The incremental war: How the US is reshaping its confrontation with Iran

The United States has entered a new phase in its confrontational strategy towards Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. After thirteen nights of US military strikes from July 11 to July 23, operations paused before resuming on July 29. They could be halted and restarted again, depending on Iran’s actions in the region. This pattern suggests the emergence of a new strategic paradigm in the Middle East that warrants close examination to anticipate the trajectory of future developments. The Trump administration has embraced a distinct approach to managing Iranian behaviour, establishing a new framework for the calibrated application of hard power.

It is no longer conducting a massive and lengthy campaign. Instead, the administration has developed an incremental model with well-calibrated operations and timely announcements on both the military and political fronts. Neither these operations nor their announcements are expected to result in an instant victory nor trigger a full-scale war. Therefore, the US is applying a model of continuous pressure that retains its military and diplomatic options for a future confrontation.

One of the distinctive features of this approach is precisely its gradualness. Rather than trying to achieve a single goal, the administration links a series of tactical manoeuvres together into a larger scheme, where each of them adds one more piece to the bigger picture. Priorities have changed after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. Nevertheless, the overall objective is to secure a strategic victory, which the Trump administration could then boast as its foreign policy legacy, especially when it comes to Israel and its security.

It is important to understand that the normalisation of Israeli-Iranian relations is neither the objective nor a viable option, given the fundamentally opposing positions of both parties and the level of hostility they have towards each other, at least under the current governments in both countries. Instead, the US aims at neutralising the Iranian capacity to threaten Israel and other regional partners and changing the balance of power in the Middle East. Freedom of navigation matters not only because roughly one-fifth of oil exports goes through the Strait of Hormuz but also because energy security is key to economic security. Increasing attention to the energy infrastructure of Iran, especially Kharg Island, testifies to the attempts of the US to plan its future energy order in case of settling the confrontation. Afterwards, Washington will try to secure a larger role in energy investments in Iran in order to retain its long-term influence.

Moreover, domestic politics affects these plans considerably. President Trump constantly faces criticism from congressional Democrats who keep on presenting War Powers Resolution to stop the military operation. Instead of addressing these concerns, the administration showed remarkable political agility by temporarily pausing the operations or announcing their completion before starting the next phase. Whether purposeful or convenient politically, this tactic allows Washington to press Iran without falling into lengthy legal disputes or further splitting the Republicans ahead of the midterm elections.

In turn, public opinion imposes certain limitations. The vast majority of Americans do not want to support another long-term Middle Eastern conflict, and high gas prices influence their economic perceptions. The administration argues that securing uninterrupted flow of energy will bring eventual stability to the energy market and lower the cost of gas, thus providing both economic and political gains.

Strategically, limited operations provide Washington with much-needed diplomatic room. China and Russia observe what tactics the United States is using in order to learn how it is going to use force in other conflicts in the future. Thus, Washington shows its willingness to conduct military operations to secure its interests but refuses to overstep. It may serve as a model for dealing with geopolitical rivalry in other areas where American interests clash with those of its rivals.

One of the most important aspects of the foreign policy of the current administration is its flexible strategy, which uses different approaches in different theaters. Rather than following a universal doctrine, the US adapts its approach to the specifics of each conflict. Despite causing some tactical inconsistencies, it corresponds to the challenge posed to a unipolar power trying to retain its hegemony. Dominating internationally is one thing, and retaining leadership is quite another. Iran is a vivid example of how the US is trying to retain its leadership by pushing its partners to share responsibility for it.

On the other end of the spectrum, a notable development has emerged in the US approach through the spatial extension of operations from the southern territories of Iran. The initial attacks were concentrated on the Strait and the coast of southern Iran in order to protect the shipping lane. Over time, operations started extending towards Tabriz in the north. It does several things. Firstly, it forces Iran to spread its air defences over different areas of the country rather than to concentrate them near the Arabian Gulf. Secondly, it shows that Washington is capable of targeting facilities far away from the Gulf, reducing the value of the geography of Iran as a defence. Thirdly, it increases pressure on the leadership of Iran, forcing it to allocate resources for the protection of the interior of the country.

This transformation might also allow international forces to participate in the protection of the Strait. Several partners are hesitant to engage in direct combat due to the risk of escalation. But if Washington succeeds in weakening Iran and eliminating the threat to the shipping lane, its partners might be willing to send their ships in order to take part in multinational operations. This will impose significant restrictions on the abilities of Tehran to sabotage one of the most vital shipping lanes.

Overall, this combination of military and diplomatic pressure, coalition building, and political manoeuvring may force Iran into accelerated negotiations not because of its capitulation but out of the practical considerations typical of Iranian strategy, when regime survival is the priority for Tehran rather than confrontation. Under growing pressure and openness for negotiation, Tehran will likely consider that agreement is better for its interests than long-lasting conflict with a more coordinated coalition.

Mohamed Aldhuhoori is a researcher in American and Middle Eastern Affairs at the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research