A panel of experts discusses the immediate future of the troubled country. There are very few flickers of hope that can be identified.
Mary Dejevsky: How can Kiev retrieve lost territory without force?
This is undoubtedly the most dangerous situation since the Ukraine crisis began last November. If Ukraine is to remain one country, the interim government in Kiev cannot allow the mainly Russian-speaking east to slip out of its control. But the truth is it already has, and it is hard to see how Kiev can retrieve the lost territory without the use of force on a scale that would be hard to contain — and that the precarious Kiev government may not even have. The risk of civil war is compounded by the starkly divergent versions of the truth believed by different communities in Ukraine, by most Russians, and many in the West. All understand that the Ukrainian state is in peril, but they differ in almost every respect on how, why and what to do about it. For all the accusations flying to and fro, very few flickers of hope might be identified. First, President Vladimir Putin has said several times on the record that Russia has no plan to intervene in eastern Ukraine. If there is serious disorder that could change, but taking eastern Ukraine is a whole different prospect from Crimea.
Second, it was Russia, not any Western country, that called Sunday’s emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, which suggests it wants whatever happens next to have international legitimacy. The West should take this seriously and not assume, as Washington appears to do, that Russia intends to invade.
Third, the snipers that caused such carnage in Kiev six weeks ago were an exception; Ukrainians have shown little appetite for firing on fellow Ukrainians.
A UN or EU route, ideally in coordination, should provide for neutral monitors to be sent within 24 hours to guarantee eastern Ukraine’s border with Russia.
Both Moscow and Kiev should undertake not to move any troops in the run-up to next month’s presidential election. Ensuring the conditions for this election to take place should be the priority on which all parties agree.
Mary Dejevsky is a former foreign correspondent in Moscow, Paris and Washington.
Martin Woollacott: Serious violence is not what either side wants
Nobody knows what Vladimir Putin will do next in Ukraine, and that includes the Russian leader himself. He will have a variety of possible objectives in mind and be ready to switch from one to another as events dictate. But it is fairly easy to see what he would regard as the best outcome, which is to have substantial influence in a united Ukraine. That would be far better, from his point of view, than the annexation of the Russian speaking regions. The price of annexation would be huge, starting with the definitive alienation of Western Ukraine; the burden of administering a run-down region whose discontents, at present focused on Kiev, could soon be aimed at Moscow; and the further political and economic costs of the rupture with the United States and the EU which would be an inevitable consequence.
The same would apply, to a lesser degree, to an outcome in which Russia, while notionally accepting Ukrainian sovereignty, covertly controlled parts of that country. Such control would be clumsy and expensive and involve a new shadow frontier with Western Ukraine that could be a continued source of unwanted, as opposed to manipulated, troubles.
This is why the extreme interpretation of Russia’s emphasis on new federal arrangements, which is that they would facilitate Russian control of the east, is almost certainly wrong.
Much more likely is that Russia sees them as a base for influence in Kiev, with the expectation that, as things settle down, Ukrainian politics will soon offer opportunities for Moscow to be an important player in that capital, as it has always been in the past; perhaps, in time, to be the dominant player.
The icing on the cake from Moscow’s point of view is that the new Ukraine would be in receipt of considerable economic aid from Western countries instead of being, as it would have been had former president Viktor Yanukovych’s deal with Putin not been discarded, exclusively a charge on Russia. The interim government in Kiev is bound to be aware of Moscow’s likely preferences, which is why the brinkmanship in which both sides are indulging is not to be taken at absolute face value.
This does not mean it could not tip over into serious violence which could lead to Russian intervention, but that would be by accident rather than design — it is not what either side wants. The battle now is over the terms of the constitution which is due to be announced in a few days, whether that constitution should be validated in a referendum, and who emerges as the winner in the presidential elections on May 25. Beyond that the prospect is of a long period of political competition over the allegiance of Ukrainians, which could take years to play out.
Martin Woollacott is a former foreign correspondent and editor for the Guardian.
Keir Giles: Military assault on Ukraine will be counter-productive
There is no doubt that Russia has put preparations in place for using military force against Ukraine. Plans for military action are consistent with Russian military doctrine, which emphasises the danger of instability along Russia’s borders (even if that instability is fomented by Russia itself). They are also essential in the context of the Russian narrative for domestic consumption, while Russian media continue to tell stories of the rights and lives of Russians in Ukraine being in danger because of the “fascist coup” in Kiev.
But full-scale military intervention may not be necessary. Direct action against the Ukrainian military, now fully prepared, would have a far less predictable outcome than the Crimea operation. What is more, even if a military assault on Ukraine were swiftly successful, it would be counter-productive in the longer term — because it would prove beyond doubt to the rest of Europe that it is time to reverse the long decline in defence spending and restart investment in ensuring the future security of the continent from Russia. Prompting Europe’s Nato members once again to take an interest in defending themselves will not be on the Kremlin’s list of desired outcomes. Putin’s overall objective, of effective control of Ukraine by rendering the country ungovernable without Russian consent, can be met in a number of ways which stop short of an invasion.
Ensuring that Ukraine is kept off balance and maintaining an image of chronic instability in the east of the country may be sufficient to meet this long-term aim.
Keir Giles is an associate fellow on the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.
Tim Cross: We should be very worried
The reasons behind the annexation of Crimea and the pressure now being applied to much of eastern Ukraine are many and varied, but the simple reality is that Russia has used force to militarily occupy a significant and strategic portion of a neighbouring sovereign state, and it is not going to stop there. We should be very worried. Once military force is applied, events can all too easily run away with themselves.
Ukraine reflects a strategic power struggle between Russia and the West, a struggle that has a potentially crucial impact on Moscow’s Western and southern borders. This is about history and strategy; about great power spheres of influence, and about the strategic failure of the West to understand that Russia could not — and would not — stand by and watch EU and Nato enlargement encroaching ever closer. Putin has managed to destabilise every former Soviet republic and greatly damage the strategic credibility of the West — of which Nato is a central pillar. He has split Nato. Central and eastern European members are rightly alarmed by the invasion while Western Europe is fast rationalising Russia’s action away.
Crimea is gone; eastern Ukraine could well be next — the Ukrainian military could do little to stop it. And the Baltic states are right to be concerned that they could well follow. Giambattista Vico famously argued that all states were subject to a law of rise and decline. They are born in austerity; they rise in affluence and power; then they become decadent and eventually decline.
The rapid shift in the military balance of power away from the democracies is but a reflection of the latter half of that assertion. While Russia is investing some $700 billion (Dh2.57 trillion) in a new military by 2020, Western Europe continues to struggle to maintain defence budgets of just 2 per cent of GDP. If deterrence, Article 5 and collective defence mean anything then Nato has to move quickly — placing military capability in the Baltic states and reassessing what capabilities are needed elsewhere.
If the West is not careful, Russia will shape the future realities — and they will not be pleasant.
Major-General Tim Cross is a former British army officer and military logistics expert.
— Guardian News & Media Ltd
