Pakistan must address the issue of terrorism

The fact that Washington's force-loaded selectively waged war on terrorism may end up further promoting a dangerously polarised and fragmented global community cannot be ruled out.

In this age of proliferated weaponry, of righteousness-fed extremism, of a weakened state apparatus, of the growing divide between the economic-cum-political haves and have-nots, such a uni-dimensional and unilaterally defined war against 'terrorists' can only be viewed with scepticism. After all it can end up escalating the scale of resentment in large sections of the global community.

While issues flowing from U.S.-led war against 'terrorists' can be a marginal one for many countries, for Pakistan those issues are central. As is its role in the campaign. Pakistan made a conscious and necessary decision to join the camp.

Subsequent developments, especially within the context of Pakistan-U.S. relations and even the region, demonstrated to Islamabad that its gains from joining the anti-terrorist camp have not been as were calculated at the time of decision-making.

To what extent, especially within the Pakistan&-U.S. context, Islamabad lost out on 'gains' because of a non-institutionalised approach to negotiating the terms of engagement with the U.S. remains a key issue.

However, some of the limited gains have to do with Pakistan's miscalculation about what, in fact, the war on terrorism will translate into not only on the western borders but also on the eastern borders.

Today, where does Pakistan stand vis a vis its involvement in the anti-terrorist war. The statements from the U.S. government praising Pakistan's role against Al Qaida and the Taliban are combined with perhaps many more statements identifying Pakistan as the hub and sanctuary for re-grouping of these two groups. U.S. generals involved in the Afghanistan military operation and U.S. press reports both complement each other in making this point.

This may or may not be true. However, if such statements can subsequently translate into a U.S. request for bigger U.S. participation in an anti-terrorist operation inside Pakistan, it should be a possibility the Pakistan government must completely rule out.

In his own, personalised manner Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf has attempted to address the two key terrorism-related questions by the U.S. government and the media: Al Qaida and Taliban inside Pakistan and continued cross-LoC infiltration of so-called "terrorists."

In his August 19 interview to the news agency AFP, Musharraf said the failure of the U.S.-led coalition forces and of the Karzai government to control Afghanistan has probably led to the re-grouping of Taliban and Al Qaida forces inside the Afghan territory.

In his prompt response, the Afghan defence ministry spokesman said that Al-Qaeda has indeed moved out of Afghanistan into areas in Pakistan where the government in Islamabad had less control. He maintained that Pakistan's territory was being used by Al Qaida fighters attacking Afghanistan.

He advised Musharraf to "do its work inside Pakistan - and leave the government in Kabul to look after Afghanistan." Defending his government's position the Afghan spokesman said that although the war against Al Qaida was not over, the government had managed to deny them safe havens in Afghanistan.

Another point made by Musharraf in the same AFP interview related to the "possibility of small groups of militants crossing over into Indian-administered Kashmir" despite his government's attempt to stop the infiltration. This evoked sharp response from Delhi.

Unfortunately choosing to twist Musharraf's words, the foreign office spokesperson blamed the Pakistani government for making "pledges and promises with no intention of keeping them. We have always been skeptical but we were prepared to wait and see if he would deliver. But this seems to confirm our worst fears. We see no hope for resumption of dialogue."

She is also quoted by AFP as having said that Musharraf's acknowledgement is "tantamount to saying that infiltration is still going on with the knowledge and cognisance of the Pakistani authorities."

From these exchanges the inevitable issues roll out: the complexity of the entire anti-terrorist campaign, the limited foreign policy advantages that Pakistan can derive from its anti-terrorist partnership with the US, the labelling by governments of the legitimate opponents of the state or of the government as terrorists, the necessary divergence that there must be in the U.S. and Pakistani anti-terrorist campaign, the meanings it has not only for India and Pakistan, maybe Afghanistan and Pakistan but also for the U.S. and Pakistan.

Significantly Pakistan has failed, as deliberate policy or oversight, to articulate this divergence in the U.S. and Pakistani anti-terrorist agenda. Practically, after some initial blunders, Islamabad has managed this divergence.

Having initially targeted innocent individuals and abandoned madrassas in the Waziristan operation, the Pakistan army has set up an elaborate system of first establishing the validity of U.S. intelligence information before actually moving against targets.

This approach is not entirely politically risk-free for the government but still reduces the chances for targeting innocent individuals and limiting the resentment of the locals who are more sympathetic towards Afghans and other Muslims than towards the U.S. objectives.

Interestingly, the August 18 Washington Post article "Deadly Minuet" written by columnist Jim Hoagland best illustrates how an important section of the U.S. opinion-making elite views Pakistan and its role and commitment to the broader issue of terrorism.

Hoagland accuses Musharraf of increasing the threat of an Indo-Pakistan war by making the comments on Jammu and Kashmir elections in his August 14 speech, of using nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail against India while supporting "cross-border terrorism" and of failure to keep his promise he made to Washington of ending cross-border infiltration, permanently.

Like many others, this Washington columnist maintains that peaceful elections in Jammu and Kashmir will be the 'litmus test' of Pakistan's real commitment to the anti-terrorist campaign.

He concludes, though, that on the issue of terrorism, on its Eastern borders, Pakistan has given a "green light for subversion and terrorism in Kashmir." Islamabad has to be unambiguous in its articulation. Especially when a uniform, often unnerving, chorus emanates from the neighbourhood or from far away capitals -that Pakistan is the "hub of terrorism".

Two issues are critical. One that in Pakistan's own national interest the action most urgently needed about the terrorism issue is to effectively curb those who use violent action as private enterprise. Pakistanis need this for their own security.

And two, that Pakistan cannot participate in this anti-terrorist war but on its own terms. Keeping our own context in mind , any barrage of criticism from across the oceans forcing any reactive or exaggerated move on the anti-terrorist campaign can further drag Pakistan into a mess.

Pakistan can be turned into a battle field. Also those from among us who were tutored in violent ways but did not practice violence have to be offered amnesty if they surrender. They are our own people. Division in society and condemning a repentant section to isolation is no wise option.

To a great extent the government does realise this. The government has to be inflexible establishing rule of law. Endless war of words against madrassas and jihad is no policy option. Across the society there is