Lebanon power play resumes in earnest

Rafiq Al Hariri is an ambitious man who does not like sharing power with anyone - and this has been evident in his past two years as Prime Minister of Lebanon. He has clashed with almost everyone who contested his leadership; ex-Prime Minister Saleem Al Hoss, Hezbollah, Master Speaker Nabih Berri, and President Emille Lahoud.

Lahoud, backed by Syria and contrary to what is believed, will be the most difficult rival to defeat. In fact, in the tug-of-war that prevails, Lahoud is winning. In the summer of 2001 a conflict arose over the distribution of power between Lahoud and Hariri. Back then, the question was: "will Syria let the enforced alliance between both men break?" Today, the question has become: "When will Syria dislocate the enforced alliance?"

Hariri, once viewed as a strategic ally, has become a thorn in Syria's side. His rise to power in 1992 was the direct result of a Syrian-Saudi agreement to end the civil war and was initiated by the late President Hafez Al Assad. During the years 1992-1998 Hariri exerted more power than any other Lebanese Prime Minister before him. Syria was not impressed. Once he became too strong, Hariri was accused of working with certain Syrian officials who were contesting the leadership of Bashar Al Assad. He was sacked in 1998 but imposed his comeback as prime minister in 2000, five months after the passing of Assad.

Lahoud unwillingly accepted Hariri, realising that his popularity was too strong to be ignored following the resounding victory Hariri achieved in the elections of September 2000. It was agreed that Hariri would handle economic affairs and Lahoud would deal with political and security matters. Hariri then tried surpassing Lahoud's authority and dealing with all portfolios on his own, without referring to Syria or Lahoud. He clashed with Hizbullah, claiming that their attacks on South Lebanon were untimely and wrong, and tried to bring General Michel Aoun, the leading anti-Syrian leader in exile, back to Beirut.

Following the death of Assad and the liberation of South Lebanon, Hariri wanted to flex his muscle and shine as the uncontested and independent leader of Lebanon. The president, after receiving a green light from Damascus, cracked down on Hariri's authorities in the summer of 2001. The Prime Minister visited Damascus to protest, but realised that Syria was unwilling to listen. In disgust, he went off to Sardinia to show his protest to the president's measures. The situation repeats itself today.

The crisis between Lahoud and Hariri erupted once again earlier last month over the privatisation of Lebanon's cellular phone companies. Nizar Daloul, an in-law of Hariri (who is married to his wife's daughter) is a huge shareholder in one of the two cellular companies, and both he and Hariri are in favour of privatisation.

Telecommunications Minister Jean Louis Qurdahhi, backed by Lahoud, is an advocate of keeping the companies under state control, claiming that they are too profitable to be given up. Hariri has argued that any delay in privatisation would force the government to adopt unpopular measures such as a currency devaluation or layoffs of thousands of public sector employees.

The privatisation deal runs as follows: public bid for granting cellular company licences, where licences are sold for a 20-year period at $1 billion. Lahoud, on the other hand, is opposed to privatisation, claiming the telecommunications sector has earned for the national treasury an estimated $300 million in 2001 and is likely to become $400 million in 2002. His supporters argue that it would be mad to sell a profitable sector for $1 billion over a 20-year period when it is already bringing $400 million a year. Lahoud also claimed that if sold at $1 billion, there is no guarantee that Hariri himself, through his associates, will not purchase the licences and re-establish his monopoly over Lebanon.

Supporters of Lahoud argue that of the $1 billion, an estimated $500 million will have to be paid in compensation to shareholders by the state, leaving the treasury with only $500 million. With a public debt of $27.6 billion and a recent downgrade of the country's credit ratings, the government needs to collect $2 billion from privatisation before the end of 2002, or else the economy that Hariri promised to revive in 2000 will sink deeper into trouble.

The conflict dragged on, but Syria preferred to keep a distance between the warring factions and, instead, delegated Master Speaker Nabih Berri, who visited Damascus in mid-May 2002, to intervene and broker a compromise. This time, in the midst of the crisis, Hariri once again headed off, going as far as China and Malaysia to avoid all the criticism at home. Meanwhile, the anti-Hariri campaign carried on in political outlets throughout Lebanon, where it was rumoured that a cabinet change was in the air.

The Lebanese weekly al-Watan al-Arabi published an article on May 17 claiming that Hariri's days were numbered, that he was going to be replaced by the Lebanese stateswoman Alia Al Solh. Other publications had already tipped Alia as a successor. al Watan al-Arabi added that the anti-Hariri move was spearheaded by President Bashar Al Assad, who wanted an alternative to traditional prime ministers like Omar Karameh or Saleem Al Hoss, and was looking for "new faces" to lead Lebanon out of its economic and political stagnation.

The crisis between the president and prime minister has also continued among their supporters. Muhsen Daloul, the ex-minister of defence under Hariri and a current parliamentarian, launched a war of words on Lahoud from the Sawt al-Shaab radio station. He spoke of the cellular deal conflict and said that the President had initiated it for "political reasons." He added that Lahoud "hears only what he wants to hear" and wants the economic situation "to explode in order to remove Prime Minister Hariri and make room for himself." Other Lebanese statesmen, who are declared allies of Hariri, were not too enthusiastic about the Premier's policies.

The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt spoke to a university audience on May 17 in Beirut and said that the presence of ministers from his coalition in the Hariri cabinet had become "a pain and source of embarrassment." He added that the Hariri cabinet, which he had vigorously endorsed in the past, must be changed and replaced with one based on "national unity." He expressed his views openly and added, "I am not in an alliance with Hariri against Lahoud."

In previous years Jumblatt was the loudest and sharpest critic of Emille Lahoud, claiming on every possible occasion that an officer should not be ruling Lebanon. Damascus, which had been surprisingly absent from the ordeal, decided to intervene and dispatched Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam to solve the crisis. Most probably, he will broker a truce but steer it in favour of Lahoud, who is backed directly by Assad.

Khaddam, who is close to both Lahoud and Hariri, does not visit Beirut unless there is an urgent need for him to be there and defuse the situation. In a bid at reconciling with Lebanese statesmen, the Syrian Vice-President will be meeting on May 22 with Hariri, Lahoud, Berri, and Walid Jumblatt.

Hariri, who is a leader of legendary standing among Muslims in Lebanon, feels confused and frustrated today at all the attention and obedience Lahoud is