Kashmiri aspirations must be considered

The significance for Pakistan in the framing and, to some extent, the goal of Colin Powell's trip to the subcontinent is that it is a response to many weeks of incessant Indian complaining.

This latest round of vigorous complaints against Pakistan began post-September 11 after Pakistan announced its decision to join the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.

The central message of the Indians is simple: Pakistan is a country that promotes terrorism in Afghanistan, in Kashmir and in India, we can provide you with evidence, Pakistan should therefore be targeted by the anti-terrorism coalition instead of letting it be in forefront of an anti-terrorist coalition.

At home, abroad and especially in Washington, Indian media and Indian officials are systematically relaying this message. The themes pushed through this campaign are hence multiple. Woven together they portray the Pakistani state as a major player in the terrorist camp.

"We are going to tell Powell that the U.S. has made the problem a part of its solution (by including Pakistan in the coalition), which we will not accept as long as Pakistan supports cross-border terrorism in Kashmir," a senior Indian foreign ministry official said before Powell's visit.

Delhi's campaign peaked with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's letter to U.S. President George Bush. Written after the attack on the State Assembly in Srinagar which left 34 dead, it stated that 'there is a limit to the patience of the people of India.'

True to an established pattern of a major attack causing many civilian deaths coinciding with important events like the beginning of Pak-India Foreign secretary level talks late 1997, President Clinton's February 2000 visit, the conclusion of the Agra summit, the October 1 attack on the State Assembly in Srinagar happened on the very day when Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh arrived in the U.S. carrying a letter from his prime minister. All fingers then pointed towards Islamabad.

Rather amusing has also been what can easily be categorised as a hijacking drama. The question remains as to who planned the hijacking and why?

Invoking the precedent-setting action by the U.S. to initiate sustained military attacks against any country in which terrorists are allegedly harboured, India too appears keen to follow the U.S. and indeed the Israeli examples, and maintains it will do the same.

Arguing in favour of cross-LoC strikes, G. Parthasarthy a former ambassador to Pakistan questioned "if the U.S. can travel thousands of miles to take out terrorist camps, I don't see why India shouldn't do so when our cities are bombed a nd legislatures attacked."

Senior Indian officials Indians have also reportedly informed the U.S. administration that India would not hesitate to cross the LoC to carry out military strikes against sanctuaries located in Azad Kashmir.

The Indian minister in his meetings with Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Powell and the National Security Advisor Condolezza Rice, sought urgent action against Kashmiri freedom fighters and Pakistan.

Delhi, to establish a nexus between international terrorism, Pakistan and the Kashmiri freedom struggle, has established bilateral anti-terrorism groups with the U.S. and Russia. With China and Iran too, the Indians were cultivating commonality of interest over the terrorist issue. Clearly in the present scenario with Pakistan, a key member of the international anti-terrorism coalition, the bottom has fallen out of India's painstakingly developed Kashmir policy.

Pressure eases off

Also all international pressures on Pakistan, at least in the short run, have eased off. In such a scenario Delhi has used all diplomatic and political tools at its disposal to discredit Pakistan by establishing its 'terrorist' credentials.

How would Washington respond to India's complaints and demand list against Washington's newly found ally, will be instructive for Islamabad. This indeed is the first test of whether there is sensitivity in Washington to Pakistan's legitimate security interests or will it relapse back into the old pro-Indian position of lecturing Pakistan to discontinue supporting 'terrorist' groups inside Indian Kashmir.

Islamabad must also recognise that the U.S. sees India as a long-term ally with intrinsic strategic value of its own. It is not a country whose importance is primarily linked to what happens around it.

Given India's economic and military assets its value as a partner is therefore not of a derivative nature. This inherent value of India would compel the U.S. to respond to the incessant Indian complaints against Pakistan.

India has managed an assurance from the secretary of state about dealing with India-focused terrorism. Following his earlier meeting with the Indian foreign minister, Powell emphasised that "We are going after terrorism in a comprehensive way not just in the present instance of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden but terrorism as it affects nations around the world, to include the kind of terrorism that affects India."

However whether the Bush administration can qualify as being objective on the Kashmir issue will depend on how Powell addresses this issue after his trip to India and Pakistan.

In formulating his position the secretary of state must recognise four factors: one, that India, through its anti-Pakistan rhetoric and not Pakistan, has attempted to escalate the tension in the region; two, that India has seized on the U.S. anti-terrorism drive hoping to press for its expansion to include freedom fighters in Indian Kashmir who it qualifies as "terrorists" that New Delhi accuses Islamabad of harbouring; three, that despite the provocative anti-Pakistan propaganda emanating from Delhi the Pakistani president confidently condemned the October 1 killing of 30 people in the bombing of the State Assembly in Srinagar and invited Vajpayee to resume bilateral dialogue; four, that at the Agra summit Pakistan demonstrated unprecedented flexibility on the Kashmir issue by not referring to the UN Security Council resolutions hoping to encourage India to engage substantively on the issue. But India refused.

Given these factors it would be wrong of Washington to establish parity between Pakistan and India in their post-September 11 conduct. Indian moves, threatening to take military action against Pakistan and pushing for Pakistan's expulsion from the coalition against terrorism are clearly aimed at scaring the U.S. Skirmishes along the LoC will not necessarily translate into a major military operation.

At this juncture Powell's contribution can be to encourage Pakistan and India to undertake three immediate steps which would help to de-escalate on the military front.

To station UN monitors along the LoC to check cross-LoC movements, allow third party mediation not just when India believes it can be to its advantage but when India and Pakistan are sincere about finding a political solution to the Kashmir problem and the resumption of a bilateral dialogue, with Kashmiri participation, on the Kashmir issue.

The only credible role the U.S. secretary of state can play within the Pak-India context is to reiterate the obvious. That the international community's expectation from I