Acute Alliance differences delayed Kunduz surrender

One major reason why the Kunduz stalemate has dragged on for so long is the acute differences between components of the Northern Alliance led by Uzbek warlord Abdul Rasheed Dostum and the Tajik forces commanded by Mohammad Daud.

Both want the Taliban defenders of Kunduz to surrender to their troops so that they can grab war booty, add one more province to their conquests and strengthen their military position ahead of the power-sharing, inter-Afghan talks in Bonn next week.

This is just one instance of the growing distrust between the minority ethnic factions that make up the fractious Northern Alliance. With their common enemy – Taliban – on the retreat, the alliance is already showing cracks within its ranks and could implode any moment without the patronising hand of the U.S.

The Taliban trapped in Kunduz wanted to surrender to Dostum. Their military commander Mulla Mohammad Fazil drove to Mazar-e-Sharif, a city he had valiantly defended for weeks in the face of heavy U.S. bombing and a three-pronged opposition ground offensive, at the head of a delegation for settling the terms of the surrender with Dostum.

It was interesting to note that Jamiat-i-Islami commander Ustad Ata Mohammad, a Tajik by race, and Shiite Hezb-i-Wahdat leader Ustad Mohaqqiq, who is a Hazara, assisted Dostum in the talks.

Dostum announced that an agreement had been reached under which the Afghan Taliban would surrender by Sunday in return for a promise of safe passage.

But Tajik military commander Daud, loyal to the Jamiat-i-Islami and Shura-i-Nazaar that now control Kabul, didn't consider himself bound by the Dostum-Taliban agreement. Wanting to capture Kunduz ahead of Dostum, he ordered an assault on Khanabad town to position his forces for a push on the besieged city.

With the American warplanes raining death and destruction on Kunduz's beleaguered defenders and civilians, it was obvious that the tussle between Dostum and Daud was delaying a quick end to the standoff and taking a heavy toll of a hapless population.

The factors that prompted the Taliban to agree to surrender to Dostum instead of Daud are rooted in the recent history of the area. There is more animosity between the Taliban, who are overwhelmingly Pashtun, and the Tajiks who make up late military commander Ahmad Shah Masood's Shura-i-Nazaar, than between the Pashtuns and Uzbeks.

Besides, Kunduz governor Haji Omar Khan, brother of slain Taliban leader Arif Khan, and his family were once allies of Masood and had switched sides to Taliban in 1997.

The Taliban now trapped in Kunduz had also earned the Tajiks' ire by twice capturing the neighbouring Takhar province, once the political capital of Masood and now Daud's headquarters.

In such circumstances, Mulla Fazil and his Taliban commanders expected a better treatment from Dostum than Daud, hence their willingness to surrender to his forces.

This is despite the fact that Dostum has a poor human rights record and has ruthlessly dealt with his opponents in the past.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has reported that its officials had recovered between 400 to 600 bodies of people put to death after the recent fall of Mazar-e-Sharif to U.S.-aided troops led by Dostum and Ustads Ata and Mohaqqiq.

With Dostum's Uzbeks and Shura-i-Nazaar's Tajiks competing to grab as much territory as possible, it won't be long before they start seeing each other as rivals instead of allies. Dostum was never on friendly terms with Masood and his ties with the latter's successor Mohammad Faheem have yet to stand the test of trial.

Dostum is also required to share power, at least for the time being, in Mazar-e-Sharif with Ustad Ata's Tajik fighters and Ustad Mohaqqiq's Shiite troops. He also has to contend with rival Uzbek warlord Abdul Malik Pahlawan, whose family wields considerable influence in Faryab province.

The Northern Alliance is also confronted with problems elsewhere in its newly captured areas.

Ismail Khan is back as governor of Herat but Hezb-i-Wahdat, reportedly with Iranian backing, has been able to infiltrate a significant number of its Shiite fighters into Herat and Ghor provinces.

They are obviously seeking a bigger share in the administration of these provinces.

The Hezb-i-Wahdat, led by Karim Khalili, and the smaller Shiite groups are also occupying Bamiyan and parts of the Shia-populated districts of Wardak, Ghazni and Urozgan provinces. They are also trying to deploy armed fighters in Kabul ostensibly to protect the city's Shiite population.

This would obviously put them in confrontation with the Shura-i-Nazar, which now exclusively controls Kabul and with whom the Hezb-i-Wahdat under the late Abdul Ali Mazari fought pitched battles in the mid-1990s.

Contrary to reports by the Western media, the Northern Alliance has neither captured nor attempted to occupy any Pashtun-majority province in Afghanistan until now.