Brash hawks eye another country

At an NSC meeting following the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, asked: "Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just Al Qaida?"

Flanked by Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defence Secretary, Richard Perle, a Pentagon advisor, and Dick Chaney, U.S. Vice-President, Rumsfeld eventually succeeded in convincing President George W. Bush that the threat to the U.S. posed by Saddam Hussain was intolerable.

The argument was that Saddam's Iraq had demonstrated enough pariah behaviour not to be trusted, had links with terrorists, and was producing weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately for Rumsfeld, this proved enough to sell Bush and the American public on Saddam, and enough to begin pressuring Europe and the rest of the world into supporting America's stance on Iraq.

The same cycle is now repeating. About two weeks ago, Rumsfeld issued a warning to Syria for alleged shipment of military equipment into Iraq, including night-vision goggles.

"These deliveries pose a direct threat to the lives of coalition forces. We consider such trafficking as hostile acts and will hold the Syrian government accountable for such shipments."

A few days back speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Wolfowitz accused Syria of "behaving badly".

"We need to think about what our policy is with respect to a country that harbours terrorists or harbours war criminals, or was recently shipping things to Iraq."

And finally, in an interview with editors of the International Herald Tribune, Perle warned that the U.S. would be compelled to act if it discovered that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have been concealed in Syria. "I don't think that anyone would rule out the use of any of our full range of capabilities."

Deja-vu anyone? It certainly seems so. The principal components are all there; the arguments are the same as those made against Iraq, as are the individuals making them.

The general framework being put-together seems to be saying: Syria, like Iraq, is an international pariah; it, like Iraq, is a state sponsoring terrorism; it, like Iraq, is intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction; and it, like Iraq, will be confronted.

Thanks in large part to a nation-wide feeling that America today faces new threats from international terrorism, and the media's newly found objective of keeping America in a perpetual state of hysteria, the hawkish neo-conservative trio should have no problems selling Syria as the next peril.

It seems Bush is already on their side. This weekend he issued a warning to Syria. "We believe there are chemical weapons in Syria. The Syrian government needs to cooperate with the U.S. and our coalition partners." To this let's also add that recent developments in Iraq are making Washington's hawks intolerably brash in managing international relations. In a recent article for the Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer wrote that "from Damascus to Pyongyang, totalitarians everywhere are watching this [Iraqi] war with shock and awe".

Such arrogance and obsession with confrontation is awful, as well as dangerous for stability at large. Europe must speak-up. It has a good case to its name and a role to play here.

Every authoritarian system does not carry the same degree of threat or imminence. The threat and imminence arise from regimes that are hermetic – those that do not yield themselves to any internal or external checks and balances and not from the fact that they are authoritarian by nature.

Even the U.S. can and does tolerate authoritarian regimes. Just consider its relationships with Pakistan, UAE, and Jordan. However, unlike Saddam's totalitarian posture, these regimes are tied to enough internal and external checks and balances that it makes them predictable. Predictability diminishes risk. In this sense, Syria is not Iraq; the risk associated with the regime in Damascus is simply not on par with the risk represented by Saddam.

Unlike Saddam, Bashar Al Assad is vulnerable to pressure, and does not head a hermetic regime. Europe maintains a vibrant dialogue with Syria, and American intelligence has access to Syrian data thanks to improved cooperation following the September 11, 2001, incidents.

Europe could certainly position itself as a bridge between Syria and the U.S. in order to keep the two talking and the dialogue moving.

First however, it must immediately adopt a unified position that will be perceived by both disputants as impartial. This is possible.

On his part, Jack Straw has already distanced Britain from the tough U.S. stance, when he said that Britain would have "nothing whatever" to do with military action against Syria. Second, there is consensus in Europe that Syria – like Iran – should be dealt with through dialogue.

A common front on Syria would surely do well to repair the battered image of European CFSP. It would even provide the right spring-board to begin drafting a long-term strategy on dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

If however, Europe chokes for the second time, it will not only be pushed out permanently from playing any serious role in the Middle East, but will also succeed in burying the transatlantic relationship forever.

After all, there is little yield in a partner that can't act.


Borut Grgic is an advisor on transatlantic issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. He is also an affiliate of Washington's School of International Service. Views expressed here are his own.