Europe must take on challenge in Prague

No doubt the upcoming enlargement is an unprecedented moment in the history of the transatlantic alliance. Not only is this the largest single enlargement in the making - Nato will most likely accept seven new members, including the three Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia - but a few existential questions regarding the alliance need addressing as well.

Namely, given that threats these days to Washington and Paris, to Budapest and Riga, can come from anywhere, shouldn't Nato be able to stray a little further afield than the Balkans? Say Iraq and beyond?

The Americans certainly think so, and in Prague, they will be the first to ask what should be the role of Nato in Iraq? How the Europeans respond to American's efforts to push Nato into becoming more flexible, lethal, and far reaching in its operations, will largely determine the future of the transatlantic alliance.

With a 15-0 Security Council vote under its belt - which by the way also includes a yes vote from Syria - the U.S. will look to get at least as strong a commitment from its allies in Prague. The pressure is now on Nato to act if its role as an indispensable security club is to be confirmed. Anything short of full support for U.S. pressure on Saddam will raise doubtful eyebrows in Washington.

The truth is, ever since Kosovo, Nato's role as a cornerstone of transatlantic security has come under considerable scrutiny. Particularly in Washington, the top brass harbours a sharp dislike for conducting operations through the joint command and control structure in Brussels.

America argues that the capabilities gap between the allies (with the slight exception of few) is making joint operations a nightmare. Nor is war fighting effective when targets are selected by a committee rather than according to their strategic worth. Not surprisingly then, the U.S. decided to skip Nato altogether in Afghanistan, opting instead for an ad-hoc coalition which served and complemented America's needs to a tee.

Despite the criticism, strikingly little has been done to correct this growing incompatibility. Apart from Britain, and perhaps France, which, under Chirac's rightist government, has boosted military spending, European defence budgets remain well under the two per cent (of GDP) target.

Not to mention Europe's refusal to spend on R&D and speed up the reforms of the continent's anachronistic military doctrines, many of which still rely on conscription. Let's just say that the European rapid-reaction force that England and France have been trying to put together since the St. Malo summit is still mostly on paper for a reason.

About a month or so back, U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld jumped the horse, and proposed Nato form its own rapid-reaction force where Europeans would participate along side Americans in some of the most lethal and sophisticated operations.

In this regard, Rumsfeld has made American needs as far as Nato is concerned crystal clear. His emphasis is on mobility, flexibility, rapid-response, and high-tech warfare. In a way, his proposal in Brussels carries a similar pitch to his reform efforts at the Pentagon.

Further, Rumsfeld's proposal sounds an awful lot like a last chance for Europe to prove its commitment to military reform. If they ditch, Washington will certainly call it quits on Nato - the Americans will still show up to the after-party, but Nato's relevance in the eyes of Washington will depreciate to that of another multilateral debate club worth circumventing.

But before Europe and America can start building a joint force, Europe first needs the appetite to be a full-fledged international actor.

As far as Washington is concerned, Europeans have to demonstrate that they can deal with the rapidly changing security parameters, and that their understanding of the danger stemming from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and tyrannical regimes is inclusive. What then the Europeans will have to say in Prague with regards to Iraq matters. It will show Washington whether the two sides of the Atlantic are on the same page.

Thus far, Britain and France have been the most forthcoming on the issue. Albeit in distinct formats, both managed to demonstrate over the weeks their individual commitment to playing a recognisable and constructive role on the global security stage. The French president has been particularly forthcoming - at times almost neurotic - in re-establishing France's international grandeur.

But others have been ambiguously missing from the debate: spare Germany, whose Chancellor has decided he wants no part in the Iraqi "adventure," and Italy, where Berlusconi is willing to do and say just about anything that can score him brownie points in Washington.

Although Berlin is now desperately trying to mend fences with Washington, Germany's stumbling economy and Schroeder's depleted coffers promise little as far as Germany's international role is concerned. It is far more likely that Germany will continue feeling uneasy at the thought of engagement beyond the continent.

A military dynamic and strategically outward looking Nato is also very unpopular amongst some of the smaller EU members, who even seem unwilling to cough-up the troops needed for keeping the Balkans in relative tranquillity. Don't expect them to say much on Thursday.

As for the former communist members (and soon to be members), few are keen on seeing Nato engage in Iraq. Let alone be asked to play a role. Countries like Slovenia are having enough trouble just convincing their population that Nato membership is in their national interest.

The fear that their population may turn sour towards the idea if their soldiers start returning from Iraq in body-bags will keep most of the invitees in hiding when Washington confronts the alliance on Iraq. With the exception of a few, the newcomers are far from ready - at least their constituencies aren't - or capable to assume the global role Washington is envisioning for Nato. However, for what it's worth, their political support for Washington is a sure thing.

As last minute preparations are made just ahead of the Prague summit, Europeans would do well to think about how they will respond to Washington's determination to transform Nato into an alliance dedicated to security for the 21st Century. Particularly as this will likely move Nato into the realm of pre-emptive action far-afield.

However, a lukewarm declaration on Iraq in Prague will confirm what many in Washington have been arguing for some time now: that Nato is becoming increasingly obstructionist to U.S. security building efforts.

With so much hanging in the balance, renewed European dithering could make Prague go down in history as the summit that buried, not enlarged and strengthened, Nato. Still there is a glimmer of hope. With sirens warning of possible large-scale terrorist attacks on the Old Continent, the Europeans just may transcend their wimpish ways and step-up to the challenge even in time for Prague. But time is not on their side.

Borut Grgic is a political analyst based at the School of International Service in Washington D.C. and a former researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.