Cairo: Established in Cairo 1931, the Court of Cassation is one of Egypt’s highest judicial authorities.

The court is mainly tasked with reviewing rulings passed by lower courts to verify their compliance with the law. It has the authority to order retrials.

Rulings by the Court of Cassation are irrevocable.

By virtue of a recent legal amendment, the court has the authority to decide on legality of lawmakers’ membership.

Legal experts hold differing views on whether the Court of Cassation can overturn a ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court invalidating the Islamist-dominated parliament. Some experts argue that such an issue is outside the jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Others disagree, saying that being Egypt’s top judicial authority, the Supreme Constitutional Court was correct to rule on the legality of the parliament. They maintain that its verdicts are irreversible.


Egypt’s newly-elected President Mohammad Mursi is locked in conflict with the powerful military over whether the country’s legislature should reconvene despite a June 14 court ruling that dissolved it. It’s the latest twist in nearly 17 months of political drama that followed the 2011 overthrow of longtime leader Hosni Mubarak.


Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court decreed last month on the eve of the country’s first-ever freely contested presidential elections that the Islamist-dominated parliament was illegally elected. Almost immediately afterwards, the then-ruling council of generals that took power from Mubarak moved to dissolve the legislature. The Islamists never accepted the court ruling, and their candidate, Mursi, won the election and was inaugurated as president on June 30. Many observers assumed that Mursi would work out an arrangement with the generals and let the dissolution of parliament stand. But on Sunday he issued a surprise decree ordering parliament to reconvene.



The Supreme Constitutional Court and the generals are Mubarak-era appointees. Mursi and nearly half the lawmakers of the dissolved parliament are members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many others in Egypt are in the middle — they are tired of political domination by the military, which has provided all of Egypt’s four presidents since the overthrow of the monarchy some 60 years ago and is believed to want to keep its power and privileges. But they also distrust the Brotherhood, a highly disciplined and secretive movement whose ultimate goal is to create a more Islamic state.



It upheld a lower court ruling that the law governing the way parliamentary elections were held was unconstitutional. Under the law, the 498 contested seats (another 10 are appointed by the head of state) were chosen as follows: Two-thirds went to candidates running on party lists, while the other third were contested by individual candidates, in which party members were also allowed to run. The Constitutional Court ruled that allowing party members to compete on the individual lists violates the principles of equal opportunity because it gives party members two chances to compete for all the seats while independent candidates don’t have the same opportunity.



This is a point of great dispute. Both sides have been careful to frame their actions as upholding the letter of the law. Mursi, for example, phrased his decree recalling parliament so that he was overruling only the generals’ own decree dissolving it, and not the original court order. But in reality, Egypt is in legal limbo. The constitution in force under Mubarak was dissolved after his overthrow, and no new one has been adopted. Both sides appear to be making up the rules as they go along — the generals, for example, issued their own “constitutional declaration” just after parliament was dissolved, giving themselves the legislative powers of the chamber.



Mursi’s power play will determine whether the generals’ constitutional declaration will stand. If it stands, the military will have not just the powers of the legislature but also the authority to steer the drafting of the new constitution. In the bigger picture, this may be a test case that determines the role of the military in post-Mubarak Egypt — whether the country will follow the “Turkish model” of the 1980s and 1990s in which the army could block civilian governments from acting against its wishes — or whether the army will be subordinate to an elected president and legislature, Islamist or otherwise.



Mursi has the legitimacy from being the country’s first-ever freely elected president, and Brotherhood supporters in the past have threatened a “second revolution” if the army tries to hold on to power. The military, on the other hand, has the top court on its side — and, of course, the ability to put tanks on the streets. Over the past 17 months, neither side has shown a willingness to push a crisis over the breaking point, however, and there are a number of ways that this conflict could be defused. Mursi also announced that there would be new elections after a constitution is adopted. And parliament could meet once or twice and then go into recess. But Egypt’s post-Mubarak transition has been wildly unpredictable thus far, and few analysts would venture with any confidence what will happen next.