Of, by and for the President

There's nothing overly surprising about the decision by General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, to assume such controversial powers as the right to dissolve the next parliament and sack the prime minister, in addition to vetting all major decisions via a high powered national security council (NSC).

For months, Pakistan has been rife with speculation that the man who took charge in a military coup almost three years ago is indeed preparing not to leave anything to chance. The new political order being stitched together by Musharraf, according to his own recent statements, would not be subject to discussion or debate even by the next elected parliament.

In choosing to press ahead with what could be characterised as a well organised political system, Musharraf is obviously bidding to create a new tailor-made constitutional and political order, defying opposition from political groups and intellectuals.

General Musharraf must see logic in creating such a new system, driven by the conviction that politicians with tainted pasts and without significant street support, are incapable of presenting a significant challenge to his rule.

In stark contrast to the past, Musharraf has indeed empowered himself to the point that his unassailable position cannot be subjected to any challenge. But ironically, that empowerment which is meant to mark a fresh beginning for Pakistan, indeed risks launching an all too profoundly disconcerting legacy, with new risks for the medium to long term.

In brief, the empowerment of Musharraf does not necessarily by default amount to the empowerment of Pakistan.

The outcome of Musharraf's efforts for beginning to turn around Pakistan's outlook remains contingent on the outlook in four vital areas, where successive governments including his own have made only half a beginning at best.

First, a newly conceived political order which perhaps deserve one or by a stretch two cheers in sharp contrast to three, is in danger of being carried forward with wide gaps that must eventually raise questions over its sustainability.

With the leaders of Pakistan's two main political parties in exile, and with stories making the rounds across political circles, reporting official backing for the proverbial "king's party" – the new political order is beginning to loose credibility.

In the past too, successive regimes have indeed tried to push peripheral politicians to centre stage in the hope that they would emerge as the ideal alternatives to mainstream options. Time and again, the lesson has been that such made on order political players can neither occupy the space already grabbed by mainstream players, nor necessarily have their own standing to begin offering solutions to some of Pakistan's most difficult challenges.

The consequence of such planned manipulation has been none other than the disarray in politics, as even the few genuinely committed politicians succumbed to political enemies with deep rooted connections at places of high power. There can indeed be no alternative to a consistent road to politics – marked by historical experiences of parliamentary evolution and maturity.

In the long term, only a naturally evolved road to politics must become the most enduring feature of stability in sharp contrast to tailor made plans.

Second, Pakistan's political uncertainty cannot be divorced from its beleaguered economy going far beyond the relative improvement in macro indicators. For months, a steady and impressive growth in Pakistan's liquid foreign exchange reserves has been used consistently by the government to claim success for its economic policies.

Real test

However, there can be no denial of the difficult but nevertheless profound reality that the real test of economic improvement for mainstream Pakistan comes more so in the shape of the quality of life for the bulk of the country's citizens.

At a time when almost a third of Pakistan's population of 140 million remains poor, according to the most recent estimates by international financial institutions, success stories such as a revaluation of the Rupee or a build of reserves-though important, nevertheless become easily overshadowed.

In the medium to long run, Pakistan's economic future can best be judged by the quality of life of the bulk of its people, along with the fate of its beleaguered investment environment and the country's capacity in continuously pushing for the improvement of social services.

Third, the challenge which stares Pakistan right in its face, presents a profound need for the country to aggressively move towards beginning to build a strong national consensus on policy choices.

Throughout most of its history, except for a few years of short lived populism here and there, Pakistan's destiny has remained tied to the decisions of a small coterie of its political power elite, not necessarily in office on the back of a popular mandate.

The bureaucratic planners of the country have often neglected their role as civil servants, only to emerge with wild aspirations of political leadership. The consequence has been that Pakistan has drifted in to becoming divided with the large mass of its society feeling itself left out from national decision making.

In the end, the public has remained aloof from influencing important choices, while the top echelons of political power in Islamabad have taken pride in keeping the situation under control, largely through administrative measures rather than political consensus.

The tragedy emerging from this specific historical experience has been that a false sense of comfort has taken over the leadership time and again, without reference to the public at large.

Finally, if reconciling with history must become an important feature of any reformist exercise, Musharraf's government just like previous regimes, may still be far from acknowledging a set of important realities.

Once again, Pakistan stands at the cross roads under the rule of a military regime, eager to install an ideal democracy with all the necessary checks and balances in place to prevent a repeat of the past legacy.

The road map for the future is once again driven by the idealism that a new political order, custom made to suit Pakistan's needs, could function relatively better than the old one and finally deliver the still undelivered benefits for mainstream Pakistan.

Yet, it's such necessary checks and balances which have failed before to prevent a slide in politics and as a consequence in other aspects of life, and perhaps may fail yet once again.

Fundamentally, a new beginning has to be followed upfront with a recognition of responsibilities of the past, in the first step towards opening a fresh dialogue with a cross section of political groups, with the objective of transferring power under a genuine civilian order.

Neither administrative measures to force back politicians returning from exile, nor the checks and balances to create ideal politics, can ever be a substitute for the development of politics using the old, well tried and well tested route of parliamentary democracy.

Indeed, with so much that has gone wrong, Pakistan also finds itself exposed