Talks with Taliban vital for peace but high risk

EVENT: A missile strike by a US drone on March 16 killed four alleged militants in the Bannu region of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

SIGNIFICANCE: Islamabad has embarked on another round of negotiations with Taliban leaders in order to end a conflict that has distracted from the state's strategic aim of maintaining a watchful eye on India. For the United States, negotiations with some militant groups could be a prerequisite for stability in South Asia and for reducing the threat of further terrorist attacks at home - but they carry significant risks.

The Pakistani army is weary of countering the Taliban, which it does not see as part of its core strategic mission.

Significant tribal and settled areas of Pakistan - and by extension, southern Afghanistan - are on the verge of becoming "ungovernable" territory.

The revised US approach is expected to address instability in the two countries from a regional perspective.

ANALYSIS:

Washington has continued to conduct missile strikes against suspected Al Qaida and Taliban militants in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan. US media reports on Friday suggested that the administration was considering extending the strikes into Balochistan. Meanwhile, the Pakistani military's repeated attempts to crush the militants have failed. Weary of the use of force, and unwilling to incur further casualties, Pakistan's military establishment appears more willing to engage the militants than Washington; although President Barack Obama's administration has raised the idea of talks with the Taliban, it believes that targeted strikes still have some utility. Reconciling these two approaches may be essential, if stability is to be achieved.

Troubled talks. Pakistan's history of engagement with Taliban militants suggests that talks are very risky, and rarely lead to a restoration of local control by the state or security for the civilian population:

1. Previous failed accord: In last April the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) militant group and the NWFP government, led by the Awami National Party (ANP), sought to establish a peace deal in exchange for the implementation of Sharia law. However, the six-point accord with TNSM founder Sufi Mohammad collapsed, in part due to the resistance of Mohammad's son-in-law, TNSM leader Maulana Fazlullah. Although Mohammad was released from prison, the TNSM never carried out its end of the bargain, which included laying down arms and allowing female education.

2. ISI setbacks: Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) has forced the ANP to negotiate similar accords with militants in the past. These actions may have been counter-productive. Directing ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan to sign such agreements with militants, before the ANP considers itself in a position to secure their implementation, may be a recipe for failure.

3. Secularists undermined? Cease-fires with the Taliban have tended to cement militant control over territory. Many observers in Peshawar, the capital in NWFP, believe that the latest truce in the Swat district of NWFP, agreed in February with the TNSM, will simply allow Taliban and Al Qaida Islamist militants to cement their political control, at the expense of secular parties such as the ANP.

The crucial difference between last year's failed truce and the most recent Swat deal lies in the details of the accord, and the effectiveness of its implementation. For example, if a local Taliban group such as the TNSM actually renounces violence, it would represent a significant tactical shift for the organisation and major boost for Islamabad. However, Mohammad probably lacks the influence to convince other militant leaders in FATA and NWFP to follow his lead.

4. Risks and opportunities: Although the successful implementation of accords with Taliban elements is fraught with difficulties, they may offer the best opportunity for a breakthrough:

No alternative options. It is increasingly clear that force alone is insufficient to achieve lasting stability. The Pakistani army is weary of countering the Taliban, which it does not see as part of its core strategic mission. Many senior Pakistani military officers believe that the army lacks the manpower or the resources to maintain a major presence in the tribal belt, along the border with India, and in settled areas of NWFP such as Swat.

5. Untrustworthy partners: Yet it is also apparent that talks are not a quick fix to the problem of Islamist militancy in Pakistan, given the entrenched network of militant leaders and conduits of influence - particularly in FATA. Their past record strongly suggests that the Taliban are untrustworthy partners. Recent events have shown that the TNSM are unlikely to implement their share of the bargain in Swat. Moreover, the imposition of Sharia law leaves little room for compromise or dialogue on religious matters, and may create a climate of fear among the local populace.

6. Polilticising the Taliban: The key to success for Islamabad and Washington may be inducing the Taliban to participate in the political process, thereby ensuring that the militants are held accountable for their policies and actions. For example, while the TNSM rejects democracy, they do not reject a tribal structure that includes non-TNSM authority figures - including tribal shaikhs, religious and political leaders, and other ethnic Pashtuns who enjoy support in their communities. Helping the Taliban transition from a largely uncompromising militant organisation into a political body could help the Pakistani state reassert its authority.

7. Pakistan's dilemma: Yet despite the imperative of holding talks, Islamabad is deeply apprehensive that should the discussion fail, the legitimacy of the state could be seriously undermined:

The Taliban will negotiate only on their own terms, which potentially limits the state's ability to renegotiate or alter agreements.

Significant tribal and settled areas of Pakistan - and by extension, southern Afghanistan - are on the verge of becoming "ungovernable" territory that serves as new save havens for Al Qaida.

Allowing the Taliban to assert the right to prosecute and impose their own sentences on criminals, according to their narrow interpretation of Sharia law, threatens to undermine the government's authority.

Absent an administrative structure that could oversee the judicial and political process, the government risks losing much of the north-western section of the country to historically dependent political allies, who now enjoy much more independence.

8. Washington's strategic crossroads: Meanwhile, the Obama administration is in the process of completing its review of US policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan:

The revised US approach is expected to address instability in the two countries from a regional perspective - which is apposite, although Islamabad is disappointed that its long term disputes with India appear to be receiving less attention.

There will also be a somewhat larger US military presence in Afghanistan. However, the debate in Washington over how and when to approach Taliban leaders, and what to offer in exchange for cooperation, remains intense; it appears increasingly likely that policy makers who favour engagement only after ratcheting-up military pressure on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan will win out. This would produce further tensions between Washington and Islamabad, given that the Pakistani government feels that the military approach has already been tried, and failed.

CONCLUSION:

For both Pakistan and the United States, engaging with Taliban militants is fraught with risks; however, there is no purely military solution to instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Success depends on engaging Taliban "moderates" in the political process, to the point where they have an incentive to disarm - a process that has barely begun.

EPA

Destruction from sky

Pakistani tribesmen examine the site of a US missile attack in Janikhel village just outside the North Waziristan tribal district, a well known hotbed of Al Qaida and Taliban militants.

AP

Border initiative

Amir Izzat (in black turban) spokesman of pro-Taliban cleric Sufi Mohammad, briefs the media about the negotiations between Mohammad and government officials in Mingora, capital of the troubled Swat Valley on March 1. Taliban militants in Pakistan's Swat Valley have extended a ceasefire, strengthening a peace process that Western governments say risks granting a safe haven to extremists close to the Afghan border.