General Pervez Musharraf wants international observers monitoring the October 10 parliamentary elections to avoid making comments about the political environment in Pakistan. His remarks, and those of his henchmen, are aimed at intimidating the election observers. Musharraf learnt a lesson about election irregularities during last April's farcical presidential referendum.

Then, the stuffing of ballot boxes in full view of foreign journalists exposed the regime's contempt for democracy. For parliamentary elections, the government's strategy has been to rig the political environment and avoid, to the best extent possible, blatant irregularities on polling day.

If the international observers restricted their role to watching the turnout of voters and the conduct of election officials on polling day, Musharraf could well sustain the myth of trying to build "real democracy". But if questions were asked about the political environment, the regime's nature would stand totally exposed.

Ironically, the criticism of the election observers comes from the same regime that has never denied the "right" of the International Monetary Fund, IMF, and the World Bank officials to comment extensively on all aspects of Pakistani life.

Since Pakistan's first military regime took over in 1958, the military establishment has looked upon engagement with the international community only as a means of securing money. IMF and World Bank conditions are not frowned upon because they are linked to the flow of hard cash.

But when someone points out the deficiencies in the Pakistani establishment's desire to control the political system, they are told (in Musharraf's words) that they "see Pakistani political culture from the eyes of the British system".

The truth is, there is something wrong with the argument that U.S. dollars and British-made weapons suit Pakistan but western democratic principles do not. Democracy is no longer just a western ideal. It has taken root all over the world. And while democracy has several forms one thing is certain. It can be many things but not military rule by other means.

Musharraf is not Pakistan's first military ruler trying to retain total control while pretending to lay the foundations of real democracy. He recently said, "The elections will change the political culture and bring new leadership in the country".

But Field Marshal Ayub Khan said the same thing when he introduced Basic Democracy in the 1960s. General Zia-ul-Haq also promised a new political order during the 1980s. Unfortunately, all Pakistan has to show for 44 years of military intervention is fixed elections, king's parties, a docile judiciary and arbitrary constitutional amendments.

Politicians in the 1950s were certainly not as corrupt as the politicians of the 1990s. But the relative honesty of Pakistan's founding fathers did not prevent Ayub Khan from barring them from the political arena and pretending to build a new political system.

Political systems evolve through consistent adherence to constitutional principles. Politics cannot evolve under constant review by the General Headquarters. When Pakistan's first general election was held in 1970, more than 63 per cent of registered voters exercised their franchise.

Voters turned out in large numbers because they expected to change their lives by electing their future rulers. Even in the flawed election of 1977, voter turnout stood at a respectable 55 per cent. But the controversy over that election, and the subsequent military takeover, caused the public to lose faith in the electoral process.

During the 1997 election only 35 per cent of registered voters exercised their franchise. This included 2.3 per cent invalid votes and it is estimated that at least six million of eligible voters were not registered. The October 10 election is also expected to suffer from a low voter turnout.

Low voter turnout reflects a feeling on the part of the electorate that its vote simply does not matter. In 1970, General Yahya refused to transfer power to the elected representatives and he may not have handed over to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto even a year later had it not been for the humiliating military defeat in 1971. The 1977 election was called at the suggestion of the Intelligence services and its real result will never be known.

The only definite outcome of that election was 11 years of dictatorship under Zia-ul-Haq. Between 1988 and 1999, governments were dismissed with alarming regularity while behind-the-scenes fixers manipulated the political process.

Once this partially manipulated political process had been completely discredited, Musharraf assumed power directly on behalf of the military. When, since 1958, has the political process been allowed to take its own course?

Pakistan is not very different from several other praetorian states in the world. The military's top brass sees itself as the country's redeemer and whoever commands the military is presented as the nation's saviour.

Since Ayub's days, Pakistanis are taught a distorted version of history that glosses over the manipulations of the establishment. Even these days, reading the government's version of events would make one think that Pakistan's political history began only with the 1988 election and the ensuing political musical chairs between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. But Pakistan's political problems started much earlier.

Musharraf's apologists may not want to face it but the fact remains that Pakistan is the only major country in South Asia where power has never been transferred as a result of democratic elections. And the military's political views are at the heart of the problem.

For that reason, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have all voted governments in and out according to their constitutions but Pakistan has not.

The October 10 election will not change anything unless the international community rejects this manipulated process of politics and Pakistanis themselves persuade their military to accept the reality of politics.

The European Union and Commonwealth election observers would be doing Pakistanis a favour if they focus on the country's political environment and not just the conduct of polls. The observers' final report must not fail to mention the history of military intervention in Pakistani politics.

It should take into account the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the last decade, including the evidence that is still pending before the Supreme Court about covert funding of one party in the 1990 election.

The observers should also point out that Musharraf's regime draws its legitimacy from a Supreme Court ruling that was obtained only after the court was reconstituted and potential dissenting judges removed from the bench.

They should acknowledge that the referendum was an absolute farce. They should note that the government has propped up a king's party and created undue difficulties for the country's major political parties ahead of parliamentary elections.

And they should not hesitate to point out that Musharraf's definition of democracy is not democracy, as the rest of the world knows it. Above all, the election observers should refuse to be intimidated by the barrage of statements against them that are being issued with the specific purpose of influencing their findings.

The findings of election observers may have no effect, just as they were ineffective against last year's fixed election in Zimbabwe. But unlike Robert Mugabe, Musharraf is the beneficiary of considerable largesse from the countries of the EU and the Commonwealth.

He might be forced to list