Arc of instability

Afghanistan could either be one end of a growing arc of instability through the Middle East or an early example of gradual, democratic post-conflict nation building. Cross-border tribal loyalties and control of remote areas in Pakistan may well be decisive.

Pakistan has played an important part in operations inside Afghanistan and hunting down and capturing Al Qaida and Taliban fugitives taking sanctuary on its territory. But while the government continues to support the "war" on terrorism, there has been a popular backlash to its pro-U.S. policies, especially in the provinces adjoining Afghanistan, where the six-party religious Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) alliance swept the polls last October.

Afghanistan itself is far from stable and attacks on U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) troops continue. Kabul has implicitly accused Islamabad of not doing enough to put down Al Qaida and Taliban elements hiding along the Durand Line border and making forays into Afghanistan.

Some reports also suggest they are regrouping and now allied with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami. Hekmatyar was a sworn opponent of the Taliban, which upstaged him in their drive to Kabul in 1996. He switched sides just before the U.S. attack on Afghanistan. Will the situation improve or is it likely to deteriorate? There are two views: some say the glass is half-full; others find it half-empty.

Successful campaign

Despite the successful campaign to oust the Taliban, Afghanistan has not shown much progress towards stability. The initial flow of refugees returning home from Pakistan first slowed and has now all but stopped. Indeed, the majority of those who had repatriated have returned to the Pakistan camps.

The $4 billion pledged by the international community in Tokyo in January last year has yet to find its way into Afghanistan. Kabul's authority does not extend beyond that city. The Isaf mandate is similarly limited to the capital. The warlords, especially General Abdul Rashid Dostum in the North and Ismail Khan in the southwest, continue to cause serious problems for President Hamid Karzai, despite his get-tough act since May.

In a speech to the Supreme Court on May 18, Karzai said the country could generate more than $600 million annually through customs revenues, taxes and other sources. The country's current annual budget is approximately $550 million, of which barely $80 million reaches Kabul.

Kabul's authority

The initial U.S. military policy of co-opting local warlords and tribal chieftains to mop up Al Qaida and Taliban supporters also did much to dilute Kabul's authority. While the U.S. military is now said to have realised the policy's disadvantages, much damage may already have been done.

In fact, Kabul might have to resort to force to dislodge powerful warlords like Khan in Herat. This could of course give more space to those opposed to the present regime to launch attacks on U.S. and Isaf troops as well as aid workers.

On the other side of the Durand Line, along Pakistan's tribal belt, Pashtun tribal loyalty and inhospitable terrain allow Al Qaida and Taliban elements to hide, reorganise, plan and execute operations inside Afghanistan and then withdraw to their sanctuaries.

Some incidents of hot pursuit have already led to exchanges of fire between Pakistani and Afghan-U.S. troops. The Durand Line itself is long disputed and not demarcated in places like Pakistan's Mohmand Agency.

There is unease among the country's Pashtun majority about the inclusion of the Panjshiri Northern Alliance in Karzai's cabinet, and Tajik and Uzbek excesses against Pashtun minorities in the north.

Karzai, whose tribal roots are Durrani-Popalzai Pashtun from southern Afghanistan, is seen by some as a mere puppet in the hands of the U.S. and powerless to defend Pashtun interests. There is also a suspicion that Washington wants to undermine Pashtun dominance by propping up the Panjshiri clan.

Reconstruction

Continuing instability, especially in the countryside, has slowed or stalled reconstruction programmes. While UN aid and relief agencies are present, as are local and international non-governmental and peace organisations, reconstruction is painfully slow. Much of the work is going on in and around Kabul rather than in areas where it is needed the most.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report, despite some positive indicators, gives a negative overview. Annan's special representative Lakhdar Brahimi is also worried and has criticised both regional players, which are still interfering, as well as the U.S. for its inability to follow up on the logic of its military campaign.

Critics also point to American policy on Iraq and say it has shifted Washington's focus from Afghanistan. As post-war violence increases in Iraq, most fear Afghanistan will slip further down the priority list.

Afghanistan still presents a problem, but there are definite positive indicators. Despite difficulties with funds and their distribution, money trickles in and reconstruction continues, although in fits and starts. A country ravaged by war and civil strife for nearly a quarter of a century cannot be rebuilt in a year and a half.

While warlords remain wary of Kabul's authority, they have begun to submit to Karzai, even if begrudgingly. The president's warning that he would step down if things do not improve seems to have worked. While most warlords would like to retain their independence, they nonetheless need a reliable person in Kabul who can deal with them as well as the outside world. Karzai is the only one who can.

This attitude springs from Afghanistan's tribal, clannish structures and the nature of patron-client relations.

Each group needs a point-man to negotiate terms with the outside world. At the apex of this sits the man who rules Kabul. Most warlords know that Karzai is the best person to deal with other countries and that his absence would plunge Afghanistan into renewed chaos.

This is ultimately likely to work to Karzai's and the international community's advantage.
The fact that the U.S. military has learnt from its original mistake of dealing directly with the warlords also seems to have contributed to the realisation by local chieftains that they now have to operate through Kabul.

Attacks on U.S. and Isaf troops continue, but they are sporadic and do not indicate central planning. Since Karzai's trip to Pakistan in April, there is now better coordination between Islamabad and Kabul on the one hand and Islamabad and Washington on the other.

Karzai also asked Islamabad to help catch wanted Taliban leaders. This not only lessened the possibility of friction along the Durand Line, but has also given the Pakistan military space to move into tribal areas and employ a mix of force and incentives to win over the populace and intimidate vested interests.

With the help of the UN, Afghanistan is drafting a new constitution. Some experts have suggested that this could be a meaningless exercise without internal security, but a constitution is mandated by both the 2001 Bonn agreement and later the popular assembly, or loya jirga, which put Karzai and his government in place.

The State Bank