertainty — the credible possibility that it could disrupt one of the world's most important energy chokepoints without necessarily doing so.

As Gulf News recently described it, Hormuz is Iran's "golden weapon" because the mere threat of disruption imposes economic costs on the rest of the world.

Once commercial shipping becomes the target, especially in the midst of a ceasefire during which freedom of navigation had been guaranteed, that leverage risks turning into a liability.

This gives Iran's opponents, primarily the US, with political and legal justification for military retaliation and broader international support.

Whether the attacks represented a fatal strategic miscalculation remains an open question.

Iranian leaders may have calculated that demonstrating a willingness to strike commercial shipping even during a ceasefire under a mutually-agreed memorandum would restore coercive leverage over Washington — by raising the economic costs of the conflict and forcing the United States back to negotiations on more favorable terms.

That logic is broadly consistent with assessments by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), which has argued that Tehran views disruption of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as a key source of postwar bargaining power and a means of deterring further US and Israeli military action. 

Yet the latest attacks appear to have produced the opposite effect.

It calls into question the very ideology that, for the last 47 years, undergirds the Iranian Islamic regime's very existence.

Rather than compelling concessions, attacks on civilian vessels during a ceasefire bolstered the case for expanded naval operations to protect commercial shipping.

Moreover, it heightened calls among Gulf states and Western allies to reduce dependence on Iranian-controlled waters.

Maritime insurers also raised war-risk premiums, commercial traffic through the Hormuz dropped sharply, and shipowners increasingly delayed voyages or diverted routes.

Analysts at The Washington Institute have argued that Tehran's enduring strength lies less in physically closing the Strait than in maintaining persistent uncertainty over maritime security.

The mere possibility of disruption imposes costs on global shipping and energy markets — giving Iran influence without necessarily provoking a unified military response.

Once commercial shipping becomes the direct target, however, that strategic ambiguity begins to erode.

Attacks on merchant vessels risk transforming Iran from a regional power exercising leverage into a perceived threat to the global common good.

If this is what the present Tehran regime stands for, this makes it easier for the US and its partners to justify coordinated military, diplomatic and economic countermeasures.

Other analysts, however, caution that Iran has not necessarily lost its Hormuz leverage.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argues that even sporadic missile, drone, mine or fast-boat attacks can sustain a climate of uncertainty because commercial shipping is highly sensitive to risk.

In that sense, Tehran may still retain significant coercive power.

The strategic question at this hour is whether recent attacks have increased Iran's bargaining leverage — or merely ramped up international drive to diminish it, eventually crushing the regime and what it stands for, over the longer term.

The coordinated attacks on civilian vessels transiting Hormuz appears to have unified many of Tehran's critics while undermining confidence among countries that depend on uninterrupted Gulf energy supplies.

That does not necessarily mean the Islamic Republic is "finished."

Despite military pressure and economic sanctions, the Iranian state retains significant capabilities and regional proxy networks.

Regime change has long been predicted by outside observers, yet the Islamic Republic has repeatedly survived periods of intense domestic unrest and external pressure.

It would be short-sighted for the US and its allies to miscalculate the regime's assets, influence and proxies.

At the same time, the country's leadership is facing one of its most difficult periods in decades.

Following the reported death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during first day of the conflict, Iran's political system has entered a period of transition.

Under the Iranian constitution, ultimate authority formally rests with the Supreme Leader, while the president oversees day-to-day government.

In the current environment, however, decision-making appears increasingly influenced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose commanders have assumed an even more prominent role in military strategy and national security.

Exactly how authority is divided behind closed doors remains difficult to verify independently.

The larger lesson extends beyond Iran.

History suggests that geopolitical leverage is most valuable when it remains a credible threat rather than becoming an overt act.

By attacking commercial shipping during a ceasefire, Tehran may have converted its strongest bargaining chip into the very justification its adversaries needed to intensify military and diplomatic pressure.

The Strait of Hormuz remains indispensable to global energy markets.

But if recent events are any indication, control over the waterway alone may no longer provide Iran with the strategic advantage it once had.

In international politics, leverage is often strongest when it is implied — not exercised.