The real and biggest danger of the country going nuclear is an uncontrolled arms race between Israel and itself that could eventually also pull into the game Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
With the victory of the conservative Mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in Iran's presidential elections, a new security constellation in the Gulf is in the making. Ahmadinejad has been outright candid about his nuclear ambitions Iran will be a nuclear power.
The production of nuclear energy will no doubt boost Iran's economic output, as it will enable Iran to export even more oil at global market price, which presently stands at $60 (Dh220) a barrel and will most likely only go up from here. Higher exports in terms of oil will increase Iran's returns, which in turn can be spent on social programmes and the development of a vibrant SME sector something Ahmadinejad promised he will do.
However, the drive behind nuclear power is also correlated to Iran's perception of statehood and security. For many Iranians, nuclear power corresponds to a nuclear bomb, which above all is a power symbol. Iran also has certain legitimate security concerns. For one, the biggest deployment of American troops abroad is sitting right on their western border. Second, Israel Tehran's immortal enemy has a nuclear bomb itself.
The nuclear project is widely supported in Iran. It is not just an obsession of the political elites, and now, the conservative Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad is probably making the calculation that not much can happen aside from diplomatic scolding if he bags the EU3 plus Iran talks and moves forward with the development of the bomb. He is probably right. Europe is in no position to pressure Iran into giving in. For one, the internal crisis in the EU is making European leaders obscenely introverted and sceptical vis-à-vis any action that may further agendas of the nationalist blocks at home.
Surgical strike
America is also limited in what it can do. American economy can't keep weathering spikes in the price of oil. A surgical military strike at this point looks difficult as there is incomplete data on the layout of Iran's nuclear industry. At the same time, an American strike would only further isolate the reformers.
Iran does not present an existential threat to the United States, which would make a full-on military occupation difficult to sell domestically at least for now. Besides, the recent military cooperation deal signed between Iran and Iraq seems to point to America's slow acquiescence to Iran's new regional role.
What will be the regional effects of a nuclear Iran?
The security balance in the Gulf Peninsula will change. Iran and Israel will grow to operate from the position of nuclear parity. Neither has enough strategic depth to develop a meaningful missile defence, which will probably render first use a dead-end option. At the same time, the relationship derived through nuclear balance is usually more stable and predictable. Consider Pakistan and India before and after nuclear power. Consider the US-Soviet relationship and the dynamic of the Cold War.
A nuclear Iran will be a more self-assured Iran, which should make it less hyperactive and more rational. What we often forget is that nuclear power brings along certain responsibilities one of them is keeping order and stability in one's neighbourhood.
For example a nuclear Iran will have an interest in ensuring full transparency and stability in the region including an interest to crack down on terrorist groups as the danger that a nuclear confrontation with Israel due to a mistaken perception of the identity of a potential attack carries along a price Iran can't afford to pay.
There's also an argument to be made which suggests that full nuclear disarmament in the region is more attainable through establishing nuclear parity between Israel and Iran than through convincing Israel to voluntarily surrender its nuclear tactical advantage.
The real and biggest danger of a nuclear Iran is an uncontrolled nuclear arms race between Israel and Iran that could eventually also pull into the game Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Available evidence seems to suggest that both are already pursuing limited nuclear programmes. The real challenge for the United States, the EU and the Gulf States is to resist an uncontained proliferation of nuclear power. On their part, the United States and Europe should offer guarantees to the Gulf States in order to neutralise Iran's tactical advantage derived through nuclear weapons.
Finally, Iran's nuclear production should be capped at a certain level. America and Europe can insist on this and also achieve it.
Iran's nuclear production can indeed be an element of long-term regional stability if its evolution is controlled and directed. Empty rhetoric which insists on a no-nuclear power policy is obscure and prevents us from taking full strategic advantage of a nuclear Iran.
Borut Grgic is director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Ljubljana.