Determined campaign needed to fight radicals

In the late 1990s, a marriage occurred with great consequences for global politics: Osama bin Laden's visions and religious fantasy-scape merged with the logistical brains and daring of Islamic Jihad to culminate in the attacks of September 11.

The possible entry of "foreign fighters" into Iraq, if they are indeed Al Qaida, spells a new marriage of convenience: the merger of Al Qaida with the hidden arms caches and the local knowledge of Saddam Hussain's supporters.

It is very unlikely these two sides had anything in common before the war, but they do now and it is certain that they will work together against the occupation of Iraq. It is a great irony that the US invaded Iraq on the erroneous claim of Al Qaida-Saddam collusion, only to cause the two to merge through common anti-American cause.

The attacks in Baghdad on the first day of Ramadan smacked of the logistics of Al Qaida: simultaneity, multi-national perpetrators and heavy shock value. If this merge has occurred, it may have much room for growth.

Baghdad is a target rich environment: Turkish, Jordanian, ICRC, UN, Iraqi police stations, political leaders, as well as the US military are all equal possibilities.

The combination of the vision and will of bin Laden, the logistical genius of Jihad and the arms and local knowledge of Saddam's followers suggest that the US has a long hard fight ahead of it. The ability to win a fight against such a grounded resistance network is an open question.

In the 1990s, Egypt faced a homegrown radical insurgence with some international ties in the form of the Gamaa Islamiya and the Islamic Jihad.

My experience in Egypt at that time as a Canadian diplomat observing the Egyptian government mount its campaign against these groups was that an extended campaign of mass arrests and extra-judicial killings (kil-ling during arrests) across the country, and especially in poorer districts and cities such as Imbaba or Qena, was required to destroy the radical networks.

The government campaign also involved a determined take-over of mosques piping radical rhetoric, and jailing the more moderate leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and journalists supportive of political Islam. These latter moves diminished the effects of the ideas behind radicalism and lessened the chance of new activists taking root.

The Egyptian campaign was generally successful. At least, it did diminish the degree of anti-government and anti-tourist violence, if the jury is still out on its social impact: political Islam remains vibrant in Egypt.

Ironically, it was Egypt's successful campaign against its militants domestically that pushed two Egyptians, Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef of Islamic Jihad, out of Egypt, first into Sudan and then possibly into Yemen, but ultimately into the waiting arms of bin Laden in Afghanistan.

After a long road, it is possible that these Egyptian "exports" have now incredibly become Iraqi "imports" – and the US has a problem that is large and growing in size and lethality. What can be done with this unholy marriage?

It may be the case that, as in Egypt, only Iraqis, whether the embryonic Iraqi council or its descendant, can bring the pressure to bear to root out the radicals and the discontented now committing attacks in Iraq.

It is likely that US troops cannot achieve this end without a level of brutality that would certainly alienate large chunks of Iraqis and defeat the political strategy in Iraq – an unaffordable price.

Iraq, however, is not as homogeneous a nation as Egypt and a successful Iraqi campaign against extremists will have to be mounted either by Sunni Iraqis or by a central government with a strong buy-in by key Sunni groups and tribes from within the "Sunni Triangle".

What is certain is that the continued American occupation will only strengthen the marriage bonds of Al Qaida and disaffected Iraqis and produce new, now unknown children. Only Iraqis, and especially Sunni Iraqis, can wage the determined campaign to flush out the radicals from Iraq.

The writer is a former UN and Canadian diplomat, a commentator on Middle East and international affairs.