In July 2012, rebel columns marched into Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city and millennia-old economic capital. Less than a month before, the United States and Russia, joined by other international and regional powers, agreed to the Geneva Communique, which called for a political solution to the crisis in Syria by way of dialogue and elections.
Despite their seemingly unstoppable drive, opposition forces failed to overrun the entire city and government forces remained entrenched in the western neighbourhoods of Aleppo. In the halls of international diplomacy, little was done to advance ‘Geneva I’, and the powers that brokered the formula became immersed in a vicious war by proxy on Syrian soil.
Four years on, the tides in Aleppo turned dramatically, and so did the regional setting and the international diplomatic scene. Russia put its full military might behind its allies in Damascus, and the Syrian Army was able to encircle opposition forces in the eastern parts of Aleppo. The United States agreed to plan for military cooperation and intelligence sharing with Russia in Syria, after refusing to do so for months on end. Turkey’s Erdogan, having survived a botched coup attempt, seems to be making a critical U-turn on Syria that might lead to dramatic shifts on the battlefield.
These monumental events will in the coming days, shift the attention of both Russia and the United States away from the fight against Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in east and north Syria, and into the raging battlefields of Aleppo and Idleb in the west. This shift will create an unparalleled opening for a political solution in Syria, and set the stage for a more serious united effort against Daesh in the future. There remains, however, one crucial caveat. How do Ahrar Al Sham and other Islamist factions, allied to Al Nusra Front, fit into the larger picture? Especially now that Al Nusra has severed its ties with the Al Qaida mothership, rebranding itself as ‘Jabhat Fatah Al Sham’.
The Syrian Army’s advance in Aleppo has proved that the notion of either militarily overthrowing, or even pressuring the Syrian government into political submission has become a costly and fruitless endeavour. In the spring, and despite the Russian-America brokered truce, fighting opposition factions sought to enhance the negotiating position of its representatives in Geneva by launching a massive offensive in southern Aleppo, followed by another in northern Lattakia. This strategy has badly backfired. Not only did government forces absorb the attack, it launched its own offensive and successfully encircled opposition forces in what was once their largest controlled urban centre. Following the military victory in Aleppo, the government unsurprisingly welcomed a return to the UN-mediated talks in Geneva.
The Obama administration seems to be having a change of hearts over cooperation with Russia in Syria. Beyond the Syrian government proving itself a staying force, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) seem unable to carry the burden of fighting Daesh alone, and other “vetted” opposition groups have failed to make the slightest advance against the terror group. Two months into the battle of Manbij, the SDF is caught in a vicious and costly urban battle against well-entrenched Daesh fighters. Hopes of a swift victory and a simultaneous march on Daesh’s capital Al Raqqah were quickly dashed.
The situation was further complicated following the failed coup in Turkey, which disrupted key air support to the forces fighting Daesh from the US base in Incirlik. It seems that the Obama administration came to realise that there is no alternative to cooperating with Russia and its Syrian allies if it wants to achieve any meaningful breakthrough against Daesh in Syria, and set the ground for more fruitful campaigning in the future, especially for a successor Democratic administration.
The bargain on the table seems fairly simple. Both powers need to apply pressure on all sides to come back to the negotiating table. Russia is not averse to seeing the opposition get a piece of the cake by way of political negotiations, while the United States is no longer asking for a fundamental political change in Damascus as a pre-condition for any negotiations. But leaving the political track for the Syrians to figure out is the easier part of the deal.
Russia will certainly demand a clear American position on Syrian Islamist groups operating in both Aleppo and Idleb, especially Ahrar Al Sham, and perhaps a green light to escalate the strikes against them. US Secretary of State John Kerry has stated back in May that all groups refusing to cut ties with Al Qaida’s Jabhat Al Nusra are a legitimate target. The American stake in eastern Syria, on the borders with Iraq, is by far more important than any commitment it has in western Syria. Therefore, the recent announcement on cooperation with Russia against Al Nusra might signal a near America acquiescence to Russian actions in western Syria in favour of bigger cooperation east of the Euphrates. If the United States does follow through, even without actively participating in any campaign against Al Nusra and its allies, it would be crossing a crucial psychological Rubicon, especially since many US-armed groups operate in the same area alongside Ahrar, and even Al Nusra.
It is because of this crucial juncture that Al Nusra finally decided to cut ties with Al Qaida. Pressures from other groups sharing the trench lines with Al Nusra is the main motive behind such a move, and definitely not an ideological change of hearts. Two days following their rebranding as ‘Jabhat Fatah Al Sham’, elements from Al Nusra, including several suicide bombers, are spearheading an opposition offensive to break the government tight grip around Aleppo. The coming days will show whether such a gimmick would affect the proposed Russian-American cooperation. But so far, both United States and Russia continue categorising Al Nusra, regardless of any rebranding effort, as a terrorist organisation.
Last but not least, the failed coup in Turkey might accelerate developments in western Syria to the benefit of Russia above all. Erdogan has squarely blamed the coup on US-backed elements, and his rapprochement with Putin seems well under way. He was once the biggest supporter of all rebel groups in Syria, especially Islamist ones, and he stood vociferously against the Russian-American brokered truce. Now, Erdogan is not only keeping strangely silent about developments in Aleppo, his foreign minister went as far as suggesting that the Turkish President might discuss joining efforts with Russia against Daesh and Al Nusra in Syria when meeting his Russian counterpart in Moscow this month.
If a Russian-American entente emerges in Syria, followed by a serious Turkish-Russian rapprochement, the Islamist factions dominating northwestern Syria will be vulnerable to an unmitigated military defeat within the coming weeks. Such developments might soon bring about a serious political effort that might see the Syrian government and opposition back on the negotiating table and perhaps reaching the long-awaited middle solution.
Fadi Esber is a research associate at the Damascus History Foundation, an online project aimed at collecting and protecting the endangered archives of the Syrian capital.
