Tilting towards Zia's legacy

General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military leader, is keen to press ahead with his political reforms in a step to mark a break for his country from its past legacy.

"Sham democracy" is how the General denounced Pakistan's 11 years of democracy before his coup in 1999, to describe how the country suffered during the interim between the last military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf's own regime.

But Musharraf's latest proposals, which mark more than a mere tinkering with the Pakistan constitution, also mark the most significant step in taking the country backwards. With political powers heavily centralised around Musharraf in his capacity of president, the country has now returned dangerously close to the legacy of Zia-ul-Haq.

Can Pakistan afford to relive its previous legacy, confronted with a host of political, economic, social and above all, security challenges? To that compelling question, there are no easy answers. But its more than clear that centralised rule of the kind experienced in the past may not be the recipe for Pakistan's future, as the country faces a window of opportunity in the wake of last September's terrorist attacks.

However, that window, essentially driven by international economic support to Musharraf's regime, could well close eventually, especially amidst increasing concerns over Pakistan's future.

Musharraf also suffers increasingly from a challenge tied to his own legacy of the past 33 months. He had the choice to either emerge as a true democratic leader or one as an overseer of tough, reformist change. He has clearly failed on both counts. While his democratic credentials have been tarnished with events such as the referendum and now the newly proposed constitutional changes, popular wisdom stands against the government's claims to have initiated bold reforms. On the streets of Pakistan, the sentiment is clearly in favour of the view that daily lives largely remain unchanged from the last government to the present one.

Caught in the eye of the proverbial storm, Musharraf still has an opportunity to set the pace for a new and progressive outlook for Pakistan, essentially driven by a fundamental review and reforms on four fronts.

First, Musharraf must reconcile himself to a true sense of history driven not just by condemnations of the past "sham" democracy, but also the Pakistani military's own role in adding to the political disarray. When Musharraf condemns Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's two past prime ministers, he often overlooks the extent to which the military supported Sharif's rise to political power. The military-led establishment in 1988, following the rise of Bhutto on the scene, chose to back the creation of the now defunct Islamic Democratic Alliance, as a counter-force to the Pakistan People's Party.

In the following years, Sharif, once the beneficiary of the military's patronage, chose time and again to cultivate contacts with senior military figures in the hope of promoting his political ends. That Sharif's appetite for political power eventually became so endless, forcing him to directly confront the military, must be seen in the context of how and when his political rise was actively prompted. Appreciating the military's role in Pakistan's political development must mark the first step towards a comprehensive review of past events with the intention of understanding the dynamics of future politics.

In sharp contrast to seeking an unassailable position for himself, Musharraf's and Pakistan's best interests lie in promoting a new dialogue with mainstream political forces with the intention of ensuring political peace across the country.

Second, Musharraf must also appreciate that his position as the president has only become controversial in the wake of this years' referendum, meant to give him a long term mandate. In civilian orders, such controversies lead to charges of rigging, sometimes even causing political fatalities. Musharraf must recognise the fallout from the referendum and work towards seeking a new mandate, even if it requires a fresh electoral mandate. But denying the fallout from the referendum and pretending that Musharraf can carry on despite his tarnished image, would only be a recipe for increased polarisation.

Pakistan's political parties may not be in a position to mount a formidable challenge to the government, though their capacity to remain a nuisance and carry on low key agitation would continue to cause a setback to prospects for political peace. In time, continued political uncertainty is bound to hit Pakistan's economic prospects and add to the popular feeling of distress.

Third, Musharraf must recognise that his claim to being a reformist leader continues to be in doubt, as Pakistanis by and large find few changes in their daily lives. For the mass population, trends on employment levels as well as the quality of life in dealing with issues such as municipal services and the police, are far more significant than the constitutional machinations currently in progress.

Musharraf has clearly shifted from the beginnings of radical measures such as the use of military troops, tried briefly, to curb tax evasion. Instead, an orientation towards the status quo is now increasingly in vogue. Ordinary Pakistanis find themselves facing ordeals of the kind daily where Mushararf hardly appears to be the saviour. More than how subdued or defiant the next parliament would be, Pakistanis may eventually give credit to the General on the basis of how far he has or has not changed their lives.

Finally, there are a number of areas where popular wisdom remains convinced that only the Pakistani military can press ahead with tough changes. As Pakistan prepares for transition to civilian rule, pressing questions such as those tied to the future of its bureaucracy, the role of the state in running the economy and the role of the private sector, remain unanswered. To some of these questions such as those linked to private enterprise, there are neither short term solutions nor immediate answers. But indeed, issues such as tackling the large bureaucracy could well be the subject of solutions where an immediate beginning could be made.

For years, Pakistan has suffered heavily at the hands of a largely inefficient and in large part corrupt bureaucracy, which has dominated its state-owned business enterprises, causing billions of rupees in loss to the country and leaving behind a legacy of large indebtedness.

Once a new government is elected, especially one headed by a prime minister who is certain to remain under pressure of being sacked by a powerful president, there is every danger that Pakistan may only see a status quo oriented regime rather than a change focussed administration.

In the next few months, Musharraf's various objectives must include one of launching a tough process of change beginning with a bold initiative to slash large public sector organisations down to size, well ahead of transition to a new government. Such an exercise is bound to be resisted by vested interests, but realistically, it may be an exercise which only the Pakistani military could undertake, with the backing of a well organised and efficient force.

If Musharraf chooses to be non-reformist and determined to aim for accumulating more political