GCC-Iran rapprochement is on a steady path

Largely because of a major Saudi foreign policy shift in late 1995, GCC states have nurtured renewed relationships with Iran, forging more or less correct neighbourly ties.

Of course, outstanding contentions remain - including the occupation of three UAE islands as well as serious religious differences - but, by and large, both sides seem to be embarked on a reconciliation path. How this reconciliation is sustained over the long run may well determine or help avert the next Gulf War.

According to Michael Bonine, a distinguished University of Arizona demographer, the Iranian population will top the 100 million in 2100. GCC States will total less than 50 million around the turn of the next century.

Irrespective of its political system at the time, Tehran will be a far more dominant regional power than it is today. That is a reality which GCC leaders are fully conscious of. In fact, it is this awareness that has propelled the Saudi Regent to embark on his Iran policy.

A high-ranking Saudi official once told me that GCC States "must be pragmatic with Iran because it is a neighbour and will continue to play a pivotal role for generations to come. As the Arab proverb says," he continued, "Al Jar Abl Al Dar."

It is that goal - to better understand the many internal changes that Revolutionary Iran is living through and how these alterations will influence its foreign policy - that Crown Prince Abdullah's new regional appr-oach aims to acknowledge.

When the Clinton Administr-ation in the United States developed its "Dual Containment" policy - essentially to contain both Iran and Iraq - Abdullah initiated a full-fledged dialogue with the newly, democratically-elected, Iranian President Ayatollah Mohammed Khatami.

He, and others, perceived the futility of the lame containment approach.

Within a short period of time, high-level exchanges followed, and significant political issues were resolved despite intrinsic tensions.

It must be emphasised that most of these tensions were directly related to super-sensitive interpretations of religious edicts but, it is worth underscoring, that senior leaders on both sides rose above them because so much was at stake.

In addition to key political accords, for example, Saudi-Iranian trade nearly reached the $1.5 billion figure in 2001. With more promising accords in the pipeline.

Like Saudi Arabia, other GCC states embarked on the reconciliation path as well, led by Bahrain and Qatar. In both cases, festering problems were addres-sed frankly, leading to a variety of compacts.

His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa visited Tehran and Manama welcomed Khatami. It seems that an understanding was reached between the two men "to substantially limit any interferences in internal affairs."

As a point of order, 'Ashura celebrations were broadcast on Bahraini television in 2003 with little trouble, something that could not have occurred in earlier years.

For its part, Doha signed an agreement with Iran in 1991 to supply it with fresh water through an undersea pipeline, a move that was then viewed with strong reservations throughout the Gulf region.

More recently, Qatar has looked for avenues to reach an understanding with Tehran over the North Field gas deposits that straddle the territorial waters of both countries.

Even Kuwait, which was especially troubled by developments in Iran, emphasised the need to further strengthen bilateral relations, and settle existing disputes peacefully.

In late 2002, for example, Kuwaiti defence minister Sheikh Jaber Mubarak Al Sabah, whose government supported Iraq in the eight-year devastating Iran-Iraq war, underscored the value of military cooperation with Iran.

In the spring of 2003, Tehran agreed to supply Kuwait with much needed natural gas and water.

Importantly, and despite the islands dispute, President His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan also noted the "satisfactory development of relations with Iran" in his December 2002 annual National Day speech.

Recently, Khatami has been formally invited to visit the UAE. In fact, both Emarati and Iranian senior officials have noted the centrality of the UAE to Iran's commerce - with trade figures hovering around $3 billion in 2001.

A few days ago, senior officials representing both countries hammered out the details of a proposal to exempt or even reduce customs duties on products manufactured or assembled on their respective territories.

All of these changes are concrete evidence that the GCC-Iranian rapprochement is on a steady path. But will it stay constant now that potentially destabilising protests against the Iranian political leadership are under way?

Iranian protestations took on a special direction in November 2002 when many university students objected to the death sentence imposed on Hashem Aghajari, a history professor who questioned the need to obey every edict issued by the country's clergy.

In early June 2003, fresh demonstrations targeted Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, chanting "Death to Khamenei" and "the clerical regime is nearing its end."

Importantly, these rallies intensified a week before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is set to convene a key meeting in Vienna (June 16, 2003), when a "devastating" IAEA report on Iran's nuclear research will reportedly be made public.

The spectre of Iranian "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is now in full display as Tehran is singled out for failing to "meet its obligations."

According to a senior U.S. State Department official, the Iranians "have a lot of explaining to do."

Not surprisingly, Iran has denied it has a nuclear programme with Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi going so far as declaring to the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) that "it was strictly forbidden for Muslims to use any weapon of mass destruction."

Kharrazi and other Iranian officials have said that Iran has a "security doctrine that is without nuclear weapons."

Irrespective of these objections, what is critical for GCC states is to maintain their relative independence from such crises. During his upcoming visit to Tehran, Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al Faisal will surely discuss more than the fate of any Saudi national detained by the Revolutionary regime.

To be sure, he would want to know if Iranian interrogators learned of any links with Al Qaida, but he would also want to know whether the second member of the "axis of evil" will meet the fate of the first.

Kechichian, author of several books, is an expert on Gulf and Middle East affairs.