Future stability lies in progressive democracy

General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, has often lamented the country's past elected governments as an example of much that has gone wrong.

As he ponders over how to change the Pakistani constitution ahead of elections planned for October, regular references to Pakistan's so called 'sham' democracy of the past, are certain to remain part of his political vocabulary.

The General is eager to oversee the next elections, driven mainly by the new political order that his so called National Reconstru-ction Bureau (NRB) has coined, in the name of an honest redistribution of political power.

While the NRB is busy pushing ahead with its 'devolution' plan, lamented by some as the 'demolition' plan, the ultimate test of Pakistan's future is certain to come from the country's outlook in times to come.

As for General Musharraf, himself overshadowed by the controversial presidential referendum this March, there's little that he can do to completely ignore the role played by his own institution-the military, in adding to many of Pakistan's political problems. "Elected governments played merry hell here" is how General Musahrraf has been quoted in the latest issue of the New Yorker magazine.

Almost 14 years after Pakistan's last return to democracy in 1988, there are many reminders of the events leading up to creation of the IJI (Islamic 'Jamhoori' (Democratic) Alliance) led by Nawaz Sharif.

Ironically, Sharif, now in exile in Saudi Arabia, was once reputed to be a protégé of General Zia ul Haq, before eventually being forced down and driven into exile by another military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf.

The memories from Pakistan's elections in 1990 are equally fresh when gossip around political circles spoke of the unnamed 'angels' who came to poll. While in the past decade, the Pakistani establishment has learnt a lesson or two from the ways in which manipulated elections lead to inconclusive results, the idea of creating structures to dominate elected parliaments, remains well intact.

One such proposal is to create a military led National Security Council, chaired by the two-hat wearing General Musharraf, who in addition to being the president also remains the chief of the military staff.

There can be little comparison with a country such as the U.S. where an elected president rather than an un-elected one calls the final shots, while Pakistan's realities and political experiences inevitably set the ground for the creation of a supra-parliamentary body, dedicated to vet all 'sensitive' decisions.

Pakistan's history has been rife with examples of manipulation that leave little comfort in accepting the argument that the malaise of today has been exclusively caused by events under political regimes. Essentially, a fresh analysis of Pakistan's history must be driven by four important factors.

First, the inherent weakness of political parties and concentration of decision making among the top few leaders, is essentially a product of the values handed down over time as the country has under repeated experiments to democratise, each time with the premise that what preceded was a sham.

Non-partisan politics

General Zia ul Haq, the last military ruler, chose to have non-partisan politics, initially in the name of the 'majlis-e-shoora' or the federal advisory council-a fancy phrase little understood by most Pakistanis. His experiment led to the party-less elections of 1985 in an attempt to seal the fate of future politics.

While in the post-Zia era, the Pakistani establishment was forced to accept a political parties' led order, non-party politics and rubber stamp parliaments nevertheless have continued to carry immense fascination.

The logic behind the exercise has mainly been that the performance of public representatives would improve substantially, once they're cut off from ties to the traditional political elite.

The naivete of this choice is obvious no more than across Pakistan's present day political spectrum, where supposedly mainstream parties are still confronted with vital questions of identity and rules of behaviour, after being repeatedly forced to suspend their processes of natural evolution.

Second, beyond individuals and groups with vested interests, lies the all too important test of political progress in the shape of the growth of political institutions. Pakistan's past and present malaise could have been minimised, if institutions across the board ranging from those dealing with high politics down to daily affairs, functioned in accordance with popular aspirations.

The repeated search for quick fixes has in fact only dented prospects for a historical evolution of institutions, necessary to lay the basis for sustaining progress.

Once again, a new political order which is expected to be created with elections planned this October, comes with an inherent handicap. There's no assurance that such a new order would respond to the challenge of building institutions without the natural evolution that should have been a vital feature of the exercise.

Third, an important lesson of the history of many nations including Pakistan must illustrate that the isolation of any individual or group from mainstream politics is bound to throw the electoral process in disarray. Pakistan's dilemma is that despite the damage afflicted upon it by past rulers, a healing process must be driven by a fresh national consensus on key reforms.

However, restructuring society fundamentally requires not only embracing imaginative new ideas, but more vitally, bringing diverse interests on board. Burying disputes and disagreements of the past must become an important element of a new healing process.

An attempt to settle scores in the name of a still unclear accountability process is bound to widen the divide which has led to creating Pakistan's polarised environment. Pakistan is indeed faced with profound challenges, emanating from its security, political and economic environments.

Finally, in spite of General Musharraf's well meaning intentions, he is certainly faced with no easy choices. In proposing the so called 'checks' and 'balance' to amend the Pakistani constitution, the General has taken a route already traversed by some of his predecessors. His position would indeed remain unassailable beyond elections to the parliament this October.

To add weight to his authority, General Musharraf's decision to create a powerful national security council which he would preside, would only centralise authority around his office.

However, such concentration is unlikely to begin helping Pakistan lift itself out of its past legacy when powerful rulers striving to create 'good' politics, often found themselves only adding to the rot, with failure to end political infighting and squabbling among rival groups competing for power.

General Musharraf makes a valid point when he laments the breakdown under governments which preceded him. He also makes a fair a point when he argues that political power without accountability could lead the way to elected dictatorships.

Across Pakistan, large segments of the public still lament the country's elected and unelected leaders as inherently responsib